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I. INTRODUCTION
The trails of history are rarely as perversely scrambled as in that violently contested
pivotal zone linking the Libyan desert with Chadian Tibesti: to the complexity of
the forces that fashioned this space.., is added the temptation to call the facts into
play in one sense or another according to the preferences of the observer, the
pressures of the event of the moment, [and] the ideological purpose.'
In August 1987, the armed forces of Chad swept across vast stretches of
desert in a series of lightning strikes that shattered an occupying Libyan army
and drove it from the northern third of Chad. This operation briefly captured
the Aouzou Strip, an obscure piece of territory in the northernmost part of the
area, but Libyan forces recaptured it shortly afterward in a campaign marked
by unusually heavy and intense fighting. Although the two states agreed to a
cease-fire the following month, they have continued to dispute title to the
territory, and in September 1990, they brought the matter to the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J. or Court).
The Aouzou Strip runs along the border between Libya and Chad for a
distance of some six hundred miles, varying in width between fifty and ninety
miles. Although roughly the size of Scotland, it has a population of only a few
thousand and contains some of the most barren land on the face of the earth.
1. Ren6 Lemarchand, A propos du Tchad: la face nord face a l'histoire, 12 MAGHREB REV. 18, 18
(1987) [hereinafter Lemarchand, A propos du Tchadj.
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Why, then, have Chad and Libya fought so bitterly for its possession? Some
commentators have suggested that the two countries really seek to control the
area's reportedly vast mineral wealth, particularly the uranium deposits be-
lieved to lie there. Although that explanation may capture some of the reasons
for the dispute, it is incomplete. If the dispute concerned only access to
resources, Libya and Chad might have negotiated a settlement. Furthermore,
Libya has displayed an interest in the area since its independence, before
geologists even suspected the possibility of mineral deposits in the region.
A better explanation for the persistence of the dispute looks to the parties'
beliefs. Each state genuinely believes that it owns the Aouzou Strip. The
predecessors of Libya and Chad in the area put forth competing claims to the
Aouzou Strip at least as early as 1890, and those claims reverberate in the
arguments of Libya and Chad today. Each feels strongly that the disputed land
forms, and throughout history has formed, an integral part of its national
territory and its national identity. This makes the dispute as much a matter of
principle as a matter of land. Because each state links the territory to its
national identity, neither state will compromise its claim.
Chad, as a former French colony and thus the successor of France, claims
title to the area through a combination of French occupation and a series of
international treaties that recognize France's rights to the area. France adminis-
tered the Aouzou Strip as part of French Equatorial Africa, the colonial entity
from which Chad emerged at its independence in 1960. Chad also invokes a
1955 treaty between France and Libya in which Libya accepted the boundary
Chad now claims. Consequently, the boundary that Chad claims is the bound-
ary to which it acceded at its independence.
Libya asserts title to the Aouzou Strip as a result of the historical interac-
tion between the people of the area and Libya. In particular, the Libyans feel
that since the Ottoman period and even before it, the Aouzou Strip area has
been joined with Libya in one cohesive entity-the Islamic state. This state
created political structures that addressed the physical realities of the North
African milieu. Because the great distances involved made effective political
control of the interior difficult, the system based sovereignty on the recognition
of "some overriding hegemony, based on religious or cultural associations." 2
"The crucial feature of the precolonial situation was that political authority was
expressed through communal links. "' The intensity of that authority depended
on tradition, geographic location, and political relationships.4
2. George Joff6, Frontiers in North Africa, in BOUNDARIES AND STATE TERRITORY IN THE MmDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 24, 27 (G.H. Blake and R.N. Schofield eds., 1987); see also ABDOUL BA ET
AL.., L'ORGANSATION DE L'UNrrA AFRiCAINE 122 (1984).
3. Joff6, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that precolonial African concept of boundary was flexible and
mobile, following populations; territory viewed as "the territory of the ethnic group ... an ethnic property,
cultivated, exploited by families and not individuals").
4. Id. at 26.









Map 1: The Aouzou Strip




Libya asserts that the people of the area have always enjoyed close ties to
Libya and that Libyans have always perceived the Aouzou Strip area as part
of Libya. During the Ottoman period, particularly in its waning years, the
authorities in Tripoli took several measures to strengthen their ties to the
region. The area also came under the influence of the Sanusiya, a Muslim
religious brotherhood based in the Libyan province of Cyrenaica.
Each state thus has valid reasons to believe that the Aouzou Strip has
historically formed an essential part of its national territory. But how can the
same territory have belonged to two different states at the same time? This
question highlights fundamental conflicts that underlie many of the boundary
disputes in Africa today. Libya invokes the precolonial status quo as a basis
for tile, arguing that the Aouzou Strip should revert to its possessor at the
moment of European colonization. Chad bases its claims on the possession of
the colonial state, France. The dispute thus pits the norm of decolonization,
enshrined in several United Nations resolutions, against the principle of uti
possidetis (from the Latin phrase Uti possidetis, Ita possidetis, meaning "as
you possess, so you may possess"), a doctrine that arose from the practice of
states and that has been enshrined in fundamental documents of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity.
The dispute also draws attention to the tension between two competing
concepts of sovereignty. Chad bases its claims on traditional Western theories
of sovereignty. It argues that France's occupation occurred in a region where
no state possessed prior sovereign rights, that France exercised sovereignty
to a degree sufficient to confer title, and that the actions of the Ottoman
Empire and the Sanusi did not satisfy the traditional test of sovereignty because
they did not display sufficient state authority over the region.
Libya can be expected to argue to the I.C.J. that the Western concept of
sovereignty arose in a political system completely different from that prevailing
in the Sahara, and that the attempt to apply those Western notions to the Sahara
and the actions of the Turks there is inappropriate and invalid. Libya will, in
all likelihood, urge the Court to consider and apply the notion of sovereignty
that prevailed in the Sahara and to take account of the methods by which the
Ottoman state displayed authority over peoples-methods that differed greatly
from those used by Europeans. The I.C.J. essentially rejected these arguments
in the famous Western Sahara case,5 in which Morocco based its claim on
such arguments, in favor of the traditional Western notion of sovereignty. The
Libyan claims will give the Court the opportunity to reconsider that holding.
Consequently, the Aouzou Strip dispute has a significance for Africa that
is out of all proportion to the importance of the territory itself. The case
squarely presents the Court with a clash of several legal principles. Will the
5. Westem Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
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Court recognize the African practice of resorting to uti possidetis instead of
the decolonization norm? Will it confirm its precedent favoring the application
of the Western, rather than indigenous, notions of sovereignty?
The present system has produced stability in African boundaries. It has
failed, however, to satisfy genuine beliefs of title, such as Libya's, that rest
on notions of sovereignty that Western law traditionally has not appreciated
or accommodated. Consequently, the manner in which the Court resolves this
conflict will have potentially far-reaching implications for Africa and for
boundary law in general.
The nature of the territory and its inhabitants further complicates the
dispute by raising the question whether a non-arbitrary boundary can even be
drawn. The terrain of North Africa does not lend itself easily to rigid bound-
aries, and the populations living there have no notion of geographical lines
separating peoples. The concept of a boundary is "borrowed from the mental
universe of the West."6 Such a notion, with its connotations of certitude and
definiteness, is "completely foreign" to the Sahara, "an area where the needs
of commerce, transhumance, raids and nomadization [are] largely incompatible
with the notion of a boundary."' In fact, the semi-nomadic inhabitants of the
Aouzou Strip, the Toubous, occupy a much larger area that stretches well to
the north of the disputed territory into Libya and well to the south into Chad.
No boundary could keep the Toubous together without tearing enormous areas
from either Libya or Chad.
The Libyan arguments further call into question the feasibility of a fixed
boundary in this case. The enormous distances and the barrenness of the land
will support only nomadic societies. Political control has been "correspondingly
punctiform and, with increasing distance from the centres of political power
... , ineffective. "' The system of political organization that arose in response
to these conditions predicated sovereignty on control over people, not territory.
The limits of a state were not clearly defined or marked, but fluctuated accord-
ing to the movements of the people owing allegiance to the sovereign.9 Conse-
quently, if Libya relies on arguments based on historical ties alone, it may not
be able to claim a definite boundary.
Straight lines drawn between geographical coordinates, such as those that
define the Aouzou Strip, obviously did not arise from the vague process of
historical interaction between peoples. In fact, international agreements from
the colonial era set the outlines of the territory. The northern line, claimed by
Chad, derives from later interpretations of an 1899 declaration between Great
6. Lemarchand, A propos du Tchad, supra note 1, at 20.
7. Id
8. Joffd, supra note 2, at 26.




Britain and France. The southern line, claimed by Libya, arises from the 1935
Mussolini-Laval Accords between France and Italy.
Libya has invoked this latter agreement in the past to support its claims to
the area, but relying on a treaty between two colonialist European states as a
basis for a boundary seems inconsistent with its claims based on historical ties.
The dispute presently before the I.C.J., however, does not specifically ask the
Court to decide the ownership of the Aouzou Strip. Such a request would force
the Court to decide a narrow question: which version of the boundary do the
law and facts better support? Instead, the Application asks the Court to deter-
mine the course of the boundary between the two states. Such a broad request
leaves the parties free to claim almost any boundary line and to advance any
arguments they wish.
As a result of the nature of their Application to the Court, either party
could invoke the norm of self-determination. Resolving the case under this
principle would allow the inhabitants of the area to decide whether they want
to be a part of either state or form their own state. Such a resolution would
render the complicated legal and historical arguments irrelevant and would
make the fate of the Aouzou Strip a matter for political, not judicial, settle-
ment.
The principle of self-determination would do more than render legal
arguments irrelevant. It would call into question the right of the I.C.J. to
determine title to the Aouzou Strip at all. The Toubous, who form a homoge-
neous ethnic and cultural unit, have historically been isolated in their desert
habitat and have displayed a strong spirit of independence. They have firmly
resisted any exercise of sovereignty and authority, both from within their own
society and from outside powers. In the past thirty years they have rebelled
against domination by the ethnic groups of southern Chad and have fought
against Libyan occupying forces. Thus, if they were asked to which state they
preferred to belong, they might well answer "neither." In that case, the I.C.J.
could not assign the Aouzou Strip to either Libya or Chad without violating
the Toubous' right to self-determination.
However, the case has come before the I.C.J. in a way that does not permit
the Court to avoid such an injustice. Libya and Chad agreed to have the Court
adjudicate their claims and only their claims. The Toubous have not been
consulted, and because they have no standing to appear before the Court, they
cannot present their arguments. The case thus excludes the real party in interest
from any effective role in its resolution. 10
10. The same difficulty arose in the 1953 Minquiers and Ecrehos case, in which France and the United
Kingdom asked the I.C.J. to decide which one of them possessed sovereignty over certain rocks and islets
in the English Channel. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 53 (Nov. 17). Because the
parties framed the issue as a choice between the two of them, they precluded the Court from considering
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This article analyzes the Aouzou Strip dispute from several perspectives.
Part II briefly describes the disputed area and its inhabitants. Part III examines
the history of the area, especially the crucial period between 1900 and 1914
when France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Sanusi struggled to establish
control over northern Chad. Part IV discusses the bodies of law upon which
the parties may draw in framing their arguments. Part V analyzes the potential
arguments for each side. Finally, Part VI concludes that Chad's arguments
have the most support under current international law.
II. THE Aouzou STRIP AND ITS INHABITANTS
A. The Geography of the Area
The Aouzou Strip comprises approximately 42,000 square miles" of
barren and arid land. It runs east by southeast for six hundred miles, from the
eastern boundary of Niger to the western boundary of Sudan, at the twenty-
fourth meridian of east longitude. It attains its greatest width, ninety miles,
at the eighteenth meridian and tapers to approximately fifty miles at either
end. 12
Site of "some of the world's wildest scenery,"' 3 the Aouzou Strip is the
northernmost part of the Chadian prefecture ofBorku-Ennedi-Tibesti (B.E.T.),
a vast desert region. B.E.T. contains forty-seven percent of Chad's area but
only eighty thousand inhabitants, less than three percent of the Chadian
population.' 4 Only a few thousand of these inhabitants, almost all belonging
to various clans of the largely nomadic Toubou people, live in the Aouzou
Strip itself.
B.E.T. contains the three subprefectures of (from west to east) Tibesti,
Borku, and Ennedi. Tibesti is bordered to the north by Fazzan, a desert region
of Libya; to the west by Bornu, in Niger; and to the south by the Chadian
prefecture of Kanem, on the northern and eastern shores of Lake Chad. To
the north of Borku and Ennedi lies more desert, with the oasis of Kufrah some
300 miles north of the Aouzou Strip; south of Borku is the prefecture of Batha;
and south of Ennedi are Biltine and Ouadai, bordering on Darfur in Sudan.
whether the islets belonged to any other state, or to no state at all.
11. The figure is based on an estimate of 110,000 square kilometers. See BERNARD LANNE, TcHAD-
LIBYE: LA QUERELLE DES FRONTItRES 151 (1982); Elio Comarin, Tchad-Libye: A qui appartient la bande
d'Aouzou?, JEUNE AFRiQUE, Sept. 11, 1989, at 4, 4. Other estimates put the size of the disputed area at
37,000 square miles, approximately the size of Scotland. Peter Kellner, Gadda, Grabs Land in Uranium
Hunt, SUNDAY Tams (London), Sept. 7, 1975, at 1.
12. These measurements are derived from IAN BROWNUE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND
DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 122 (1979).
13. SAMUEL DECALO, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CHAD 77 (2d ed. 1987).
14. Id. at xxiii, 76.
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Map 2: Map of the Toubou World
WALTER CLINE, THE TEDA OF TIBESTI, BoRKu AND KAWAR IN THE EASTERN SAHARA 6 (Gen. Ser.
in Anthro. No. 12, 1950) (reprinted with permission).
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The western part of the Aouzou Strip encompasses the northern edge of
the Tibesti massif, a mountainous region of basaltic rock that covers twice the
area of the Pyrenees and has an average altitude of 6000 feet, with peaks as
high as 11,000 feet. To the southwest, south, and east, the massif tapers
gradually, but in the north it ends more abruptly. The terrain is extremely
uneven, marked by long, deep valleys, ravines, craters, and plateaus. The area
contains a number of wells, springs, and small oases.15 Although some of the
massif lies within the Aouzou Strip, and a small part of it juts into Libya, most
of it is undisputed Chadian territory. To the north of the massif stretches a vast
flat, sandy plain, the Serir Tibesti. 6 North of the Aouzou Strip the Libyan
desert extends to the oases of al-Qatrun and Marzuq.
Immediately south and east of the massif lies Borku, a region characterized
by gravelly outcrops, sandy and eroded plateaus, and a generally "chaotic"
landscape17 whose barren aridity is broken by small lakes and by two lines
of oases meeting at a right angle at Ain Galakka. The first line runs east by
southeast approximately forty-six miles to Faya-Largeau, the capital of B.E.T.;
the other runs northeast along the southeast edge of the Tibesti massif.18 To
the west and northwest, as it approaches the massif, the land becomes harsher
and more dry, ascending gradually in a series of enormous, flat plains of hard
sand (regs) incapable of supporting human life. 19 The more fertile southern
regions of Borku, particularly Mortcha, Djourab, and Egueli, the so-called
"Netherlands of Chad," contain pastures where numerous Toubou tribes drive
their flocks during part of each year.2"
Southeast of Borku is Ennedi, containing the eastern edge of the Aouzou
Strip. The Ennedi massif, smaller and lower than the Tibesti massif, comprises
two plateaus separated by valleys running east and west. Especially in the
north, the terrain has been sculpted by erosion, leaving a jumble of gorges,
corridors, grottoes, and small plateaus (erdis).2  The south of Ennedi is a
15. JEAN CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS DU SAHARA: LES TOUBOUS 41, 67-69 (1957) [hereinafter
CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS]; E.-F. GAUTIER, SAHARA: THE GREAT DESERT 161-62 (Dorothy Ford
Mayhew trans., 1935).
16. See ARrrro Dasio, IL TiBEsTi NoRD-ORmENTM.AE 96 bis, 102-07 (1942); GAUTIER, supra note
15, at 62, 103.
17. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 118.
18. LT. JEAN FRRARNI, LE CENTRE-AFRicAIN ERANqAIS 100-01 (1930); see also CHAPELLE,
NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 121-22; WALTER CLINE, THE TEDA OF TiBEsTi, BoRKU AND KAWAR
IN THE EASTERN SAHARA 26 (General Series in Anthropology No. 12, 1950).
19. CHAPELLE, NoMAnEs NOiRS, supra note 15, at 118; ALBERT LERouvREUR, SAHkLIENS ET
SAHARIENS DU TCHAD 11 (1962); see also GAUTIER, supra note 15, at 39.
20. CLIN, supra note 18, at 32; GAUTIER, supra note 15, at 166.
21. GAUTIER, supra note 15, at 161-64; see also FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 205-06; LERouVitEUR,
supra note 19, at 30-31. For an excellent description of the geography of Borku and Ennedi, see Lt. Jean
Ferrandi, Les oasis et les nomades du Sahara oriental, RENSEIGNEMENTS CoLONIAUX, Jan. 1910, at 3,
3-8 [hereinafter Ferrandi, Les oasis et les nomades].
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sahelian 2 region, receiving regular if modest precipitation. Almost no rain
falls beyond the huge Depression of Mourdi in the north, where a succession
of smaller plateaus, the Erdis, rise above arid lands reaching to the Libyan
desert, which extends from there as far as Kufrah.'
The Aouzou Strip thus consists generally of extremely dry, rocky terrain,
interrupted by occasional wells and oases and marked at either end by high
ground. The area is inhospitable, and the vast Libyan regions immediately to
the north are harsher still, utterly lacking in water.24 Yet the Aouzou Strip,
and the lands both north and south of it, support a distinct people: the
Toubous.
B. The Toubous
The semi-nomadic Toubous inhabit an area stretching from Fazzan in Libya
southwest to Bornu in northeastern Niger and southeast to Ennedi. They are
also found in small pockets in regions further south: in Kanem as far as Lake
Chad, and in northern Ouadai.? The Toubous presently migrate throughout
the desert, and the scope of their wandering has varied over time. Despite their
small numbers they have played crucial roles in the region. They have been
described as "a constant and usually malign presence in mid-Sahara, endanger-
ing (yet never wholly severing) the always precarious communications between
the two sides of the central desert. 
26
1. Area of Inhabitation and Origins
Although the Toubous have spread over an enormous area-some 1.7
million square kilometers (653,000 square miles), approximately equal to the
size of Libya27-ninety percent of them live in Chad, and over ninety-five
percent in former French territory.28 Of a Toubou population estimated in
1957 at 195,000, B.E.T. accounted for approximately 46,000,29 while less
22. The sahel is a transitional belt of semiarid grasslands running across North Africa between the
Sahara to the north and the subtropical areas to the south.
23. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 134; FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 205.
24. See Jean Ferrandi, La v~ritg sur l'occupation turque au Borkou, dans le Tibesti et I'Ennedi, 40
BULLETIN DU CoMiTA DE L'AFRIQuE FRANqAisE [B.C.A.F.] 391, 397 (1930) [hereinafter Ferrandi, La
vrite].
25. DEcALO, supra note 13, at 314; see also John Wright, Chad and Libya: Some Historical
Connections, 8 MAGHREB REV. 91 (1983) [hereinafter Wright, Historical Connections]; 1 GUSTAV
NACHTIGAL, SAHARA AND SuDAN 209, 214-15 (Allan G.B. Fisher & Humphrey J. Fisher trans., 1974).
26. JOHN WRIGHT, LIBYA, CHAD AND THE CENTRAL SAHARA 20 (1989) [hereinafter WRIGHT,
CENTRAL SAHARA].
27. Id.
28. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 394.
29. Most estimates for the population of Tibesti fall between eight and twelve thousand, a figure that
has not changed since Gustav Nachtigal visited the area in 1870. See, e.g., LLOYD CABOT BRiGGS, TRIBES
Yale Journal of International Law
than two thousand lived in Libya, either in Kufrah or in the oases of
Fazzan. 0 Within Fazzan the Toubous inhabit primarily the southern oases
of al-Qatrun and Tajarhi.3" Until the seventeenth century the Toubous consti-
tuted a much greater part of the population of the Libyan desert than they do
today; a series of invasions by Arab tribes from the north and then by Ottoman
forces drove them from present Libyan territory.32
While the Toubous have populated the eastern and central Sahara for
centuries, anthropologists have not been able to identify their pre-ninth century
origins. Although they share characteristics with Berber tribes, such as blood
group patterns, 33 the languages of the two peoples do not seem to be relat-
ed. 34 The Toubou language may be linked instead to the Kanuri languages
spoken to the south.35 Some observers, drawing inferences from the appear-
ance of the Toubous, have compared them to Ethiopians.36 Others, using
physical and linguistic evidence, have suggested possible Egyptian origins .3
A fourteenth-century Arab manuscript refers to the Toubous as "people of the
Pharaoh,"3 but this label, coming as late as it did, may refer only to their
religion and not their origins.39
2. Physical and Cultural Traits of the Toubou People
The Toubou physique presents a unique mixture of Caucasian and Negroid
features.'W Whereas other mixed races, such as the Moors or the Tuaregs of
OF THE SAHARA 167 (1960) (estimating 9,000-10,000 Teda in Tibesti); 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at
421-22 (estimating 6,000 Teda in northwest Tibesti and 5,000 in southeast Tibesti); Lt. Rdquin, Les clans
Tedda du 7ibesti (pt. 1), 45 B.C.A.F. 55, 57 (1935) [hereinafter Rdquin 1] (estimating 8,000-10,000 Teda
in Tibesti). But see J. d'Arbaumont, Le 7ibesti de le domaine Teda-Daza, 16 BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT
FONDAMENTALE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE 255, 257 et seq. (1954) (reporting results of 1954 census that,
although probably inaccurate, estimated 6,500 Teda in Tibesti).
30. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 405-06; see also Lemarchand, Apropos du Tchad,
supra note 1, at 20. Approximately 5,500 Toubous lived in Niger. The rest lived in Chad, south of B.E.T.
Id. The current estimated Toubou population of 200,000 is only slightly higher. WRIGHT, CENTRAL
SAHARA, supra note 26, at 20.
31. See LArNE, supra note 11, at 153, 236; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 22. The
Toubous in these areas belong to clans whose primary territory is in B.E.T. See CHAPELLE, NOMADES
NOIRS, supra note 15, at 98-99.
32. See infra notes 181-195 and accompanying text.
33. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 18-19; see also DECALO, supra note 13, at 314;
DESto, supra note 16, at 150 (discussing opinion of one scholar that Toubous are "a branch of the great
Hamitic root closer to the Mediterranean Berbers").
34. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 10; see also BRIGGs, supra note 29, at 168; 1
HENRI CARBou, LA RtGION flu TCHAD ET DU OUADAY 116 (1912).
35. DEcALO, supra note 13, at 314.
36. DEsIo, supra note 16, at 149; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 16.
37. See, e.g., 1 CARBOU, supra note 34, at 116-17; DECALO, supra note 13, at 314.
38. 1 CARBou, supra note 34, at 116.
39. See id. at 117 n.2 (comments of Ren6 Basset). On the origins of the Toubous generally, see PMRR
BECK & GEN. PAUL HuARD, TmEsTI: CARREFOUR DE LA PRtHISTOIRE SAHARIENNE 255-65 (1969),
40. See generally WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 18-19.
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the central Sahara, tend to exhibit considerable physical diversity, Toubou
appearance is surprisingly uniform. This evidence suggests an ancient mix,
with time and isolation smoothing out variations. 4' The typical Toubou has
brown skin, curly hair, and a lanky build, including a shallow chest and
narrow waist and hips.42 The Toubou face most clearly shows traits consid-
ered Caucasian: a long and straight nose, slightly thick lips, a prominent chin,
a high forehead, and large cheekbones.43
The Toubous as a group also display certain personality traits. They are
self-interested and opportunistic, frequently switching sides in a conflict to
adapt to changing circumstances." They are "individualistic, contentious,
resistant to all authority above the family and clan levels. 4 Their strong
sense of honor leads to frequent blood feuds between families and clans.'
Except in times of extreme crisis, this constant factiousness and self-interested
behavior prevents the Toubous from achieving any form of cohesive organiza-
tion. The Toubous lack "a sense of a true racial solidarity" and even "a
political structure distantly comparable to that of a nation. "' Western observ-
ers have deemed them "incapable, not only of cooperating all together in the
execution of a given policy, but even of conceiving such a policy."4
3. Social, Economic, and Political Organization
The Toubous, called Goranes by the Arab populations of Chad,49 form
two main groups, the Teda and the Daza, each of which speaks its own
dialect."0 The Teda inhabit Tibesti, where they are the only Toubou group,
41. See CHAPELLE, NoMADEs NOiRS, supra note 15, at 11.
42. Id. at 11-12; see also DESio, supra note 16, at 149.
43. CHiAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 11; see also BECK & HUARD, supra note 39, at
57-58; BRIOS, supra note 29, at 167-68; 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 209.
44. See CAPEILLE, NOMADES NoiRs, supra note 15, at 17, 19.
45. VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOPF, CONFLICT N CHAD 8 (1981).
46. JEAN CHAPELLE, LE PEUPLE TCHADIEN 167 (1980) [hereinafter CHAPELLE, PEOPLE TcHADiEN];
see also BRiGs, supra note 29, at 172-73.
47. DEslo, supra note 16, at 152.
48. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 38. See generally WRiGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA,
supra note 26, at 19.
49. See FERRANDI, supra note 24, at 112.
50. The Toubous call themselves Tedagada ("those who speak Teda") and Dazagada ("those who speak
Daza"). See DECALO, supra note 13, at 314. Goukouni Oueddei, the rebel leader and then briefly President
of Chad until 1982, is a Teda; Hiss~ne Habr6, the man who overthrew him and governed Chad until
deposed in November 1990, is a Daza. See Ren6 Lemarchand, The Case of Chad, in THE GREEN AND THE
BLACK: QADHAFI's POLICIES IN AFRICA 106, 116 (Ren6 Lemarchand ed., 1988) [hereinafter Lemarchand,
The Case]; see also Comarin, supra note 11, at 5; Charles Lambelin, Long Duel in Chadian Sun Tilts
Toward Habrd, Reuters, Nov. 19, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; THOMPSON &
ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 60. Idris Deby, Chad's President since late 1990, belongs to the Zaghawa tribe,
which is sometimes classed with the Toubous due to linguistic similarities with the Teda dialect, but which
is actually an Arab people related to the Berbers. See DECALO, supra note 13, at 335; Nicholas Kotch,
Chad's New President Promises New Dawn, Reuters, Dec. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File; Paul Michaud, Hissne Habr6, Chad's Leader, Survives Coup Attempt, But.. ., DEF. &
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and Borku. They also inhabit the neighboring parts of Niger and Libya. 1
They are "naturally attracted, both geographically and culturally, to the
North," particularly Fazzan.52 The Daza, the larger group, constitute the
dominant Toubou population in Borku (where they outnumber the Teda by
more than three to one) and in Ennedi, but the great majority of them live
further south in Kanem and Biltine."3
Before examining Toubou organization, a note of caution is appropriate.
All information on the Toubou society comes from the work of Western
anthropologists. While many of them have studied the Toubous closely, they
come to their topic with Western conceptions of social and political organiza-
tion that may not fit the notions prevailing among their subjects. The corre-
sponding Toubou conceptions may contain nuances or assumptions that elude
their observers. Consequently, such studies may not reflect accurately the
Toubous' perceptions of their own society. This point will assume special
significance if the I.C.J. looks to native concepts of sovereignty in resolving
the dispute, since the Western accounts may only poorly capture those con-
cepts.
a. The Impact of the Physical Surroundings: The Clan System
The economic realities of the Sahara and the sahel divide the Toubous into
sedentary and nomadic populations. In the Tibesti massif, the oases contain
the only resources available: dates, nuts, small quantities of grain, and pastures
for animals.5 4 These conditions have permitted small populations to settle in
the oases of that region, e.g., BardaY, Zouar, and Aouzou. The same is true
of the oases of Borku.5' Where water is not plentiful enough to support seden-
tary life, however, the Toubou must rely on mobile resources-animals. As
a result of the short rainy season and the scarcity of rainfall in the desert and
the Sahel, the available pasture resources shift over the course of the year, and
the herdsman must move with them.56 The camel is the animal of choice in
these conditions. It is able to walk slowly from one tuft of grass to the next,
eating as it crosses the great distances involved. The camel is the primary herd
animal found north of the sixteenth parallel-that is, in most of B.E.T.57
FOREiGN AFF., May/June 1989, at 40.
51. DEcALO, supra note 13, at 308; see also CHAPELLE, PErPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 44.
52. Comarin, supra note 11, at 5.
53. DEcALO, supra note 13, at 76, 108; see also CHAPELLE, PEOPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at
44; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 21.
54. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 69-70.
55. CHAPELLE, PEOPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 88.
56. Id. at 88-89; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 70-71 (describing annual
cycle of migration).




The camel comes with its benefits and its requirements. Its milk provides
the nomad's primary source of nutrition. Hardier and better able to move in
the desert than a horse., it makes an excellent mount and beast of burden, thus
allowing the nomad to gain by trade what he cannot provide for himself."
The Toubous also use the camel to exploit the natural resources of their
lands-dates, huge deposits of salt, and natron (sodium carbonate). 9 To care
for camels, the nomadic herder must be able to find a secure place with the
proper conditions. He must have regular access to water sources and room for
his animals to roam unmolested.60
Partially as a response to these exigencies, semi-nomadic Toubou society
is loosely organized into clans. Clan membership helps guarantee access to
needed resources through a system of recognized territorial rights, founded on
links with a particular site. These rights generally do not confer exclusive use
of a resource, such as a pasture or a well, but rather priority in use. Outside
the mountainous areas, the Toubous recognize a clan's rights to an "area of
traditional routes." These rights are not absolute-they may be challenged by
other clans and modified.6' Limited individual rights do exist as a supplement
to clan rights; families own gardens, and date palms belong to specific individ-
uals.62
The Toubou clans, whose members usually number in the hundreds and
rarely exceed 1,000, do not fit the usual notion of a coherent social or political
group united under a single leader and living or traveling together. "The clan
system... permits neither a geographical nor a political classing of individu-
als. It gives only a genealogical and historical classing. "63 The clan has no
chief in the traditional sense, as all male members are equals4 Moreover,
the members of a clan are rarely united; instead, they are scattered over a wide
area, with each family essentially independent. A single village or nomadic
camp is likely to contain members of several clans.6 5
An individual Toubou belongs to the clan of his or her father, even after
marrying. In addition, each Toubou will incur a network of obligations owed
to several clans through maternal relationships, marriage, and social interac-
tion. Hierarchy is consequently impossible, and cohesion is temporary and
58. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 90.
59. Id. at 93; see also FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 108. Ferrandi noted an "incessant movement of
nomads, going to look in Borku for dates and salt, and bringing butter, tanned skins, and meat"-all of
which are, incidentally, derived from the camel. Id. at 105.
60. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADiEN, supra note 46, at 88.
61. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOITS, supra note 15, at 367; see also CLNE, supra note 18, at 23.
62. CLN, supra note 18, at 26.
63. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 368.
64. Id. at 344-45. On the institution of the chief, see infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
65. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 168; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra
note 15, at 344-45.
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Map 3: Toubou Migration Patterns
JEA OWLLE, NOMADES NOIR S DU SAHARA: LES TOUBOUs 213, 215 (1957) (reprinted with
permission).
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fragile.66 "[Tihe clan serves the individual," it has been observed, "but the
individual does not serve the clan."67 Without a higher authority to enforce
obligations, the Toubous rely on honor and the threat of reprisal.6"
b. Structures of Authority: The Chief
Jean Chapelle, a former French officer who spent years among the
Toubous in B.E.T., described the clan as an "acephalic social system."69
Lloyd Cabot Briggs, an American anthropologist, elaborated on this idea:
Apparently the Teda [by which Briggs means Toubous] have long been politically
in a state of kaleidoscopic fragmentation and recombination, because the various
communal groups are often relatively isolated by the exigencies of their environ-
ment, because of a blood feud system which is elaborately formalized, and chiefly
perhaps because the Teda have an extremely individualistic spirit so strong that it
prevents their ever really uniting even in the face of an invasion. 70
Toubou society is simply too individualistic to permit the accumulation of
political power in one man. Occasionally, a temporary chief will arise in the
event of natural disaster or war, but his power lasts only as long as the condi-
tions that necessitate it. The chief is not an authority figure who makes law,
but rather an adviser or wise man who states custom.71 The Toubou term
used to denote such an individual, boui, means "aged one."72 The chief pos-
sesses some authority to act for the clan in its relations with other clans and
external groups, but he functions primarily as a conciliator or mediator. He
has no authority to enforce any decision, to tax, or to punish members of his
clan.73 All Toubous being equal, each is free to obey or disregard the deci-
sions of the chief.74 Nor do the chiefs see themselves as serving some broader
66. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 167-68.
67. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 350.
68. Id. at 345, 348.
69. Id. at 350.
70. BRIGOs, supra note 29, at 169-70.
71. Briggs described "[t]rue chieftainship... at the level of the tribe, which is a unit made up of
clans and fractions held together by ties of kinship or by geo-political considerations." The tribal chief's
functions include negotiating agreements with other tribes, leading warriors into battle, and mediating dis-
putes (although the chief is without power to enforce his decisions). Id. at 170-71. While conglomerate
or composite "clans" exist among the Toubous, other observers of Toubou society have not noticed this
level of permanent organization among them, and in any event the powers that Briggs describes are largely
ad hoc, concerned with external rather than internal affairs of the tribe, and limited to specific situations
that demand a single spokesman.
72. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 370; HAROLD D. NELSON ET AL., AREA
HANDBOOK FOR CHAD 66 (1972).
73. CHAPELLE, NoMADEs NOiRS, supra note 15 at 372. But see CLiNE, supra note 18, at 43 (noting
that Derde (chief of Tomagra clan) Chai Bogarmi levied tribute from cultivators, owners of date palms,
passing caravans, and raiders).
74. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 370; CLINE, supra note 18, at43; see also BiGOS,
supra note 29, at 170 ("The principle of freedom raised almost to the level of anarchy is so deeply rooted
in the Teda [Toubou] philosophy of life that many families refuse to acknowledge anyone as their chief,
while individuals frequently dispute the authority even of their own family headman.").
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public interest. Instead, each chief looks to, and seeks to reward, only a
narrow clientele. 75
The chief does not occupy a hereditary position. By custom, an assembly
of notables from another clan chooses each new chief from among the mem-
bers of two or three prominent families.76 Such is the case, for instance, with
the Derde of Tibesti, the chief of the Teda clans. 7 The Derde, chosen by a
council of notables of the Tozoba clan from among the three most important
families in the Tomagra clan, is actually simply the chief of the Tomagra clan.
Because the other Teda clans recognize the Tomagra as the noblest and purest
clan, they accept the Derde as spiritual head as well.78 Although the Gounda
and Arna, two other noble Toubou clans, select their own chiefs, these chiefs
recognize some duty to the Derde.79
As is true of all Toubou chiefs, the authority of the Derde is more symbolic
than actual. In addition to his position as spiritual leader of the Teda, the
Derde represents the Teda in their relations with foreigners. 0 Traditionally,
the Derde has had the greatest authority in Bardal and Zumri (Zoumeri), in
the northern part of Tibesti, and among the nomadic clans of the center of the
massif. "Elsewhere he had prestige but little or no control."' Although the
Derde's assent is sought on matters of public importance, individuals can act
with impunity, often without the agreement of the Derde or even contrary to
his wishes. 2
The power of any particular Derde will depend heavily upon his own
personal influence. The Derde at the time of Nachtigal's visit in the late
nineteenth century, Tafertemi, had "negligible influence."83 In contrast, Chai
Bogarmi, the Derde at the time of the French colonization of Chad, extended
his power to the "maximum development" of the chieftainship. He collected
tribute from cultivators, owners of date palms, and passing caravans, and he
claimed a share of any booty from raids." Chai built his power through a
combination of good fortune and astute relations with outside powers. During
a severe drought around 1890 the last of a series of old, weak, and ineffectual
75. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 371.
76. Id. at 373.
77. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 169.
78. CLINE, supra note 18, at 43; see also BRiGCs, supra note 29, at 169; DEcALO, supra note 13,
at 110, 311.
79. CLIN, supra note 18, at 43.
80. CHARLEs LE COEUR, LE RrTE ET L'OJT- 66 (1939) [hereinafter LE COEUR, LE RITE].
81. CLINE, supra note 18, at 43; see also LE CoEUR, LE RrrE, supra note 80, at 66 (stating that power
of Derde is purely honorific).
82. See 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 398-99; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRs, supra note
15, at 353.
83. Id. at 398. Nachtigal added that where a Toubou chief did possess influence, "this was always
based more on [his] personal qualities than on his official position, which by itself carried neither great
influence nor any considerable income." Id. (footnote omitted).
84. CLINE, supra note 18, at 43; see also BRIGos, supra note 29, at 169.
Vol. 17:301, 1992
The Aouzou Strip
Derdes resigned. Chai, thirty years old, was named to succeed him. He
immediately traveled to Bilma to consult a famous marabout (revered holy man
and teacher), returned to Tibesti, and performed the sacrifices that had been
recommended to him. That year it rained in Tibesti as never before. 5
This success brought Chai enormous prestige and respect, and he proceeded
to strengthen his position. He made overtures to the Sanusiya, the Muslim
religious brotherhood that had been spreading through the eastern Sahara. 6
Although Chai did not permit the Sanusi to infringe on his power, he did use
the Sanusi influence to claim powers to enforce Muslim peace and Muslim law
in Tibesti8 Chai tracked down, tried, and punished fugitive killers hiding
in the mountains.88 Under his leadership, Teda forces destroyed an invading
force of Fazzanese in the early years of the twentieth century. 9 At the mo-
ment when his personal prestige was greatest, he cemented his position by
submitting to the Turks. The Ottomans appointed Chai kaymakam (head of an
administrative subunit of a sancak, or province) of Tibesti and granted him a
monthly stipend.9" However, even as strong a Derde as Chai was unable to
compel behavior among the clans; when French forces arrived in Tibesti in
1914, Chai resisted while the Gounda clan submitted, and the Arna continued
to resist after Chai later submitted. 91
c. Fragmentation and Recombination of Clans
Because Toubou society is highly individualistic and lacks effective authori-
ty, the clans are not permanent institutions. They break up and recombine over
time "in a never ending series of piecemeal disintegrations and local reconsoli-
dations."92 In addition, the conditions of Toubou life erode clan structures.
Men must take long voyages to find pasture, to harvest dates, and to trade.
Because Toubou custom does not permit men to marry close relatives, mar-
riage may require travel over a considerable distance. The members of any
clan thus live dispersed over enormous areas, impeding centralization of
authority. Furthermore, as a clan matures the increasing complexity of the web
of obligations tends either to pull the clan apart or to render it unmanageable.
Eventually, a clan will cease to have practical utility for its members and will
85. LE COEUR, LE RITE, supra note 80, at 66-67.
86. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
87. When the Sanusi representatives in Tibesti tried to encroach upon Chai's traditional function of
administering justice, Chai saw to it that they were recalled. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
88. LE COEUR, LE RrAE, supra note 80, at 67; see also WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26,
at 96-97.
89. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text.
91. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
92. BRIGGs, supra note 29, at 170.
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dissolve, splinter, or disappear altogether. No current clan has existed for more
than fourteen generations. 3
Some Toubous belong to political groupings in addition to, and separate
from the clan system. These groups consist of sedentary Toubous, mostly
Teda, who inhabit and take their name from a given locale-e.g., the Gouroa
around Gouro, the Aouzouya around Aouzou. Such a group generally includes
members of many different clans, but the common conditions of their habitat
create a tie among them. These groupings are political not in the sense of
obedience to law or authority, but rather in their relations with their neigh-
bors.94 They are essentially identical to clans in function and organization,
differing only in their composition.
d. Sumnary
In summary, the Toubous are a highly individualistic people unwilling to
recognize higher authority. Their society is splintered into numerous indepen-
dent clans, and even the clans do not possess a political identity. The Toubous
are opportunistic and strictly self-interested. Except in rare instances, they are
unable to act in concert, and their self-interested behavior dooms any organized
effort to ultimate fragmentation as individual Toubous desert the group to
pursue better opportunities. These conditions render any claim to the exercise
of sovereignty over the Toubous highly questionable.
4. Geographic Distribution of the Toubou Clans
A further obstacle to any historical claim to sovereignty over the whole of
the Toubou people is the wide dispersal of the clans over the desert and the
migrations of some clans, both within an annual cycle and over long periods
of time. Each clan roams during the year within its own recognized area.
Several clans also drive their animals far from these areas during parts of the
year. The Tomagra, for instance, inhabit the southwestern part of the Tibesti
massif, but they take their camels each year to Mortcha, in the south of
Borku.9' Although the pasture lands are "ownerless in theory," each clan has
priority in the use of certain lands recognized as belonging to it by agreement
with neighboring clans. Clans also "own" palm groves that are tended by the
93. CHAPELLE, NoMADEs NOIRS, supra note 15, at 346-48.
94. Id. at 368; CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 169. Briggs felt that these groupings
possessed greater political cohesion than the clans, but no other observer has noticed any difference of this
nature. See supra note 71.
The first Europeans in the area initially discovered the local groups and mistakenly applied European
notions of political groups to them: "canton," "tribe." They encountered the clans only later and referred
to them as "fractions." CRAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 369.
95. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 126.
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clan itself or by a servile or vassal clan;9" each year, the clan visits its groves
for the harvest.97 This constant pattern of migration further hinders claims
that a power asserted sovereignty over the Toubous. For instance, an occupy-
ing power may receive promises of submission from one clan in one spot
during one time of the year, but that promise (assuming that it will even be
honored) in no way binds other clans or even assures the occupying power of
sovereignty over that spot.
The Toubous have also migrated over time, responding to the pressure of
external events such as natural catastrophes or the rise of a powerful neighbor.
Thus, for example, several clans have settled since the thirteenth century in
the Tibesti massif, an impenetrable refuge from the "peoples of the plains,"
and several other clans, or parts of them, have left the area.9" Since the tenth
century the Teda have generally moved south from the Libyan desert into
Tibesti, while the Daza have migrated south from Tibesti and Borku into
Kanem and Biltine. The Bideyat have moved north into Ennedi from Ouadai,
replaced by a related but separate people, the Zaghawa, who originally in-
habited the area around Kawar in Niger.99
Even as small an assemblage as the Teda of Tibesti, which can count fewer
than ten thousand members,"oe includes groups of widely diverse origins.
Only three or four Teda clans are native to the massif. Others have Daza
origins, while yet others, such as the Aouzouya (or Emmeouia), come from
the Donza clans immediately to the southeast of the massif. Still others have
come from Bideyat clans in Ennedi, from Kufrah, or from the Tuareg tribes
to the west. 1°' The Tomagra and the Gounda arrived from Bornu in the six-
teenth century after having previously left the area."e2 In the twentieth centu-
ry the Gounda have migrated to Agadem, the Mourdia and the Gouroa toward
Ennedi, and the Tomagra south toward Toro. 3
a. The Teda Clans of Tibesti
The Teda of Tibesti form approximately forty clans, none of which can
count more than a few hundred members."° Each clan is associated with
96. As used here, the word "vassal" does not imply a formal recognition of allegiance; rather, the
vassal relationship may stem from an ancient defeat of one clan by another, or from one clan's history of
enslavement by another.
97. BRIGOs, supra note 29, at 178-79. For examples of Toubou migration patterns, see Map 3.
98. See CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 41-48.
99. Id. at 44-45.
100. See supra note 29.
101. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOItS, supra note 15, at 72-79.
102. Id. at 59, 83, 376-77.
103. LEROUVREuR, supra note 19, at 396.
104. Rdquin I, supra note 29, at 57; see also CLJNE, supra note 18, at 13. See generally
Map 4, Map 5.
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Map 4:'The Tibesti Massif
PIERRE BECK & GEN. PAUL HUARD, TIBESTI: CARREFOUR DE LA PRtHIsTOmRE SAHARIENNE 14-15
(1969) (reprinted with permission).
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particular areas. Although this loose association creates a temptation to locate
individual clans on a map in order to shed some light on the Aouzou Strip
dispute, any attempt to do so is a highly uncertain enterprise. First, the Teda
move seasonally between oases and the plateaus of Tibesti, depending for their
survival on their camels, goats, and whatever grains and nuts they can gather.
The men travel in the winter to Kufrah, Fazzan, or Kawar, but not to other
places in Chad, to trade their goods."l 5 The transient character of the Teda,
and the vast area their annual migration covers, would frustrate any attempt
to associate specific clans with particular pieces of territory.
In addition, the classification into clans is somewhat arbitrary, since the
clans are in the constant process of disintegration and reconsolidation described
above."°  The existence of composite clans made up of members of other
clans illustrates the difficulties of classification. Furthermore, no particular
area is exclusively associated with any one clan. The members of each clan
are scattered over a wide area and mixed in with members of other clans; a
typical village contains a few families from each of several clans, rather than
many families from one or two clans. Finally, most of the information on clan
history, origins, and migration is derived from native traditions. As such, it
is largely undocumented and susceptible to modification or fabrication to fit
local prejudices.1 7
These disclaimers should put into perspective the following brief attempt
to describe the distribution of the various Teda clans in the different parts of
Tibesti. If any conclusion can be drawn from this effort, it must surely be that
the distribution and movements of the Teda render futile and hopelessly
complex any attempt to resolve the Aouzou Strip dispute by reference to the
places occupied by the various groups inhabiting the area. Rather than compre-
hensively cataloguing the various tribes and their migrations, the following
sections will focus on a few clans who have played significant historical roles
or who highlight important aspects of Toubou culture.
(1) Clans of Northern and Eastern Tibesti
The Aouzou Strip runs through the northern and eastern parts of Tibesti,
an area that includes the best land and the largest part of the population of the
massif. Eastern Tibesti has two belts of habitation: the first spans the foot of
the massif between Ouri and Gouro; the second, slightly to the west, comprises
several villages in the mountains, including Aozi, Goumeur, and Tioro. °8
In the northeast, the valleys (enneris) of the Aouzou massif and Enneri Yebbi
105. LERovRE tR, supra note 19, at 397, 399-400.
106. Rdquin I, supra note 29, at 57.
107. CLINE, supra note 18, at 18.
108. Id at 13, 25.
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Map 5: Geographic Distribution of the Teda Clans of Tibesti





and its tributaries are the principal population centers." ° The northern part
of Tibesti, especially the areas around Barda', Zumri, Aouzou, and Guezenti,
contains not only the most productive gardens and date palms but also excellent
grazing land.1 °
In the area around Aouzou live the Tedema, the Emmeouia, and the
Derdekichia (a combination of Arna and Emmeouia)." The Tozoba live
slightly to the east, in Guezenti, Omou, and Enneri Yebbi."' South of the
Aouzou massif live the Mahadena." 3 Several small clans rove the eastern
slopes of Tibesti: the Teghaa, Bessara, Eidea, and Torama." 4 These clans
range over territory on both sides of the line claimed by Libya.
West of Aouzou, several clans occupy the Bardaigue-Araye-Zumri region.
These clans include "the Terintera (who have maintained contacts at
Kufrah)," the Odobaya," 6 the Ederguia,1 7 the Kussada," and the
Taizerea, who migrated to Tibesti around 1815 after being driven from Kufrah
by the Zowaya Arabs." 9 In the area around Ouri, east of Aouzou, the Ouria
(a composite clan whose members originally belonged to other Teda clans)
occupy the oases of Yebbi Bou, Goumeur, and Aozil ° and the surrounding
areas in eastern Tibesti. The Ouria, too, straddle the line claimed by Libya.
Members of the Arna and their vassals, the Marmarea, also inhabit this
area.' They are the only Teda clan of Tibesti inhabiting territory on both
sides of the boundary claimed by Chad, although some other clans regularly
cross that boundary in the course of their migrations and some have relatives
in Libyan oases.
The Gouroa, another composite group composed of members of other Teda
clans (Mahadena, Arna, Eidea, Odobaya, and Gourma), live in the region of
Gouro, an oasis on the southeastern edges of the massif.' The Gouroa wan-
109. Id. at 13, 23.
110. Id. at 23, 24, 25, 32.
111. Most of the Emmeouia have left Tibesti for Borku, and the Tedema, who stayed in the Aouzou
region, are dying out. Lt. Rdquin, Les clans Tedda du 71besti (pt. 2), 45 B.C.A.F. 259, 260 (1935)
[hereinafter Rdquin II]; see also CraNE, supra note 18, at 14.
112. Rdquin 1, supra note 29, at 59; see also CLNE, supra note 18, at 15.
113. CLINE, supra note 18, at 15-16.
114. Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 260; see also CLNE, supra note 18, at 16.
115. Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 259; see also CLINE, supra note 18, at 15.
116. Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 260; see also CLINE, supra note 18, at 14.
117. CINE, supra note 18, at 14.
118. Id. at 16.
119. The Taizerea are also found in eastern Tibesti, and a few live as far away as 'Uwaynat in the
southern part of the Libyan Desert. Id. at 15.
120. The Ouria comprise members of several other Teda clans found in eastern Tibesti: Mahadena,
Torama, Odobaya, Foktoa, Teghaa, and Eidea. See CHAPELLE, NoMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 119.
121. See supra notes 125 & 128 and accompanying text.
122. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 119; LERoUvREUR, supra note 19, at 421, 424.
LeRouvreur identifies the Gourma, the fifth element of the Gouroa, as a Daza clan. Id. at 424.
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der over an enormous area stretching from southwest Tibesti to the eastern
edge of Ennedi.'
(2) Clans of Western, Southern, and Central Tibesti
Southern Tibesti contains several valleys-Enneri Miski, Enneri Maro, and
Enneri Tehagam-that support a semi-nomadic population. 4 The Arna,
considered a noble clan, occupy a region that stretches along the mouths of
the enneris over the southern edge from Maro to Gouro and wraps around on
the eastern edge of Tibesti as far north as Ouri.' s They range from there
over a large area extending south from the massif.'2 6 Their trading routes
keep them wholly within Tibesti, Borku, and Kanem. 7 Their vassals by
tradition, the Marmarea, inhabit Enneri Marmar in the southwest corner of
Tibesti and are also found with the Arna along the north edge of the massif
around Ouri.12 1
The Tomagra clan occupies the southwest corner of the massif, between
Zouar and Sherda. The Tomagra arrived in Tibesti in the sixteenth century,
defeated the Derdekichia clan (the clan from which the Derde had hitherto been
chosen), and extended their influence over all of Tibesti. A rivalry with the
Gounda followed and ended with the defeat and migration of the Gounda to
Abo, Kawar, and Fazzan.2 9 The Tomagra drive their camels each year to
Djourab and Mortcha, in the south of Borku, for pasture. 3 '
Western Tibesti, including the massif of Abo, is in general poorly suited
for human habitation. Agricultural conditions are unfavorable except in the
valleys of Marmar, Zouar, and Yoo, where there are good pastures.' The
Abo area in the northwest part of Tibesti contains excellent grazing lands and
some date palms. 32 Clans inhabiting western Tibesti include the Gounda,
considered one of the most noble of the Teda, and found in Kawar in Bornu
123. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 177. Sedentary when the French arrived, the Gouroa have gradually
become nomadic. LEROtJVREUR, supra note 19, at 421-22.
124. CLINE, supra note 18, at 13, 24.
125. Id. at 15; see also R6quin II, supra note 111, at 260.
126. LERouvREuR, supra note 19, at 432.
127. Id. at 432-34.
128. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 80; Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 260.
129. CLiNE, supra note 18, at 14; Rdquin I, supra note 29, at 58-59.
130. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 125, 126.
131. Id. at 23, 32.
132. Id. at 23, 25, 32.
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and Marzuq in Fazzan as well; the Mogodi;' 34 the Keressa;135 and two
smaller clans, the Tchioda and the Abordami.
136
In Bornu, to the west, live the Braoya (or Djadoboi, after the group of
oases they inhabit). In addition, numerous other Teda clans from Tibesti, as
well as the Anakazza (a Daza clan from Borku and Ennedi) also have members
in Bornu.
137
Central Tibesti is home to numerous small clans: the Dirsina, 3 1 the
Goboda, 139 the Tomourtioua, the Tarsoa,1 ° the Foktoa (who formed from
other clans after the Taizerea invaded in the early nineteenth century), 1' and
a few Belalia, a clan found predominantly in Bilma. 42
b. The Clans of Borku and Ennedi
The clans of Borku and Ennedi highlight several features of Toubou
culture. While each region is home to numerous clans, only a few need to be
discussed to convey a sense of those features. 43
The Kamadja are not actually a clan, but rather a semi-servile caste spread
throughout the Toubou lands. Employed by the Teda for labor deemed menial,
the Kamadja are mostly descendants of former captives.'"
The Kokorda are noteworthy as a composite of eight clans of geographical-
ly diverse origins." 4 Furthermore, their patterns of annual migration are
representative of Toubou behavior. The Kokorda previously shared the oases
of Borku with the Anakazza; the Kokorda occupied the oases to the west, and
the Anakazza occupied those to the east. In the middle of the twentieth century
the Kokorda migrated eastward to Toro from the grazing lands they previously
used southeast of Faya. The Kokorda presently retain interests in certain oases,
133. CLINE, supra note 18, at 14-15; 1 NACHTiGAL, supra note 25, at 419; Rdquin I, supra note 29,
at 57.
134. CLINE, supra note 18, at 14; Rdquin I, supra note 29, at 57.
135. CLINE, supra note 18, at 15.
136. R1quin I, supra note 29, at 57.
137. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 103.
138. CLINE, supra note 18, at 14.
139. Id. at 15; 1 NAcirnGAL, supra note 25, at 419.
140. CLINE, supra note 18, at 16; Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 260.
141. CLINE, supra note 18, at 16.
142. Id. at 15.
143. For a map locating the Toubou clans of Borku and Ennedi in addition to Tibesti, see Map 7.
144. See CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 7; Rdquin II, supra note 111, at 164.
Although LeRouvreur concurs as to the role and origins of the Kamadja, he reports that their former
masters were Anakazza, not Teda, and that their area of inhabitation is much smaller, confined to the string
of oases stretching from Ain Galakka to Faya-Largeau. LEROUVREUR, supra note 19, at 387-90. The Ounia
are another servile caste who cultivate the oases of the Gaeda southeast of Gouro, but they have also
become semi-nomadic in the past fifty years, adopting camel-raising and spending part of each year in
Mourdi. Il at 415-16.
145. LERoUVREUR, supra note 19, at 412-13.
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Map 6: Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi
WALTER CLINE, THE TEDA OF TIBESTI, BORKU AND KAWAR IN THE EASTERN SAHARA 6 (Gen.
Ser. Anthro. No. 12; 1950) (reprinted with permission).
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The Aouzou Strip
returning from June through September for the date harvest."
The Anakazza, a collection of approximately fifteen to twenty large fami-
lies of diverse origins with some seven thousand members, form the most
populous single group in Borku. 47 Their name indicates a mixture of Bideyat
and other Toubou groups from Borku."4 They present a good example of
the extent of Toubou migration. After 1925, as the French administration
brought raiding by other Toubous, 'Awlad Sulaiman Arabs, and Tuaregs under
control, the Anakazza migrated west from the northern part of Mortcha to
Djourab. There they raise camels, but almost the entire group travels to the
oases around Faya for the date harvest from July to October, while the young
men remain behind to tend the camels. Between October and April the men
travel south to Ouadai to trade at the markets there. In April each family is
reunited in Djourab, where they stay until July. 49 The Anakazza "own"
extensive holdings, which once included parts of Djourab where they pastured
their animals part of the year, and they roam east to Oum Chalouba in Ennedi
and beyond. 50
The Anakazza also illustrate the kind of historical Toubou behavior that
complicates claims to the region. At the time the French arrived the Sanusi
religious brotherhood controlled the northern oases that supplied the Anakazza
with dates, while the French controlled their customary pastures further south.
Forced to choose between them, the Anakazza split: some sided with the
Sanusi, and others with the French.' Thus, either Libya or Chad could now
cite the Anakazza in support of its claims, when in reality the Anakazza merely
acted out of typical Toubou self-interest, without hierarchical control.
In Ennedi, the Mourdia rove in the Mourdi Depression and along the
northern parts of the Ennedi highland. '52 Another collection of approximately
twenty clans of various origins, the Mourdia are the only group besides the
Teda of Tibesti to inhabit part of the Aouzou Strip. They occupy the northeast
corner of Ennedi and spill over into Sudan to the east. Their migration takes
them between the massif of Ennedi in the warm months and the open spaces
146. Id. at 414.
147. LERoUVREUR, supra note 19, at 405; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at
130, 132 (reporting 19 clans actually split into 30 fractions); FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 111.
148. "Ana" is the Toubou word for the Bideyat; "kazza" signifies "mixed." CHAPELLE, NOMADES
NOIRS, supra note 15, at 131 n.67.
149. LEROUVREUR, supra note 19, at 405-08. Another Toubou clan with a large area of migration
is the Gaeda, who rove for part of each year along the western edges of Ennedi, descend in late summer
to Mortcha, and return in July to traditional oases southeast of Gouro for the date harvest. CHAPELLE,
NomADEs NoiRs, supra note 15, at 124.
150. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 104, 111. In the early twentieth century Arab tribes drove the
Anakazza from Djourab. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 132.
151. See infra notes 334-338 and accompanying text. The Gaeda behaved similarly, with one faction
holding out for a short time and another submitting immediately to the French forces. LEROUVREUR, supra
note 19, at 420.
152. CHAPELLE, NOMADEs NOIRS, supra note 15, at 135.
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Map 7: Location of Toubou Clans
ALBERT LBRouvREuR, SAHmLIENS ET SAHARIES DU TCHAD 56-57 (1962) (reprinted with permis-
sion).
The Aouzou Strip
north and east of it in the colder months. They are also noteworthy because
their origins illustrate the process of clan formation. The Mourdia are descend-
ed from an Arna who left the eastern slopes of Tibesti and settled in the
Mourdia Depression in the late eighteenth century."5 3
Southeast of the Mourdia are the Bideyat, and south of them live the
Zaghawa. Although similar physically and in social organization to the
Toubous, these groups have different customs and languages. 54 The semi-
nomadic Bideyat are actually of Zaghawa, not Toubou, origin. Reportedly
native to Ennedi (and formerly Ouadai), the Bideyat clans form two major
groups. The Bideyat Borogat, a relatively old confederation whose twenty clans
have a total of some five thousand members, inhabit western Ennedi. The
slightly more numerous Bideyat Bilia inhabit the east and the areas south of
the plateaus." 5 The Bideyat, like the Anakazza, split between the French and
the Sanusi.156 They also exploited the hostility between them, always serving
their own interests by telling each side what it wanted to hear."57
One final group, the 'Awlad Sulaiman, may be mentioned here, although
they are of Libyan Arab origins and not Toubous at all. As a result of emigra-
tions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 'Awlad Sulaiman emigrated
from Libya and settled in northern Chad. Although Libya has argued that the
presence of this tribe supports a Libyan claim to the Aouzou Strip, the 'Awlad
Sulaiman do not inhabit any of the contested territory or any area near it. They
live only in the southernmost parts of the Toubou lands, occupying parts of
Kanem, far to the south of the Aouzou Strip."15
5. Some Conclusions About the Toubous
Some of the Toubou clans have migrated since 1935, but the general
location of most clans has not changed significantly."5 9 The areas that had,
through submission of a clan, passed under the control of the Sanusi or the
French are in general still home to the same clans that occupied them at that
153. LERouvREUR, supra note 19, at 426-28. Other, smaller clans in this region include the Erdia
and the Tabia. Id. at 424-26.
154. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 136; CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note
46, at 45, 170; LERotVREUR, supra note 19, at 403.
155. CHAPELLE, NoMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 137; FERuANDI, supra note 18, at 208; LE-
RouvREuR, supra note 19, at 428-32.
156. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 217, 231.
157. Id. at 216.
158. See LERoUVREUR, supra note 19, at 63, 436-41.
159. Compare CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 67-138 (noting location of clans in 1957)
with Rdquin I, supra note 29, at 55-59 (noting location of clans in 1935) and Rdquin II, supra note 111,
259-64 (same).
Yale Journal of International Law
time." Consequently, relations between particular powers and Toubou
groups might support a claim to sovereignty over the regions inhabited by
those groups.
However, the foregoing description of the Toubous makes clear that serious
obstacles confront a claim to sovereignty over part of their land based on
relations with some of its inhabitants. First, the distribution of the clans
themselves dooms to futility any attempt to draw a line based on population.
Parts of the same clan may be found at different locations, and one area may
often be home to members of several different clans. Therefore, relations with
one clan will not necessarily confer exclusive sovereignty over that clan's
traditional territory.
Second, the acute fragmentation of Toubou society and the completely
opportunistic behavior of the Toubous renders doubtful any claim that political
relations with a particular clan or chief is sufficient to entail a relation of
sovereignty. The Derde, as we have seen, was and is unable to command any
obedience from other clans or individuals in political matters. Other chiefs
wield even less authority. There is simply no guarantee that individual Toubous
will follow their chiefs. In short, the anarchy of Toubou society precludes any
claim based on the subordination of individuals to the chief.
III. HISTORY OF THE AREA
The parties to any boundary dispute cannot put forth legal arguments
without reference to the underlying history of the disputed territory. This is
especially true for the Aouzou Strip controversy. Each party must try to
establish that at some crucial point in the past, the Aouzou Strip belonged to
it or its predecessor through a display of sovereignty in the region. The history
of the area is extraordinarily complex. But without an understanding of that
history no observer can appreciate the origins of the dispute or formulate an
informed opinion as to its proper resolution.
A. From the Tenth to the Nineteenth Century: The Influence of Kanem, Bornu,
and Tripoli
In August 1890, France and Great Britain signed a declaration recognizing
a French zone of influence in the Algerian hinterland as far as the shores of
Lake Chad. At the end of October, the Ottoman Empire protested in diplomatic
notes, claiming that the agreement violated established Turkish rights in the
Tripolitanian hinterland. According to the Turks, this hinterland included
160. However, migration has nonetheless occurred: lack of rainfall in the 1970s caused the Gounda
clan of Tibesti to move south and west, and the Ouria have also abandoned Ouri due to drought there.




Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, and Kanem (north and east of Lake Chad), and
extended as far as the watershed between the Congo and Lake Chad."'
Although this protest marks the beginning of the dispute over the Aouzou
Strip, understanding the controversy requires a review of events even further
in the past.
1. The Dominance of the South: Kanem, Bornu, and Ouadai
The early history of northern Chad was shaped by its more populous and
wealthy southern neighbors, the powerful kingdoms of Kanem and Bornu. One
Toubou family from Fazzan, the Sefawa, played an important role in the
founding of the Empire of Kanem in the eighth and ninth centuries.162 At the
height of its power in the thirteenth century, Kanem's control extended, in the
words of the contemporary chronicler Ibn Sacid, "over the countries of the
desert up to Fazzan."'163 One of the kings of Kanem, Dounama Dibalemi,
fought a seven-year war against the Toubous before establishing a colony in
Fazzan, reportedly installing a Toubou lieutenant to govern it."6 Shortly
afterward, however, this officer rejected Kanem's authority, took the title of
Mai (king), and founded a dynasty lasting into the fourteenth century.16
Starting in the second half of the fourteenth century, however, a series of
invasions weakened Kanem, and the focus of power shifted westward into
Bornu. In the fifteenth century, Bornu was struggling against invaders in
Kanem and no longer had a presence in Borku, Ennedi, or Tibesti.'66 But
a late sixteenth-century mai of Bornu, Idris Alaoma, made war on some
Toubous in northeast Kanem, causing the Tomagra and Gounda clans to
161. See Note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 1899), in 15 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUFS
FRANgAis (1871-1914) [D.D.F.] (ser. 1) No. 98, at 155-56 (1959); LANNE, supra note 11, at 27; EToRE
Rossi, STOlIA DI TRiPOLI E DELLA TRIPOLirANIA 341 (1968) [hereinafter RossI, SToIA]; Ettore Rossi,
Perla storia dellapenetrazione turca nell'intemo dellaLibia eper la questione del suoi confini, 9 ORINTE
MODERNO 153, 161-62 (1929) [hereinafter Rossi, Penetrazione]; Les aspirations italiennes en Afrique, 39
B.C.A.F. 325, 326 (1929) [hereinafter Les aspirations]. During the negotiations preceding the convention,
France and Great Britain anticipated that the Sultan might protest the agreement as an infringement of his
rights. See Telegram from William Waddington, French Ambassador to Great Britain, to Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ribot (Aug. 6, 1890), in 8 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 141, at 198-200 (1938). Accordingly, they
inserted a clause stipulating that the arrangement "does not affect the rights that the Sultan may have over
the regions situated on the southern boundaries of his Tripolitanian provinces." Id. at 198. Lord Salisbury,
the British Prime Minister, gave a speech to the same effect to the House of Lords on August 10, 1890.
JEAN PICHON, LA QUESTION DE LBYE DANS LE itkGLEMENT DE LA PAIX 48 (1945).
162. LANNE, supra note 11, at 27; see also CLINE, supra note 18, at 19; MONIQUE COMBY, Docu-
MENTATION SUR LES EMPIRES TCHADIENS 0 (1984).
163. See CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 58; see also CoMTy, supra note 162, at
0; NELSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 26. In Khaldun, writing in the fourteenth century, gave a similar
description of the extent of Kanem's domination. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 8-9.
164. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADMN, supra note 46, at 198; cf. CLINE, supra note 18, at 19.
165. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 49-50.
166. CHAPELLE, PEOPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 199-200; NELsON ET AL., supra note 72, at
27.
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migrate to Tibesti.' 67 He also received a large ambassadorial party from the
Ottoman Sultan.16 Following the death of Idris Alaoma, Bornu lost political
power but retained its economic vitality. 169 Tripoli conducted "lively" com-
mercial relations with Bornu, and during the mid-seventeenth century it twice
exchanged ambassadors with the sovereign of Bornu, Mai Omar. 7 ' Despite
the commercial importance of Bornu, the dynasty itself was weak, and the Peul
invasions from the west in the early nineteenth century essentially finished it
off. The Sefawa had to appeal for aid to Muhammad al-'Amin, a powerful
tribal notable from Kanem. In 1846, Muhammad al-'Amin's son Umar over-
threw the last of the Sefawa, who had been reduced to figureheads."
Beginning in the eighteenth century, the empire of Ouadai, a trading
sultanate, began to gather power to the east as Bornu's influence faltered. By
1780 Ouadai was able to take Kanem and Baguirmi from Bornu. 72 At the
apogee of Ouadai's power in the early nineteenth century, Sultan Sabun opened
up a commercial route to Banghazi through Oum Chalouba, Ennedi, and
Kufrah, further weakening Bornu by speeding the decline of the trade routes
linking it to Fazzan." A successor to Sabun, Muhammad Sharif, defeated
Bornu and gained hegemony over a large part of Chad. 74 Ottoman authority
was not a factor in this area at the time; it remained confined to the coastal
portions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.' 75
167. See id. at 201-02; CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 59; see also CoMBY, supra
note 162, at 2. Idris Alaoma, although a Muslim, did not recognize the Ottoman Sultan's authority as
superior to his own. In 1577, after Turkish soldiers briefly conquered Fazzan and seized a fortress along
a trade route, Idris sent an embassy to Constantinople to protest Turkey's meddling in Bornu's trade and
to seek Turkish aid in a war against one of the Hausa states. However, the Sultan returned a high-handed
response, and no alliance ensued. Mai Idris eventually sought aid from Morocco, which at the time ruled
Fazzan. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 44-45. Wright believes that such incidents "might
well have given the Ottomans an inflated impression of the allegiance and sovereignty they nominally
exercised in central Africa, and were indeed to claim in the face of European expansion into Africa at the
end of the nineteenth century." Id. at 45.
168. NELSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 28.
169. CoMBY, supra note 162, at 3-4.
170. NELSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 30; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 154.
171. COMBY, supra note 162, at 5-8, 10-11; NELSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 28,
172. CoMBY, supra note 162, at 5, 7-9.
173. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 204-05; CoMBY, supra note 162, at 7, 17; see
also KOLA FoLAYAN, TRIPOLI DURING THE REIGN OF YUSUF PASHA QARAMANLI 80 (1979); MAOALI
MoRsy, NORTH AFRICA, 1800-1900: A SURVEY FROM THE NiLE VALLEY TO THE ATLANTIc 60 (1984).
174. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 205-06; see also CHRISTIAN BOUQUET, TCHAD:
GENtSE D'UN CONFLir 43 (1982).
175. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 44-46. Wright states that "the tribes' acknowledg-
ment of the Sultan at Constantinople as caliph did not imply any willingness to obey his laws, serve in his
armed forces, and least of all to pay his taxes." Id. at 46. A settlement was reached in 1626 in which
Turkey recognized the authority of the local 'Awlad Muhammad (Moroccan) ruler, and Fazzan agreed to
pay an annual tribute to Constantinople. Bornu maintained trade relations with Tripoli as well. Id.
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2. The Karamanli Dynasty in Tripoli and Expeditions to the South, 1711-
1835
In 1711, a Turkish cavalry officer named Ahmed Karamanli overthrew the
last of a series of weak deys (the title, after 1611, of the head of the Turkish
government in Tripoli) 76 and effectively bought the Ottoman Sultan's recog-
nition of his status as an independent paja (or pasha, denoting governor or
military commander). Karamanli invaded Fazzan twice in response to its
failure to meet its tribute obligations, reasserted Tripoli's rights to commercial
access to the Sudanic regions south of the desert, and imposed a "modest"
tribute on Fazzan. His aim, however, seems to have been largely to strengthen
Tripoli's share of the trans-Saharan trade, 77 of which the principal element
was the slave trade. 17
8
At approximately the same time the regions to the north began to exercise
greater influence over the Toubous and the Aouzou Strip area. From about
1815 onward the growth of the power of the European trading states in the
Mediterranean forced the Karamanlis to turn to the south. The Karamanlis'
power then reached no further south than Ghadamis, 79 but military raids
began against Kanem in 1818."0
The Toubous, who had long occupied Kufrah and Fazzan, began migrating
south as a result of invasions from the north. Beginning in the eighteenth
century, the Zawiyah (or Zowaya) Arabs from the Tripolitanian coast had
driven the Toubous from all but the southernmost oases of Fazzan.'' In
1813, Yusuf Paa Karamanli, the governor of Tripoli, sent an expedition under
Muhammad al-Mukni to subject Fazzan to Ottoman rule and govern it. Al-
Mukni succeeded in establishing Ottoman rule and even conducted slave raids
into Kanem. However, Karamanli power soon waned, and in 1831 the 'Awlad
176. The term dey, literally "maternal uncle," originally referred to a junior officer commanding a
company ofjanissaries, the elite Ottoman military corps. In 1611 the deys of Tripolitaniastaged a successful
coup and secured the appointment of their leader as head of the government. His successors kept the title
of dey. See La Verle Berry, Historical Setting, in LIBYA: A COUNTRY STUDY 18-19 (Helen Chapin Metz
ed., 1989).
177. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 47.
178. Id. at 48.
179. Id. at 62.
180. MoRsY, supra note 173, at 101; see also WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 61.
181. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 48-50; ROsrrA FORBES, THE SECRET OF THE
SAHARA: KUFARA 211 (1921); ANNIE M.-D. LEBEuF, LES POPULATIONS Du TCHAD 11 (1959); WRIGHT,
CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 86.
Until the Arab invasions the oasis of Kufrah was called Taiser; it received the name "Kufrah," which
means "pagan" in Arabic, after the Muslim victory over the Toubous who had previously held it. 1
NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 366 n.2; see also GAUTIER, supra note 15, at 132. Most of the Toubou
families migrated in 1813 to Tibesti, where they formed the Taizerea clan. CLINE, supra note 18, at 20;
see also supra notes 119 & 141 and accompanying text. However, a few Toubous remained in Kufrah,
generally in a wretched condition. See CLINE, supra note 18, at 20; FORBES, supra, at2l1; GAUTIER, supra
note 15, at 132-33.
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Sulaiman Arabs under CAbd-al-Jalil seized Fazzan and ruled it as their own
until the 1840s.11 From there, the 'Awlad Sulaiman began raiding in Bornu,
Kanem, and Borku and cut Karamanli control over their trade routes." 3
Other efforts by the Karamanlis were unsuccessful at establishing their
sovereignty over the regions south of the Tripolitanian coast. Yusuf Paga
Karamanli sent an expedition to Bornu in 1807-1808 to establish commercial
relations, but the mission enjoyed only limited success.", In 1817, Muham-
mad al-'Amin, the de facto ruler of Bornu, proposed to Tripoli a joint action
against southern rebels."' Yusuf Paa, encouraged by this overture, sent an
expedition across Fazzan in conjunction with the English explorers Denham
and Clapperton. Hoping to prepare the way for a future invasion of the area,
Yusuf found instead that Muhammad al-'Amin's troops would outmatch his
own.186 Financial difficulties eventually forced Yusuf to abandon his imperial
designs on Bornu.1
7
3. Early Ottoman Initiatives and Disturbances from the East, 1835-1900
After Constantinople deposed the Karamanlis in 1835 and began to govern
Libya directly,' the Ottomans embarked on "a phase of effective conquest
of territory."' 89 They quickly discovered "that the tribes [of the interior],
while quite willing to pay homage to the Sultan and Constantinople, were quite
unwilling to pay his taxes or submit to his authority."19' Nevertheless, Otto-
man forces inflicted a major defeat on the 'Awlad Sulaiman at 'al-Baghlah in
1842, killing Abd-al-Jalil and forcing the tribe to leave Fazzan for the
south. '9 While the Turks pushed onward to Fazzan and Ghadamis, 92 the
'Awlad Sulaiman eventually established themselves as roaming freebooters
beyond the Ottoman reach in Kanem; they controlled the strategic trans-
Saharan trade and even encroached on the territory of Ouadai, before they
182. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 71; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 154;
see also CLINE, supra note 18, at 21.
183. CHAPELLE, PEuPLE TCHADiEN, supra note 46, at 210-11; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra
note 26, at 71.
184. FOLAYAN, supra note 173, at 83-84.
185. Id. at 84, 89.
186. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 64-66; see also FOLAYAN, supra note 173, at
91-92.
187. FOLAYAN, supra note 173, at 97-100.
188. See MoRsY, supra note 173, at 130; E.G.H. Joff6, Social and Political Structures in the Jafara
Plain in the Late Nineteenth Century, in SOcIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LIEYA 19, 28-32
(E.G.H. Joff6 & J.S. McLachlan eds., 1982).
189. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 155.
190. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 73.
191. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 60-61. The Toubous participated in this struggle
against the Turks. DmIO, supra note 16, at 151. Indeed, one of 'Abd-al-Jalil's sisters was married to a
Toubou notable. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 73.
192. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 155.
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were finally defeated by the Tuaregs in what is now northern Niger.193 By
retaining links with other members of their tribes who remained in Fazzan,
the 'Awlad Sulaiman strengthened commercial ties between Libya and the areas
they raided.194 Notably, however, they never ventured into the Tibesti mas-
sif.195
Despite their victories in Fazzan the Ottomans proved unsuccessful in
subduing Tibesti and in obtaining recognition of their authority in neighboring
areas. As Rossi noted, their attempts to penetrate into the interior and set up
an administrative structure were "neither guided by a definite plan nor sus-
tained by an adequate policy."' 96 The Sultan's 1853 prohibition of slavery
went completely unenforced. 197 Although Ahmed Izzet Papa, the governor
of Tripoli, took some measures in 1858 to extend Ottoman protection over
Tibesti, his act "had only the significance of a political aspiration and was not
followed by tangible results." 19' Sultan cAbd-al-FAziz, through Ali Riza Pa§a,
the governor of Tripoli, sent a sword of honor and a manuscript to the Sultan
of Bornu in 1869,199 but this act was little more than symbolic. Traveling
through southern Fazzan and Tibesti in 1869-1874, Gustav Nachtigal reported
that the inhabitants did not mention any effective Turkish sovereignty over
Tibesti.2'
A later governor of Tripoli, Mehmed Nazif Papa, suggested sending an
armed garrison to Tibesti, but no action followed this proposal.2 ' 1 His sug-
gestion coincided with the creation in 1879 of two new kazas (administrative
subunits), one for the Ajjer Tuareg and one for the Toubou Reshada (literally,
"Toubous of the rocks," meaning Toubous of Tibesti2°), by Mustafa Faiq
Papa, the mutasaif (lieutenant governor) of Fazzan.2  However, "neither
of these had any existence in practice,"2 4 and Mehmed Nazif's successor
in Tripoli, Ahmed Rasim Papa, removed Mustafa Faiq in 1881 and reproached
him for "having wasted money through ambitions and having followed fantastic
plans with the pretense of subjecting all of the Sudan [to Turkish rule] through
193. CHAPELLE, PEuPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 210; CLINE, supra note 18, at 20; MoRSY,
supra note 173, at 269; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at74; Wright, Historical Connections,
supra note 25, at 92.
194. WRIGr, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 70, 76.
195. Id. at 75.
196. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 156.
197. Id. at 159.
198. Rossi, SToRIA, supra note 161, at 338; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 159; see also
WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 113.
199. Les aspirations, supra note 161, at 325; see also Rossi, SToRiA, supra note 161, at 339.
200. Rossi, SToRrA, supra note 161, at 338; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 159; see also
WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 113.
201. Rossi, SToRIA, supra note 161, at 340; see also Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 160.
A similar proposal in 1900 met a similar fate. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
202. 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 343; see also CLINE, supra note 18, at 11.
203. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 113; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 159.
204. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 113.
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grants of stipends to the chiefs. "205 The Turks thus did not perceive them-
selves as possessing sovereignty over Tibesti at this point. Years of inaction
followed this incident, until the Tuaregs around Ghat revolted in 1886 and
murdered the Turkish garrison there.2"s The French consul in Tripoli report-
ed in 1890 that none of the heads of the regions Turkey claimed in its 1890
note had ever recognized Turkey's 1835 seizure of Tripoli, and that they all
refused to communicate directly with the Constantinople government.2°
Thus, at the time the Sultan issued his note protesting the Anglo-French
agreement of 1890, the nearest Turkish troops were some 1500-2000 kilome-
ters (900-1200 miles) from the southernmost boundary claimed by Turkey."'
This fact, coupled with the collapse of Bornu and the raiding of the 'Awlad
Sulaiman, produced a state of disorder that was exploited by Zubair Rahma
Mansur, an Egyptian merchant prince with a private army. In the space of two
years Zubair overran Darfur and became Pap$a in 1874. Although Zubair was
shortly afterward captured and held prisoner in Cairo, his son Sulaiman ruled
the principality and expanded it westward. Sulaiman's reign, too, was short;
in 1879, he surrendered to an Egyptian military expedition and was shot.2"
At this point an associate of Sulaiman named Rabih ibn Fadl Allah fled to
the Lake Chad area. Rabih rapidly overran the region and set up an indepen-
dent principality there in 1893-1894, destroying "what remained of Bornu
sovereignty."2"' Launching a religious movement similar to that of the Mahdi
in Sudan, Rabih attempted to stave off French intrusions into the Chad area.
In 1900, he died in battle with three French columns that had converged at
Kousseri on the shores of Lake Chad.211
4. The Sanusi
After subduing the sons of Rabih, the French encountered a new foe: the
Sanusi religious brotherhood.21 2 Founded in Cyrenaica during the 1840s, and
205. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 160. Interestingly, this tactic was exactly the one used
by the Turks to establish a foothold in Tibesti after 1906. See infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text.
206. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 160.
207. See Note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 98, at 155-56
(1959).
208. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 115. Wright asserts that the claims did not reflect
"any present reality or even future possibility" and that the greater part of them were "clearly fanciful."
Id. at 114, 115.
209. MoRsy, supra note 173, at 223-24.
210. Id. at 224.
211. CHAPELLE, PEOPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 214-19; FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 2.4;
MoRsy, supra note 173, at223-24 (giving date as 1901, while all other sources give 1900); NELSON, supra
note 72, at 31; Gen. P. Mangeot, L'Ephfmtre aventure turque au 2ibesti, au Borkou et dans I'Ennedl,
40 B.C.A.F. 326, 327 (1930); see also BOUQUET, supra note 174, at 50-51, 66-68; THOMPSON & ADLor,
supra note 45, at 9.
212. See BOUQUET, supra note 174, at 70.
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emphasizing a return to a stricter and purer form of Islam, the Sanusiya
expanded southward during the late nineteenth century, while the French were
pushing northward from central Africa.
a. Origins and Spread of the Order from 1856 to the late 1890s
Islam had penetrated northern Chad gradually and unevenly. The Muslim
world's traveling diplomats, merchants, scholars, and geographers brought
Islam to Lake Chad from the north,"' and the Islamic world was aware of
Kanem from at least the twelfth century onward. Ibn Said, in the thirteenth
century, reported that Kanem was predominantly Islamic." 4 However, Islam
did not take hold in Ouadai until the seventeenth century, and in Tibesti until
the nineteenth.2" 5 The Toubous still practice forms of Islam that are imbued
with various elements of animism.216
The founder of the Sanusiya, Muhammad Ibn-eAli al-Sanusi, was born in
Algeria in the late eighteenth century. His lineage was sherifian; i.e., he was
descended from the Prophet's daughter Fatimah. He could also claim descent
from the Moroccan dynasty. Educated in Fez, 'al-Sanusi spent several years
in Mecca, where he founded the order, before returning to Cyrenaica.217 In
1856, 'al-Sanusi moved the headquarters of the Sanusiya to 'al-Jaghbub, a
location in the desert approximately 160 kilometers south of Tobruk and
beyond the reach of both Egypt and Tripoli. 28 By the 1850s the Sanusiya
213. See CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 149-50; LANNE, supra note 11, at 27-28.
214. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 58. According to a history known as the Bornu
Chronicle, Kanem converted to Islam in the late eleventh century. COMBY, supra note 162, at 0.
215. See, e.g., BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 188. In 1798, the German explorer Frederick Hornemann,
traveling across Cyrenaica, reported information on pagan Toubous. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra
note 15, at 9. Some scholars attribute the arrival of Islam to the 'Awlad Sulaiman, who fled Fazzan in the
mid-nineteenth century to avoid Turkish repression. See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 5, 7.
Others attribute it to the "determined missionary efforts" of the Sanusi in the nineteenth century. See
BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 188. Since that time the presence of the Sanusi and other marabouts among the
Toubous has decreased markedly. See id.
216. For example, the Toubous still participate in animistic rites for planting, date harvesting, and
rain-making. Islam has not deterred the Toubous from using alcoholic drinks, from adhering to the pre-
Islamic custom of trial by ordeal, or from observing their clan-specific taboos. See CHAPELLE, PEJPLE
TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 150-51; CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 362, 380-91; see
also BECK & HUARD, supra note 39, at 90-94; BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 188-89; LEBEUF, supra note 181,
at 29-30. The French officer Rdquin went so far as to say that the Teda of Tibesti "are not, properly
speaking, Muslims." According to Rdquin the Muslim rites used by the Teda are superficial displays of
piety, while the strength and persistence of pagan beliefs and rituals are much more important. Rdquin II,
supra note 111, at 263.
217. For a more detailed account of al-Sanusi's formative years, see HENRI DUVEYRIER, LA CON-
FPRPIE MUSULMANE DE SIDI MOHAMMED BEN 'ALI ES-SENOOSI ET SON DOMAiNE GtoGRAPHIQUE EN
L'ANNAE 1300 DE L'HtGIRE = 1883 DE NOTRE PRE 4-5 (Paris, Soci&t6 de G~ographie 1886); MOHAMMED
BEN OTSMANE EL-HACHAYCHI, VOYAGE AU PAYS DES SENOUsSIA 84-86 (V. Serres & Lasram trans., 1903);
NICOLA A. ZIADEH, SANuSIYAH: A STUDY OF A REvIvALST MOVEMENT IN ISLAM 35-46 (1958).
218. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA 14 (1949); MoRSY, supra note 173, at
276; ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 48-49.
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had a strong line of defenses set up at oases along the twenty-ninth parallel.
The movement spread southward into the Sahara from these bases, ultimately
reaching Tibesti and Kufrah. 19 As the order's center of gravity shifted south-
ward, so did its headquarters: to Kufrah in 1894, and to Gouro, in the Tibesti
massif, in 1899-well south of the borders presently claimed by either Chad
or Libya. 2 °
The southward move of Sanusi influence served another purpose of the
order: independence from Turkish control. 2' Although the Sanusi despised
the encroaching European powers,m especially the French, they had no love
for the Turks.' First, the Sanusi rejected the Sultan's claims to the leader-
ship of the entire Muslim community. 4 More generally, in the words of a
contemporary, the "Sanusi detest[ed] the Turks, whom they consider[ed] poor
Muslims."' One Sanusi leader reportedly cursed the Ottomans, wishing that
the Europeans would conquer every land that the Turks occupied. 622
After the death of 'al-Sanusi in 1859 his two sons, Muhammad al-Mahdi
and Muhammad al-Sharif, assumed the leadership of the order. Over the next
forty years the number of zawiyahs (lodges) quadrupled, with the greatest
expansion occurring in the Sahara.' The Sanusi exploited a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the trans-Saharan trade, constructing zawiyahs that provided
security for the caravan routes and also expanded the order's influence. 8
The oasis at Kufrah, equidistant from Banghazi and Ab6ch6 in Ouadai, was
a critical center of commerce and remained so until France and Italy conquered
the territories it served.? 9 Control over this trade, and the ability to use their
219. MoRsY, supra note 173, at 278.
220. See Wright, Historical Connections, supra note 25, at 93.
221. See 1 CARBOU, supra note 34, at 134; Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 327.
222. The Sanusi reportedly promised paradise to anyone who would kill the German explorer Gustav
Nachtigal during his travels in the Fazzan between 1869 and 1874. See infra note 248 and accompanying
text.
223. 1 CAou, supra note 34, 131 (quoting Louis RINN, MARABouTrs Er KHOUAN (Algiers, A.
Jourdan 1884)).
224. MoRsY, supra note 173, at 281.
225. 1 CAtaOU, supra note 34, at 144; see also Rossi, STO IA, supra note 161, at 327 ("the Sanusi
could not bring themselves to submit to the direction of the more tolerant and less religiously observant
Turks"), 342 ("the Sanusi harbored a certain aversion to the Turks as infidels").
226. HACHACHI, supra note 217, at 106-07; see also 1 CARBOU, supra note 34, at 144 n.1.
227. MoRSY, supra note 173, at 279.
228. See Emrys L. Peters, Cultural and Social Diversity in Libya, in LIBYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
103, 109-10 (J.A. Allan ed., 1982); see also GLAUcO CLAMMAIcHELLA, LIBYENs T FRAN QAIS Au TcHAD
(1897-1914): LA CONFRtRIE SENOUSSIE ET LB COMMERCE TRANSSAHARIEN passim (1987); EVANs-
PRIrCHARD, supra note 218, at 16; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 97-108.
229. Wright, Historical Connections, supra note 25, at 93.
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influence to end raids against local populations,"o brought the Sanusi consid-
erable power? 3 '
Building upon this influence, 'al-Sanusi and then his sons concluded several
political alliances, the first with the Sultan of Ouadai, who had met 'al-Sanusi
in Mecca in the 1830s." "The eastern Sahara sultanates were all to pass
under Sanusi influence and were to resist not only European encroachments
but also those of the Mahdiyya."' 3 The 'Awlad Sulaiman were also "pro-
gressively brought under Sanusi influence" in this manner. 4 Muhammad
al-Mahdi won over the Sultan of Borku and continued to expand and consoli-
date Sanusi power between Fazzan and Lake Chad. By the late 1870s, when
the order had established a zawiyah at Ain Galakka, the 'ikhwan (brothers) of
the order had extended its influence over more than half of the Sahara. 5
The Sanusi had made some inroads in Tibesti, but they were unable to
overcome the Toubous' independence. Although Duveyrier claimed the Sanusi
arrived in Tibesti as early as 1870 and built a zawiyah at BardaY',' this
seems unlikely. Nachtigal did not notice a Sanusi presence during his stay in
Tibesti and reported that the nearest zawiyah was in Fazzan.? Instead, the
Sanusi penetrated Tibesti only "after encircling the massif with zawiyahs. "18
Derde Chai Bogarmi and other Teda from Tibesti visited the Sanusi at 'al-
Jaghbub in the early 1890s and at Kufrah in the late 1890s. They returned to
Tibesti with Sanusi 'ikhwan, who conducted missionary efforts to revitalize
Islam among the Toubous. 2 9 However, Chai balked when they interfered
with the administration of justice (a traditional role of the Derde), and the
Sanusi envoys had to be recalled.2'
230. See, e.g., CLAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 45; Letter from Muhammad bin All al-Sanusi
to the People of Ounianga (Nov. 20, 1849 (4 Muharram 1266)), in FoRBEs, supra note 181, at 335-36
(reporting dispatch of delegates "to make peace between you and the Arabs who invade you and take your
sons and your money").
231. See CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 43-60; see also 1 CARBOU, supra note 34, at 137;
EVANS-PRTCHARD, supra note 218, at 21.
232. EVANs-PrrcHARD, supra note 218, at 16; WRIGHT, CENTRALSAHARA, supra note 26, at 86-88;
ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 49-50. However, the extent of the Sanusi influence in Ouadai may have been
exaggerated by scholars. See WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 87-88.
233. MoRsY, supra note 173, at 276. The Sanusi rejected the Mahdi's orders to appoint him Caliph,
declaring him instead an impostor. Id. at 280.
234. Id. at 277.
235. Id. at 281-82; B.G. MARTIN, MUsLIM BROTHERHOODS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AFRICA 119
(1976).
236. See DUVEYRIER, supra note 217, at 45-46, 70-71.
237. 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 404. In addition, Duveyrier consistently portrayed the Sanusiya
as an urgent threat to French expansion in the Sahara, and most scholars today recognize his assertions
as exaggerated and biased in this regard. See EvANs-PRrrcHARD, supra note 218, at 6; MARTIN, supra
note 235, at 121; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 84-85; ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 91-92.
238. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 96.
239. CHAPELLE, NoMADES NOmS, supra note 15, at 93-96; CIJNE, supra note 18, at 21; WRIGHT,
CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 96-97.
240. Allan G.B. Fisher & Humphrey J. Fisher, Tibesti Since Nachtigal's Visit, in 1 NACHTIGAL, supra
note 25, at 427; see also WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 97.
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b. The Extent of Sanusi Influence: An Assessment
While the Sanusiya was primarily a religious brotherhood, it wielded
significant political influence. The Sanusi formed a "semi-independent
state"24 and exercised "effective command of the region."242 Surprisingly,
the movement's power did not upset the Ottoman governors of Tripoli. Instead,
by allowing the Sanusi to expand and to exercise control over the regions south
of Cyrenaica and Fazzan, the Turks used the movement to extend their own
influence over these areas.243 One Italian historian has gone so far as to say
that, despite the hostility of the order, "the Ottoman Sultan could count on [the
Sanusiya] to strengthen his position in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. "2I Espe-
cially after 1908, the Turks "turned to their own advantage the Muslim and
xenophobic preaching [of the Sanusi] against the menace of the French ad-
vance. "245
It is difficult to assess the Sanusi attitude toward Europeans. European
contemporaries described the Sanusi as implacably opposed to any European
presence and accused the order of numerous massacres and other atrocities
against Europeans. 2' Nachtigal described the Sanusi as "red-hot Christian-
haters"247 and wrote that a Sanusi missionary incited the local population
"openly to murder me,... preaching in general the murder of a Christian as
an assured title to the delights of Paradise."248 On the other hand, Ziadeh
emphasizes that the Sanusi were originally a religious, not political, revival
movement, and that the order's doctrine stressed emigration rather than violent
resistance to the European advance.249 According to Nachtigal, in 1870 the
Sanusi not only sought to revive Islam among those who had become "slack,"
but also "particularly directed their attention to the inhabitants of the eastern
desert, who, whether nominal Muslims or Pagans, [were] much in need of
instruction."" It was "only as a response to foreign incursions into their
241. Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 342.
242. 1 CARBou, supra note 34, at 144.
243. See RossI, SToRIA, supra note 161, at 342; see also 1 CARBou, supra note 34, at 144. In 1895
an emissary of Sultan Abdilhamid I visited Muhammad al-Mahdi at Kufrah and returned with a letter to
the Sultan from the Sanusi leader. Rossi, SToIUA, supra note 161, at 343.
244. Rossi, SToRrA, supra note 161, at 327.
245. Id. at 342-43; see also infra notes 297-329 and accompanying text. Until 1908 the Sanusi
disfavored offensive action against the French. CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 92.
246. See, e.g., DUVEYRIER, supra note 217, at 14-15; Capt. Mangin, Les derniers secrets du centre
afrcain, 7 Dt pBCE COLONIALE ILLUSTRtE 177, 177 (1907) (providing examples of Sanusi hostility to
European travelers and officers).
247. 1 NACHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 178.
248. 2 id. at 386.
249. ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 90-91; see also Knut S. Vikor, Al-Sanusi and Qadhafi-Continulty
of Thought?, 12 MAG-REm REV. 25, 25 (1987).
250. 1 NAcHTIGAL, supra note 25, at 176.
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domains" that the Sanusi became "a fighting order. '"" Ziadeh and others
therefore caution against taking French and Italian accounts of Sanusi hostility
and fanaticism too literally.' 2 It seems safe to conclude that the Sanusiya
displayed hostility to Europeans and actively resisted their advance once it
perceived a real threat to the spread and preservation of Islam in the Sahara.
The degree of political influence actually exercised by the Sanusi is a
matter of some uncertainty. The order itself had little military importance and
usually used its spiritual authority to incite local populations to take up arms
against European colonial expansion. 3 However, some have portrayed the
Sanusi as a "semi-independent state,"' and the French themselves admitted
that the Sanusi performed acts of administration, such as levying tithes. The
size of the Sanusi following resists precise estimation, since it always increased
in the face of threatened European expansion. Contemporary estimates placed
the number of adherents at nearly three million, but the overwhelming majority
of this following lived in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.' 5
The arrival of French forces pushing northward from the French Congo
into Kanem tested the depth and extent of Sanusi influence. When the ruler
of Kanem entered into relations with the French explorer Joalland, Muhammad
al-Mahdi sent a deputy to Kanem from the Sanusi headquarters at Gouro. This
deputy, Muhammad Sunni, had the Kanemi ruler killed and then constructed
a zawiyah at Bir Alali, on the northeast shore of Lake Chad, in 1896. 6
Situated more than 800 kilometers south of Aouzou, this zawiyah marked the
southernmost limit of Sanusi expansion. Muhammad Sunni left the fort under
the command of his lieutenant, Muhammad al-Barrani, and then returned to
Ouadai; the Sanusi, however, occupied Bir Alali only briefly. Although Tuareg
and 'Awlad Sulaiman forces under Sanusi leadership repulsed an initial French
assault on the zawiyah in November 1901, French forces succeeded in captur-
ing it the following January. Al-Barrani fled to Ain Galakka, 600 kilometers
to the north. 7
The taking of Bit Alali rendered the Sanusi position in Kanem untenable.
A third battle near Bir Alali in December 1902 killed 'al-Barrani's successor,
251. Vikor, supra note 249, at 26; see also Letter from Muhammad ibn-PAli al-Sanusi to the People
of Ounianga (Nov. 20, 1849 (4 Muharram 1266)), in FORBEs, supra note 181, at 335-36 (stressing
importance of adhering to requirements of Islam, and reporting dispatch of "ikhwan to Kufrah to "teach
you and your sons of the Book of God and the tradition of his Prophet, Mohammed" in fulfillment of Sanusi
mission "to remind the negligent, teach the ignorant, and guide him who has gone astray").
252. See, e.g., ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 91-92; see also MARTIN, supra note 235, at 121; WRIGHT,
CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 84-85.
253. Wright, Historical Connections, supra note 25, at 94; see also BOUQUET, supra note 174, at 85.
254. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
255. Compare MoRsY, supra note 173, at 280 with EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 218, at 24-25.
256. See Mangeot, supra note 211, at 327; see also FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 7.
257. LANNE, supra note 11, at 32; see also FERRANDI, supra note 16, at 8, 14; MORSY, supra note
173, at 315; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 328.
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and the Sanusi evacuated Kanem."s Muhammad al-Mahdi had died at the
end of 1901; his nephew and successor, Ahmad al-Sharif, abandoned Gouro
and re-established the Sanusi headquarters at Kufrah. 9
5. Summary
By the turn of the century, then, the area presently constituting northern
and central Chad had undergone a series of disruptions; neither the French nor
the Ottomans had exercised power resembling continuous control. While some
of the 'Awlad Sulaiman, hostile to Turkish rule, migrated from Fazzan and
the regions immediately to the south, Zubair and then Rabih invaded Kanem
and Borku. Rabih's empire quickly fell to the French forces arriving from the
south, and the French thereafter drove the Sanusi from central Chad.
Although Turkish troops had reconquered Fazzan by the end of the 1870s,
their control over the area was tenuous and certainly did not extend south of
the area. The hostility of the 'Awlad Sulaiman precluded any attempts to
extend influence by conquest or by relations of tribute. Nor could the Ottomans
rely on the Sanusi for support. Although the Sanusi shared Turkey's interest
in resisting European expansion, their relations with the Sublime Porte were
hardly cordial.
B. The Turkish Presence and the First French Occupation of B.E. T., 1900-
1916
In 1898 and 1899, France and Great Britain signed agreements under which
Britain allowed France free rein in acquiring control over Kanem, Ouadai,
Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi.260 However, French forces did not penetrate
258. LANNE, supra note 11, at 32.
259. Id.
260. See infra notes 788-822. At this time the Porte renewed the protests it had made in 1890, again
asserting its rights to territory extending as far as Lake Chad. See Letter from Mflnir Bey, Turkish
Ambassador to France, to Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (May 19, 1899), in 15 D.D.F.
(ser. 1) No. 179, at 293-98 (1959); Dispatch from Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to
Ambassadors to Turkey and Italy (Apr. 1, 1899) in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 127, at 198 (1959) (reporting
receiving note of protest from Mfinir Bey dated Mar. 19, 1899).
France responded, as it had in 1890, that it had no designs on the Sultan's rights or possessions in
Tripolitania, but it refused to concede a Tripolitanian hinterland extending to the regions Turkey claimed,
Id. France also denied that the Sultan's status as the chief religious figure of Islam could create any right
of sovereignty over the regions claimed, and asserted that the hinterland "is not a principle of international
law but an ensemble of considerations of fact, of a geographic, political, commercial or other order."
Dispatch from Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Constans (May 29, 1899)
in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 191, at 317-19 (1959).
Anticipating Turkish protests, France and Britain had structured the agreement in a way that they felt
would preclude dispute. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to Britain, suggested leaving "a certain
hinterland to Tripolitania," to which British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury assented. See Telegram from
Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Britain, to Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (an,
18, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 25, at 39 (1959).
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even the southernmost of these areas until late 1901, and France did not
occupy northern Tibesti until 1914, because of Sanusi and Turkish resistance.
The French delay enabled Turkey to occupy parts of Borku, Tibesti, and
Ennedi, and thus created some of the circumstances giving rise to the present
dispute.
1. Early French Probes, 1902-1909
Although the Sanusi withdrew from Kanem in 1902, they did not relinquish
Borku. From posts at Ain Galakka, Faya, Yarda, and Ounianga Kebir, the
Sanusi "maintained a thick curtain of protection" using 'Awlad Sulaiman,
Tuareg, and Teda tribes, and directed a series of raids against the French in
Kanem. In response the French created a platoon of m~haristes (soldiers
mounted on camels).261 Counterraiding by French forces took them to Faya
in June 1906. Another French unit attacked and briefly held Ain Galakka in
April 1907, not far to the northeast and approximately 400 kilometers south
of the frontier now claimed by Chad. 2  These expeditions were temporary
and did not lead to a permanent occupation of Borku; the Sanusi rebuilt the
forts shortly afterward. In 1908, further raiding provoked a second French
expedition to Ain Galakka.263 During these years, the French were consoli-
dating their hold on Ouadai, formerly a close ally of the Sanusiya. 2
Italy also protested the convention and requested that France disavow any designs on Tripolitania.
See Dispatch from Ambassador Barrbre to Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Apr. 4, 1899),
in 15 D.D.F. (ser.1) No. 130, at 202 (1959). French Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcass6 responded that
in avoiding making a delimitation north of the Tropic of Cancer, "we left outside our accords all the regions
that one could reasonably consider as depending on Tripolitania." Delcassd also reassured Italy that France
had no designs on Tripolitania or its reasonable hinterlands. Dispatch from Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Barr~re (Apr. 5, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser.1) No. 131, at 202-03 (1959);
Dispatch from Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Barr6re (Apr. 11, 1899),
in 15 D.D.F. (ser.1) No. 135, at207-09 (1959). Admiral Canevaro, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
seemed to accept these assurances. In a speech to the Italian Senate later that month he asserted that
Turkey's claimed hinterland was "exaggerated" and had no international legal value, as it was not based
on any diplomatic arrangement. PICHON, supra note 161, at 65, 81.
See generally L'Arrangeraent anglo-frangais, l'Italie et la Porte, 9 B.C.A.F. 141, 141-42 (1899)
[hereinafter LArrangement]; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 27.
261. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 14-15.
262. LANNE, supra note 11, at 32, 60; see also Ferrandi, Oasis et nomades, supra note 21, at 4.
263. LANNE, supra note 11, at 32, 43, 75-76; see also FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 22.
264. See MoasY, supra note 173, at 315; Wright, Historical Connections, supra note 25, at 94; see
also Ferrandi, La vWritg, supra note 24, at 392; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 328.
In 1902 the Sanusi had pushed Ouadai, which had earlier concluded an alliance with the French officer
Gentil, to take a more aggressive stance against the French. In 1906 Ahmad al-Sharif intervened in Darfur
to end its attacks on neighboring Ouadai so as to allow Ouadai to devote its full attention to halting the
French advance. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 33.
French forces occupied Oum Chalouba for nine days in 1909 and forced the Anakazza, the local
Toubou clan, to swear never to take up arms against the French again. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 22.
The French had little hope that the Anakazza would honor their oath.
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After taking Ab6ch6, the capital of Ouadai, in June 1909, France sought
to maintain the territorial status quo rather than acquire additional land. Even
before the capture of the town, French Minister of Colonies Georges Trouillot
had stated, "the taking of Ab6ch6 will mark the end of our occupations of
territory."265 In November, Jean Morel, the new Minister of Colonies, in-
formed the Chamber of Deputies that France had no present intention of
expanding beyond Ouadai. He also added, however, that France would not
abandon any territory it legitimately owned.266
2. The Initial Turkish Response, 1900-1909
The French advance did not go unnoticed in Constantinople. Indeed,
according to one historian, the Turks were preoccupied with the French push
into the Sahara.267 An officer of the Turkish General Staff presented to the
Sultan a study in 1888 advocating the use of Tripoli and Banghazi as basing
points for Islamic expansion into the interior.268 The study certainly influ-
enced the Sultan's 1890 note of protest. The Porte's protest following the
Franco-British agreement demonstrated Turkey's continued interest in the
interior, although Turkey does not seem to have pressed its claims vigorous-
ly. 2
69
In 1900, Mahmud Bey, the mutasarrif of Fazzan, wrote to Tripoli noting
with alarm the French advance to Tuat and suggesting the establishment of
Turkish administration over the Toubous as a means of preempting the French.
Mahmud Bey noted that the division of the Toubous into two "tribes" centered
in Kawar and Tibesti lent itself naturally to the creation of two kazas. He
proposed installing a battalion of troops in Tibesti and constructing a barracks
there.270 This proposal, like the ill-fated attempts of Mustafa Faiq Papa to
send an armed garrison to Tibesti,271 implies that Turkey did not believe that
it exercised sovereignty over Tibesti. The Turks began to assert a greater
military presence in the region at the same time. In 1899, the French consul
in Tripoli reported Turkish expeditions to punish the Toubous for depredations
committed against caravans. The Turks were also considering permanently
occupying some points along the caravan route linking Kawar and Kanem.72
265. LANNE, supra note 11, at 60.
266. Id. at 61.
267. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 163.
268. Id. at 161.
269. LANN, supra note 11, at27; W.B.K. Shaw, IntenationalBoundariesofLibya, 85 GEOGRAPIC-
AL J. 50, 51 (1935).
270. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 163.
271. See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text.





At about this time, however, the Toubous inflicted a major defeat on
Turkey's plans to extend sovereignty over Tibesti. Near Aouzou a force of
several hundred Fazzanese, attempting to take possession of Tibesti, fell in a
gruesome battle against Toubous led by Derde Chai.273 The Turks reportedly
began making further moves around 1900, such as reinforcing garrisons in
Fazzan (Ghadamis, Marzuq, and Ghat) and sending an expedition to Bilma in
1902.274
In 1906-1907, the Turkish government took additional action to counter
the growing French influence by improving its relations with Derde Chai.
Recep Papa, the governor of Tripolitania, summoned Chai to Marzuq, where
Chai agreed to the re-establishment of the kaza of the Toubou Reshada.27
In return for a promise to stop the Toubou raids against Ottoman positions and
caravans plying the trade routes linking the Libyan coast with Bornu and
Ouadai, Chai received a monthly payment "that had been his in old times,"276
some local administrative powers, and a pledge of aid against the French.'"
Two soldiers and a flag accompanied him back to BardaY.27
However, the Turkish regalia were of little use to Chai in quelling disorder
in Tibesti, and in 1909 or 1910 Chai, evidently feeling little loyalty to Tripoli
or Constantinople, appealed to the French commandant in Bilma for assistance,
after he had already submitted to the Turks.279 Chai also strengthened his
ties to Turkey at the same time by cooperating in the establishment of Turkish
garrisons at Zouar and Bardai.
273. Fisher & Fisher, supra note 240, at 425; see also LE COEUR, LE RITE, supra note 80, at 67-68;
CHARLES LE COEUR, MISSION AU TIBESTI: CARNETS DE ROUTE, 1933-1934, at 174-75 (Marguerite Le
Coeur ed., 1969) [hereinafter LE COEUR, MISSION]; Comarin, supra note 11, at 6. Although in his 1957
work Chapelle reported this incident as occurring in the first years of the twentieth century, his 1980 study
dated it around 1810. Compare CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 92-93 with CHAPELLE,
PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 210.
274. Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 344; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 163; see also
LANNE, supra note 11, at 30.
275. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
276. Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 345-46; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 164.
277. LANNE, supra note 11, at 37; see also CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 93;
WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 118.
278. LE COEUR, LE RITE, supra note 80, at 68; RossI, STORIA, supra note 161, at 345; Rossi,
Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 164. Some have speculated that Chai decided to accept the Turkish troops
as protection against the advancing French. See Comarin, supra note 11, at 6.
The Turks also considered placing a second Toubou chief, Mai Chitmi, on their payroll in order to
stop his disruptive raids from eastern Tibesti on the trade between the Libyan coast and Ouadai. Under
this plan Chitmi was to receive 200 piasters monthly, and Chai's stipend was to rise to 500 piasters. The
same proposal also included the creation of a base at Barda! to be manned by fifty Turkish soldiers and
financed by taxes levied on caravans. These plans, however, never came to fruition. Rossi, Penetrazione,
supra note 161, at 164; see also Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 345.
279. La France et la Turquie en Afrique, 20 B.C.A.F. 290, 290-91 (1910) [hereinafterLa France et
la Turquie]; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 38; 1 CARBou, supra note 34, at 147. Chai's submission
to both France and Turkey demonstrates concretely the difficulty of relying upon relations with the Toubous
as a basis for titie.
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3. Turkish Actions After the Young Turk Revolution, 1909-1912
The seizure of power in 1908 by the reformist Young Turk movement
brought a more active Ottoman policy to the region .28  An incident in March
1910 exemplified the new aggressiveness. A French officer encountered a
Turkish lieutenant and detachment of soldiers escorting a caravan in French
territory from al-Qatrun to Bilma. Upon searching the caravan, the French
discovered a raiding party of approximately sixty Toubous. The Turkish officer
was bearing a safe-conduct pass from Sami Bey, the mutasarrif of Fazzan. The
French press criticized the action as a violation of French rights." 1 In June
1910, Trouillot wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon that
France would not allow Turkish forces to cooperate with it in policing the
Sahara until the raids then forming in Tripolitania ceased. 2
Despite these efforts the Turkish authorities still faced resistance from the
Sanusi and the local populations in the Libyan desert. In April 1908, for
example, the Sanusi leader Muhammad al-Sharif wrote to Gouro to inform
Muhammad Sunni, his lieutenant in charge of all the zawiyahs in Tibesti,
Borku, and Ennedi, that two Turkish officials had "arrived at Kufrah, sent by
the Turkish authorities to affirm the rights of the Porte over this area. The
Zawiyah are opposed to their desire." 23 The Sanusi joined the Zawiyah (or
Zowaya) in rejecting even a purely formal recognition of Ottoman authority
over the area.2 4
a. The Arrival of Osman Efendi at Bardar
In either 1908 or 1909, with the support of Derde Chai 285 and at the
urging of Sami Bey, governor of Fazzan, the Turks appointed a medical
captain named Osman Efendi to be kaymakam at BardaY, to the southwest of
280. LANN, supra note 11, at 33.
281. See La France et la Turquie, supra note 279, at 291; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at
166; see also 1 CARBou, supra note 34, at 147; LANNE, supra note 11, at 49. The Italian historian Ettore
Rossi's version of the incident portrays it as a reflection of France's increased determination to wrest the
region from the Turks and makes no mention of any concealed Toubou raiding party. See RossI, STORTA,
supra note 161, at 347.
The Sanusi also continued to enlist the Toubous against the French. In 1909 the commander of the
zawiyah at Ain Galakka, 0Abd-Allah Tuwwar (called Abadallah Tooueur by the French, and also known
as 'Abd-Allah ibn-al-Fadhil), had fallen upon a French detachment and massacred it at Ouaschenkelld. See
Mangeot, supra note 211, at 328; see also FERRANDI, supra note 18, 'at 25-26; LANNE, supra note 11,
at 32.
282. LANNE, supra note 11, at 49.
283. Ferrandi, La veri, supra note 24, at 394; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 42; Lespauvres
turcs du Borkou!, 38 B.C.A.F. 502, 502 (1928) [hereinafterLespauvres turcs]. The Zawiyah was the Arab
tribe that had driven the Toubous from Kufrah in the nineteenth century. See supra note 181 and accompa-
nying text.
284. CLAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 119-20.
285. CHAIELIE, NoMADEs NoiRs, supra note 15, at 93.
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Aouzou. The Turks also acted on earlier proposals to establish small garrisons
at Bardai and Zouar.8 6 According to Rossi, Osman won the favor of the
local population and, with a local chief's help, extended Turkish sovereignty
to Borku.2" 7 The French were well aware of these actions; in March 1911
the Bulletin du Comit de l'Afrique francaise reported the presence of the
Turkish garrison at Barda' and noted that the Turks had performed "acts of
authority" there since 1909.288 Following French protests, France and Turkey
agreed to refer the matter of the boundary between their possessions to a
delimitation commission." 9 Unfortunately, this commission never had a
chance to meet, since the Italo-Turkish war erupted in October of that
year, °90 and so the question remained to trouble later generations. The boun-
dary was the subject of negotiations between France and Italy during the
1930s"' and France and Libya in the early 1950s.
In 1911, a French functionary in Cairo, Bonnel de Mzi~res, attempted to
reach an understanding with the Sanusi regarding northern Chad. In an
exchange of letters in which Bonnel de Mdzibres identified himself as a high
official in the French government, he suggested a line drawn along the parallel
at Arada (far south of the Aouzou), demarcating a Sanusi zone of influence
to the north and a French zone to the south. 92 The Sanusi accepted this
proposal, but the embarrassed French quickly recalled Bonnel de
Mzibres. 293 In response to repeated Sanusi references to the agreementas
4
France claimed that the true boundary had been set by its 1899 sphere of
286. See Les aspirations, supra note 161, at 326; Ferrandi, La vrite, supra note 24, at 396. One
contemporary described the Turkish garrison as "six poor devils with a flag." 1 CARBoU, supra note 34,
at 146-47. Rossi, in contrast, puts the number of Turkish soldiers at 35. RossI, STORTA, supra note 161,
at 346.
287. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 166.
288. Robert de Caix, La question du Tibesti, 21 B.C.A.F. 88, 88 (1911) [hereinafter de Caix, La
question].
289. The commission was to be formed pursuant to a 1910 treaty fixing the boundary between Tunisia
and Tripolitania. See Convention Respecting the Frontier Between Tunis and Tripoli, May 9, 1910, Tunis.-
Turk., art. 3, 211 Consol. T.S. 130-131; Jacques Dorobantz, Les turcs au 7ibesti, 32 QUESTIoNs
DIPLOMATIQUEs ET JCoLONIALES 366 (1911); de Caix, La question, supra note 288, at 88; see also La
d~limitation de la Libye, 24 B.C.A.F. 15, 15 (1914).
290. See infra notes 316-318 and accompanying text.
291. See infra notes 898-921 and accompanying text.
292. Ferrandi, La vritd, supra note 24, at 395; see also CIAMMAIC-ELLA, supra note 228, at 121;
FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 33.
293. CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 121.
294. See, e.g., Telegram from Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to French Colonial Administration
at Brazzaville (May 27, 1912), in CIAMMACHELLA, supra note 228, at 152-53 (discussing letter received
from 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar mentioning Bonnel de Mzires agreement); Telegram from Colonel Victor-
Emmanuel Largeau to French Ministry of Colonies (June 6, 1912), in CIAMMAcHELLA, supra note 228,
at 154-56; Letter from 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar, kaymakam of Borku, to Colonel Hirtzman (Jan. 9, 1918 (30
Muharram 1331)) (the French erroneously calculated the date as December 25, 1912), in CIAMMACHELLA,
supra note 228, at 163-65; Letter from Muhammad 'Idris al-Sanusi to Stephen Pichon, French Minister
of Colonies (Apr. 18, 1913 (11 Jumatha al-'ula 1331)), in CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 170-71;
Letter from OAbd-Allah Tuwwar, kaymakam of Borku, to French Commandant of Ouadai (April 20, 1913)
(the date is approximate), in CTLAMMAicHELLA, supra note 228, at 174-76.
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influence agreement with Great Britain, and argued that Bonnel de Mdzi~res
had acted outside the scope of his delegated powers.29 Nevertheless, Bonnel
de Mdzibres's letters gave rise to later claims that France had tacitly consented
to consider this area "as a sort of contested zone that could one day be consid-
ered the object of negotiations.""26
b. The Arrival of Captain Ril at Ain Galakka
In 1911, the Sanusi, through Muhammad Sunni, also requested a Turkish
presence.297 Ahmad al-Sharif, the Sanusi Grand Master, opposed this deci-
sion, but Muhammad Sunni defended it, saying that "Turkish supremacy would
be an evil, but we have to accept it, since it will spare us from a greater evil:
French domination."298 Reinforcements under the Turkish Captain Ahmed
Rifki arrived at Ain Galakka in 1911, bringing the total number of Turkish
troops in the area to at least sixty.99 The Turks also extended their hold on
Tibesti, establishing a post at Yoo, on the south side of the massif, in
1911.300
However, the Sanusi commander of the zawiyah at Ain Galakka, 0Abd-
Allah Tuwwar, gave the Turks a decidedly cool reception. 0Abd-Allah Tuwwar
had led the massacre of a French platoon at Ouaschenkell6 in 1909 and thus
was certainly no friend of the French, but he also was unwilling to cede
control over Borku to the Ottomans. Telling Rifki that his efforts would be
better spent in reconquering Kanem from France,30 the Sanusi leader refused
to permit Rifki to station his forces at Ain Galakka, forcing him to set up his
295. See, e.g., Letter from Albert Defrance, French Minister Plenipotentiary, to Muhammad Idris
al-Sanusi (June 24, 1913), in CiAMMAICHLLA, supra note 228, at 173-74 ('this boundary had been set
for several years by an agreement known to all between the great governments and of which you undoubted-
ly were aware").
296. Ferrandi, La vdfitd, supra note 24, at 395.
297. Explanations for this action vary. Some have asserted that the Sanusi sought to quell Toubou
unrest arising from Sanusi taxes and corvees and to prevent these disturbances from opening the door to
French intervention. See id. at 392; see also LAN, supra note 11, at 44. According to a contemporary
French officer with access to captured Sanusi records, the inadequacy of local resources led the Sanusi
to raid the populations under French control to the South. Lespauvres turcs, supra note 283, at 502. Others
have suggested that Turkey and the Sanusi had reached an understanding to resist French and Italian
colonial expansion jointly. See PICHON, supra note 161, at 70.
298. Ferrandi, La vdrir, supra note 24, at 392. According to a French officer who had spoken with
Sanusi leaders and Toubou chiefs, Muhammad Sunni hoped to use the Turks to keep order in the regions
and deliberately exaggerated the French threat in order to persuade Ahmad al-Sharif to consent to a Turkish
presence. Les pauvres turcs, supra note 283, at 502. French civilian officials still had no intention of
occupying Borku at this time. See infra notes 319-320 and accompanying text.
299. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 37-38, 45-47; Les aspirations, supra note 161, at 326; Wright,
Historical Connections, supra note 25, at 94. Other contemporary sources put the number of Turkish troops
at 80. Auguste Terrier, La pacification du territoire militaire du Tchad, 22 B.C.A.F. 77, 82-83 (1912).
300. CoNE, supra note 18, at 21.
301. Terrier, supra note 299, at 82.
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camp at nearby Yen.3"2 Whether CAbd-Allah Tuwwar also refused to raise
the Turkish flag at Ain Galakka is less clear. 303
Understandably irked, Rifid wrote to the French commander Colonna de
Leca, stating that he had come at the request of the Sanusi who feared the
destruction of their zawiyahs. Rifki expressed hopes of having good relations
with the French and of cooperating with them to police the area.3" In a
personal exchange with Colonna de Leca, Rifki also reportedly confided his
humiliation at being duped and used by the Sanusi. When recalled by his
government in 1912, he wrote to Colonna de Leca that he was "glad to be free
of the Sanusi trap."305
c. The French Reaction to Rijfl
Rifki's arrival placed France in a difficult situation. Although Rifki was
asserting Turkish sovereignty over areas France claimed under certain trea-
ties,3" France still preferred the Turks to the Sanusi. However, the Turkish
presence prevented France from acting in force against the Sanusi, without
guaranteeing an end to the Sanusi raids against French troops. But France had
pledged to remain neutral in the conflict between Turkey and Italy, which
erupted in October 1911, and it could neither aid nor expel Rifid without
violating that pledge. 7
Given Rifid's evident annoyance at the Sanusi attitude and his desire to
cooperate with the French, the French military commandant, Largeau, wrote
to Rifki in January 1912. Largeau stated first that France's neutrality prevented
him from allowing Rifid to obtain supplies and provisions from "French
territory." He then reserved French rights over Tibesti and Borku and observed
that their respective governments should negotiate to resolve this question.38
Largeau cautioned that "[w]e do not recognize the Ottoman occupation of
302. Ferrandi, La vdrit, supra note 24, at 394; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 328-29; Lespauvres
turcs, supra note 283, at 502.
303. See, e.g., I CARBOU, supra note 34, at 156 ("we learned with amazement that the Turkish flag
had been raised at Ain Galakka"); Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 347 (Rifki "planted the Ottoman flag
at Ain Galakka"); but see Ferrandi, La vgritg, supra note 24, at 394 (,Abd-AlIah Tuwwar told Rifki "that
if he insisted on planting the Turkish flag on a fortress, he had only to raise it over a French post").
304. Ferrandi, La vgritd, supra note 24, at 394; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 329; Les pauvres turcs,
supra note 283, at 503.
305. Lespauvres turcs, supra note 283, at 503.
306. Indeed, the timing of Rifki's arrival was awkward: Rifki arrived in August, and the Franco-
Turkish delimitation commission was supposed to commence its work in the autumn. This may be
coincidence, or instead it may suggest a final attempt by Turkey to bolster its position before the commis-
sion began meeting.
307. See FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 32; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 329; see also Les aspirations
africaines de Iltalie, 38 B.C.A.F. 496, 501 (1928) [hereinafter Les aspirations africaines]; see generally
PICHON, supra note 161, at 108.
308. Letter from Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to Captain Ahmad Rifid (Jan. 12, 1912), in Les
aspirations Ofricaines, supra note 307, at 501; see also Ferrandi, La veritd, supra note 24, at 394-95.
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Borku," but proceeded to reassure Rifid that, "linked with the Porte by a
secular friendship, we will not profit from its present difficulties to attack its
lodge at Galakka. We will therefore respect the present situation" until the end
of the war."°9 Hoping to enlist Rifid in a project to end the raids emanating
from Tibesti and Borku, Largeau declared that the Ottoman government, "by
planting its flag in Borku," had "taken responsibility" for the "thefts and
pillaging" committed by the Borku population against peoples under French
protection.10 Italy would later argue that France's tolerance of Rifki's pres-
ence and its attempt to hold him responsible for the actions of the population
constituted a recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the area.31
Rifki responded to Largeau that Turkey had never assented to the Anglo-
French accord of 1899, that Turkey had possessed rights in Borku, Ennedi,
and Tibesti for decades, and that France and Britain could not modify these
rights.312 Through this correspondence Largeau and Rifki reached a modus
vivendi for the maintenance of local order and security.
The French government protested more forcefully. Alarmed at Rifid's
actions, it stated that it would refuse to recognize them as conferring any valid
title on Turkey.313 The Ministry of Colonies, claiming that the contiguity of
Tibesti and Borku with Kanem placed those regions in a special situation,
announced that France intended to enforce its rights under the 1899 treaty.314
French colonialists later denied vigorously that Rifid's presence established
an effective Turkish occupation. They noted first that Rifid himself explained
that he had come at the request of the Sanusi, not on orders from Tripoli.
(However, the Sanusi did make their request to Sami Bey, the governor of
Fazzan.) Moreover, the French argued, in addition to receiving shoddy treat-
ment from cAbd-Allah Tuwwar, Rifki was totally dependent on the Sanusi for
provisions. Nor did Rifki ever perform any administrative act in Borku (apart
from helping the French to maintain order), such as collecting taxes or signing
passes; instead, 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar continued to exercise these responsi-
bilities. Finally, the French noted, the Turks never interfered with French
miharistes who pastured their camels in southern Borku.315
309. Telegram from Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to French Colonial Administration at
Brazzaville (May 27, 1912), in CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 151.
310. Letter from Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to Captain Ahmad Rifki (Jan. 12, 1912), in Les
aspirations africaines, supra note 307, at 501.
311. See Rossr, STOMA, supra note 161, at 347 n.124 (arguing that letter "constitutes a recognition
of Turkish sovereignty in Borku"); Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 166 n.6; Les aspirations, supra
note 161, at 325-26 (discussing Rossi's arguments appearing in Oriente moderno of April 1929).
312. CrAMM CHELLA, supra note 228, at 120; PICHON, supra note 161, at 70.
313. 1 CARnou, supra note 34, at 156; PICHoN, supra note 161, at 71-72, 231-32.
314. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 62. For a discussion of the 1899 treaty, see infra notes 791-823
and accompanying text.
315. See generally Les aspirations italiennes vers le Lac Tchad, 38 B.C.A.F. 417, 417 (1928).
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In any event, Captain Rifki's stay in Borku proved to be brief. In October
1911, war broke out between Turkey and Italy, and the Ottomans evacuated
their forces from Tibesti and Borku in the spring of the following year. 16
Rifid left behind a few soldiers and a Turkish lieutenant (malazim).317 Under
the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne ending the war, Turkey withdrew its
garrisons from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, implying a withdrawal from Borku
and Tibesti as well. 31' Thus, the Turkish presence in the region lasted less
than three years and was sizeable only for a matter of months.
4. The French Conquest After the Turkish Evacuation, 1913-1916
As late as April 1911, Minister of Colonies Adolphe Messimy had dis-
claimed any French intention to occupy Tibesti and Borku, stating that such
action "would be crazy because [these regions] are occupied by plundering and
warlike tribes." 319 Asked in the following November whether France would
occupy Tibesti and Borku in order to assure the security of Ouadai, Messimy's
successor, Albert Lebrun, replied that France would have to be "prudent."32
The cautious French attitude changed radically after Rifki's arrival and his
subsequent departure for the coast.
Even after the bulk of the Ottoman forces withdrew to fight against the
Italian invasion, Turkey continued to claim territory in northern Chad. In
October of 1912, shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the
Ottoman maiadzim at Ain Galakka journeyed to Ennedi, reportedly at the
bidding of cAba-Aah Tuwwar, 321 and proclaimed a Turkish protectorate
over the region. Once there he exacted tolls from passing caravans.32 The
French Commandant Jannot, stationed in Ouadai, protested these measures in
early November and reaffirmed France's rights in Ennedi.3 3 CAbd-Allah
Tuwwar responded that the Turkish soldiers would be withdrawn,324 but the
316. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 40.
317. Id. at 52; Ferrandi, La vrit, supra note 24, at 395.
318. Treaty of Peace, Oct. 18, 1912, Italy-Ottoman Empire, art. 2, 22 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy)
243, 244 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne]; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 53. Turkey reportedly
notified France at the time that it was abandoning the entire hinterland of Tripolitania and ordering its
troops to return to Istanbul. Auguste Terrier, Au territoiredu Tcha.d: Avant etapr&s laprise d'Ain-Galakka,
25 B.C.A.F. 6, 6 (1914) [hereinafter Terrier, Au rerritoire].
319. LA.NE, supra note 11, at 62.
320. Id. at 63.
321. See Ferrandi, La veritd, supra note 24, at 395.
322. Id. at 395-96. Contemporary French observers stated that the lieutenant was in a desperate
condition in the desert and that the exaction "was less an act of sovereignty than an unavoidable concession
to the necessity of not starving to death." Id.
323. Letter from Commandant Jannot to cAbd-Allah Tuwwar, kaymakam of Borku (Nov. 4, 1911),
in CIAMMAIcRHLLA, supra note 228, at 160-61.
324. Letter from 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar, kaymakam of Borku, to Commandant Jannot (Dec. 18, 1912
(8 Muharram 1331)) (French erroneously calculated date as December 13, 1912), in CLAMMAICHELIA,
supra note 228, at 162-63.
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Turkish officer stalled and offered to take the matter up with Istanbul. 3"
French forces occupied Oum Chalouba as a preventive measure in early
1913.326
In March 1913 the Turkish lieutenant appeared at Bald, southwest of Fada,
where he informed the French that he intended to construct a post. Only when
some ninety French riflemen arrived later that month did the Turks evacuate
the town, leaving Ennedi forever.327 The lieutenant told the French that he
was "happy to leave" and had been "the slave of the 'ikhwan," but the French
officer who spoke to him did not believe him. 2' It is possible that these
incidents represented a deliberate policy by Istanbul; however, it is also
possible that these soldiers and officials had not been informed of Turkey's
abandonment of the region.3"
France quickly moved to occupy the rest of B.E.T. In June, Largeau, the
three-time French military commander in Chad, returned yet again with orders
to occupy Borku and Ennedi.33° In late November French forces assaulted
and captured Ain Galakka. They found no trace of a Turkish presence."'
In December they took Faya, which the Sanusi had abandoned, chased Mu-
hammad Sunni from Gouro, the former Sanusi headquarters, and finally
captured Ounianga Kebir to the southeast.332 By February Largeau discovered
that the Sanusi had entirely abandoned Borku and Ennedi, and he installed
military posts at Faya, Ain Galakka, Fada, Gouro, and Ounianga Kebir.333
In driving the Sanusi from Borku and Ennedi, Largeau also had to confront
the Anakazza. Some of this Toubou group, under the leadership of Alla Tchi,
sided with the Sanusi, while another group, led by a chief named Djime, joined
the French.334 In January 1912 Alia Tchi still remained at large in Borku and
loyal to the Sanusi, creating a dilemma for the French forces in Ennedi as
thousands of Anakazza, unwilling to submit to the French, brought their camels
325. See CIAlMAImHELLA, supra note 228, at 165-66; LANNE, supra note 11, at 53.
326. LANINE, supra note 11, at 53 n.94.
327. Id. at 54; Ferrandi, La vWritd, supra note 24, at 396; Mangeot, supra note 211, at 330; Terrier,
Au territoire, supra note 318, at 6. See generally Les pauvres turcs, supra note 283, at 503. The French
claimed that the Sanusi had the Turkish detachment murdered in the desert on its way to Libya. Id.
328. See CI BAMCHELLA, supra note 228, at 168-69.
329. When the French protested these incidents at Istanbul, the Turkish government replied that it
was unaware of any penetration by its forces in Ennedi and promised that the matter would be quickly
resolved. The Turkish governor of Tripoli gave no response to inquiries from Istanbul. Again, the failure
to communicate may have been genuine. Lanne suggests that it was a deliberate part of a dilatory campaign
to avoid settling the question of the Tunisian boundary. See LANE, supra note 11, at 58-59.
330. See Ferrandi, La vWritd, supra note 24, at 396.
331. LANNE, supra note 11, at 54. The French did find, however, that the Sanusi had told the local
population that Europeans were "ogres' and "satyrs" who were capable of killing with a glance. Ferrandi,
La vgrt, supra note 24, at 84.
332. La campagne du Borkou, 24 B.C.A.F. 50, 50 (1914); see also LA4NE, supra note 11, at 66;
Mangeot, supra note 211, at 330.
333. LANNE, supra note 11, at 67.
334. CHAIILLE, NOMADES NOIRS, supra note 15, at 133; FERRANi, supra note 18, at 111.
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to Ennedi for pasturing according to their custom. The Anakazza eventually
attacked and murdered an 'Awlad Sulaiman chief on his way to Faya to submit
to the French, provoking a vigorous French response.33 By the end of 1913,
Alla Tchi's brother had submitted to Largeau at Faya, 36 but only in January
1914, after making some "voluntary restitution" of recently stolen animals, did
Alla Tchi finally surrender at Fada in Ennedi.337 As for Djime, he later
turned against the French and massacred a detachment. 38
Contemporaneous with the conquest of Borku and Ennedi, a French column
from Bilma, in present-day Niger, was operating in Tibesti. The Gounda clan
had submitted in 1912.339 Zouar, site of a former Turkish fort, fell in
December 1913. Bardal, to the north, fell six months later, causing Derde Chai
to flee to Kufrah for refuge. By the end of July 1914 the French had linked
Tibesti and Borku.3" A cousin of Chai named Guetti, whom the Turks had
appointed as chief of western Tibesti, surrendered after Chai fled, and the
French appointed him Derde and his son Alifa chief of Barda. 341
5. Summary
The French conquered northern Chad in two stages, interrupted by a brief
Turkish presence in the northernmost parts. The first stage, between the death
of Rabih in 1901 and the capture of Ab6ch6 in 1909, brought France control
of Kanem and Ouadai. The taking of Ab6ch6 roughly coincided with the arrival
of Ottoman troops in Tibesti and Borku, and, although France protested the
Turkish actions, its troops coexisted peacefully with the Turkish forces for a
brief period. With the departure of the bulk of these troops northward in the
spring of 1912, and Turkey's renunciation of sovereignty over Tibesti and
Borku later that year, France began the second stage of its occupation of the
area, completing its conquest in the summer of 1914.
335. FERRANDI, supra note 18, at 217.
336. Id. at 201. Alifa Guettimi, the son of the Derde, also arrived at Faya at the same time, hoping
(according to Ferrandi) to avoid submitting to the French forces who were then invading the Tibesti massif
from the West. The French, well aware of these facts, recognized "usual Gorane tactics" and refused to
fall into this "trap." Id. at 201-02.
337. See id. at 229-31.
338. CHAPELLE, NOMADES NOiRS, supra note 15, at 133.
339. CLiNE, supra note 18, at 21, 43.
340. LANNE, supra note 11, at 67; see also Notre action au Tibesti, 24 B.C.A.F. 106, 106-07 (1914);
L'Occupation du 71besti, 24 B.C.A.F. 349, 349-50 (1914).
341. CLu4E, supra note 18, at 21, 43.
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C. France's Withdrawal From Tibesti, Subsequent Reoccupation, and Friction
With Italy, 1916-1940
While French forces were subduing Tibesti and Borku, Italian forces were
taking control of the Tripolitanian hinterland. By the spring of 1914, Italy had
conquered Fazzan 42 However, the Italians never penetrated as far south as
the Turks had before them, and they did not remain long in the region. In
August a revolt led by the Sanusi and instigated by the Turks broke out. In
1915 the Italian forces in Fazzan abandoned their positions and retreated to
the Libyan coast, leaving the Sanusi in control over the interior.343
1. The Withdrawal From Tibesti
The Sanusi, along with Derde Chai (who was in exile with them at
Kufrah), continued to foment disturbances and raids from Fazzan against the
French. Although Tibesti and Borku were not targets, the French, perhaps
prompted by local uprisings, abandoned Barda' and Zouar.3" France also
withdrew from Ounianga Kebir and transferred the post to Yao. The French
withdrawal left the area "in a highly disturbed condition," and the French were
obliged to launch occasional punitive expeditions, including one in 1919 from
Faya, "but even by 1930 the pacification of the BET... was scarcely com-
pleted, nor could anything resembling orderly administration be established
for some time."3 45 The competing claims of Chai and Guetti to be Derde
contributed to the unrest. However, this source of tension ended when Chai
submitted to the French in 1920 and Guetti fled. 3
The submission of Chai brought peace between the French and the Teda.
The French, who sharply restricted Chai's powers and watched him closely,
reported that Chai was cooperating with them. 347 Nevertheless, internal disor-
der continued in Tibesti. The chief of the Gounda had fled to Fazzan, the Abo
342. LANNE, supra note 11, at 78.
343. Id. at 67, 98; see also JoHN WRIGHT, LIBYA: A MODERN HISTORY 29-30 (1982) [hereinafter
WRIGHT, LIBYA].
344. SeeL occupation du Tibesti, 40 B.C.A.F. 95,95-96 (1930) [hereinafterL'occupation]; La mission
du lieutenant-colonel Burthe d'Annelet en Afrique centrale, 40 B.C.A.F. 163, 166 (1930) [hereinafter La
mission]; see also Comarin, supra note 11, at 6; Fisher & Fisher, supra note 240, at 429. Italy did not
miss the opportunity to point out that French troops passed through the region only infrequently and
sporadically. See Lesfrontihres de la Libye, 39 B.C.A.F. 111, 112 (1929).
345. Fisher & Fisher, supra note 240, at 429-30.
346. CLINE, supra note 18, at 21, 43. Some observers have detected a pattern in Chai's relations with
external powers. Chai would first lead Toubou resistance, then submit at a moment that was opportune
for preserving his internal authority. Thus, shortly after leading the massacre of the Fazzanese expedition,
Chai journeyed to Marzuq and submitted voluntarily to the Turks, receiving an appointment as kaymakam
and a monthly stipend. Similarly, Chai resisted the French between 1914 and 1920 but submitted once it
became clear that France could support rival chiefs against him. See LE CoEUR, LE RITE, supra note 80,
at 68.
347. CLINE, supra note 18, at 43.
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district in the west had not yet submitted, and the Arna were still raiding. 348
The situation became so chaotic that several Toubou chiefs, seeking to preserve
what little authority they possessed, pressed the French to reoccupy the
territory in the 1920s." 49
Despite the French absence, Sanusi elements never re-entered Tibesti, and
French forces from Bilma later reoccupied Zouar.35 Still, it was not until
1929, prompted by the Italian advance to Kufrah, that French forces reoccu-
pied Tibesti and remained there continuously until 1964. 511 France estab-
lished several posts along the north edge of the massif to prevent Italian entry
into the area.352
2. The Italian Territorial Demands and France's Reoccupation of Tibesti
After Italy entered World War I on the side of the Entente, various Italian
groups began to clamor for a readjustment of boundaries in Africa, claiming
that Article 13 of the Treaty of London entitled Italy to certain territorial
concessions.353 For instance, in April 1918 the Rivista Coloniale published
a report claiming Borku and Tibesti on the basis of historic rights inherited
from Turkey. 354 The Italian demands became more strident as the 1919 peace
conference approached. Early in January, for instance, the SocietA Africana
d'Italia called for a border based on the claims Turkey had made in response
to the Anglo-French declaration of 1890."55 And the Bulletin du Comitd de
I'Afriquefrangaise recognized the need for a "light rectification of the frontier
of Tibesti and Borku."3 56
Overall, however, the French remained reluctant to make concessions in
this area. After negotiating over the Italian colonial demands at Versailles,
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon and Ambassador Bonin of
Italy reached an agreement memorialized in an exchange of letters dated
September 12, 1919 (Pichon-Bonin Accord). The Accord concerned only
adjustments to the western frontier of Libya, as the parties were unable to
348. See id. at 44.
349. Fisher & Fisher, supra note 240, at 430.
350. LANNE, supra note 11, at 67.
351. L'occupation, supra note 344, at 95-96; see also BEcK & HuARD, supra note 39, at 270; LANNE,
supra note 11, at 68; La mission, supra note 344, at 166.
352. CLINE, supra note 18, at 22; LAINNE, supra note 11, at 117, 123, 175.
353. The treaty obligated France and Britain, if they increased their colonial holdings in Africa at the
expense of Germany, to recognize Italy's right to "certain equitable compensations, notably in the settlement
in its favor of questions concerning the boundaries of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya
with the neighboring colonies of France and Great Britain." Treaty of London, Apr. 26, 1915, art. 13,
23 Trattati e Convenzione (Italy) 284, 289; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 83-85.
354. LANNE, supra note 11, at 86.
355. Id. at 87. For a description of the Turkish claim, see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
356. Camille Fidel, Leproblhme colonial italien et l'alliance italo-franaise, 29 B.C.A.F. 30, 30-45
(1919); see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 89.
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reach any agreement on the southern boundary. 7 France published a "yel-
low book" in January 1920 that sought to demonstrate that Italy had accepted
the boundary France claimed by agreeing in 1902 that France would restrict
herself to the territory within the lines drawn on the map annexed to the 1899
declaration."' Italy responded that the 1902 agreement concerned the bound-
ary only to the west of Tummo, and that the question of the boundary east of
Tummo remained open.359
Through the 1920s French resistance to further Italian demands hardened,
even as the Italian press became more strident. Late in 1921, for instance, the
Italian government protested a convention concluded between France and Great
Britain in 1919,360 claiming that the agreement altered, to Italy's disadvan-
tage, the line envisioned in 1899. 361 At the heart of the Italian claim was lan-
guage in the 1899 Declaration stipulating that the limit of the French zone of
influence was to run "south-east" from the Tropic of Cancer at 160 east
longitude. Italy argued that this language indicated a line running truly south-
east; France countered that the preparatory documents to this agreement
indicated an intent to include Ennedi in the French zone, and that the line
envisaged actually ran more to the east-southeast. The parties continued to
debate the matter in another series of diplomatic notes in 1923 and 1924.
However, when France and Britain confirmed the French version of the
boundary in 1924,362 Italy did not protest.
363
A second diplomatic campaign followed in late 1928, when France offered
to cede to Italy a triangle of land in southeastern Algeria and northern Niger.
357. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 93-94; see also PICHON, supra note 161, at 226; E. RoUARD DE
CARD, LE DIFFAREND FRANCO-iTALIEN CONCERNANT LA FRONT1ARE MARIDIONALE DE LA LIBYE 29-30
(1929) [hereinafter RoUARD DE CARD, LE DIFFAREND]. In September 1919 Tommaso Tittoni reported to
the Italian Parliament that the question of Tibesti and Borku remained open and would be the subject of
further negotiations. Id.; Lesfrontiares mridionales dela Libye, 38 B.C.A.F. 42, 43 (1928) [hereinafter
Lesftont~resmdridionales]. In July 1923 Mussolini (who had become President of Italy the previous Octo-
ber) revived these claims, informing France that the Pichon-Bonin agreement was not a definitive solution
for Italy and that Italy would continue to press for the compensation it deserved under the Treaty of
London. ROBERTO CANrALUPO, L'ITALiAMUSULMANA 260 (1928); LANNE, supra note 11, at 97; PICHON,
supra note 161, at 220-21. Italy further argued that by agreeing to additional negotiations in 1927, France
implicitly admitted that the 1919 accord did not extinguish Italy's claims under Article 13 of the Treaty
of London. LANNE, supra note 11, at 106.
358. FRANCE, MINISTPRE DES AFFAIREs ETRANOGtRES, DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES: LES ACCORDS
FRANCO--TALiENS DE 1900-1902 (1920); see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 95. For a discussion of the
Anglo-French agreement and Italy's agreement to accept the boundary described in it, see infra notes 791-
815 and accompanying text.
359. CANTALUPo, supra note 357, at 258; see also PICHON, supra note 161, at 181, 189-97; ROUARD
DE CARD, LE DIuFREND, supra note 357, at 41-42. Italy also claimed that the Pichon-Bonin Accord
covered territorial "debts" arising from Turkey's hinterland and that Italy could therefore seek additional
concessions under the Treaty of London. See PICHON, supra note 161, at 226-27.
360. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 25 n.37; PICHON, supra note 161, at 190. France rejected these
claims in diplomatic notes dated February 7 and March 27, 1923. Id.
361. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 24-25.
362. See infra notes 826-827 and accompanying text.
363. See generally LANNE, supra note 11, at 96-97.
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Mussolini's counterproposal, which would have given Italy all of Tibesti,
almost all of Borku, and a large part of Ennedi, did not engender French
enthusiasm."
Italy's goal in making these demands was not merely to gain territory.
After all, the land in dispute was barren, harsh, and not known to have any
economic resources. Rather, Italy sought control of the trans-Saharan trade
routes. These routes linked Fazzan with Lake Chad and the surrounding area
and Kufrah with Ouadai. 65 French colonialists, unwilling to cede any territo-
ry, painted a different picture, claiming that Italy hungered for territorial
expansion and that French concessions would only whet the Italian
appetite. 36
6
However, Italy had not yet reoccupied Fazzan. This reconquest commenced
only in 1929 (prompting France to reoccupy Tibesti). In 1930 the Italian
campaign, like the Turkish reconquest in the 1840s, spurred a migration of
'Awlad Sulaiman to northern Chad.367 By February of that year Italian forces
had reached the boundary set in 1899. The following January Italy reoccupied
Kufrah. 368
The French, for their part, not only reoccupied Tibesti but also set up a
series of posts and mobile detachments along the frontier to prevent Italian
encroachment, including installations at Agoza in the east, Aouzou in the west,
and Ouri between them.369 Despite these measures, the Italian General Balbo
claimed to have performed an aerial reconnaissance mission over Tibesti in
late June 1931 and to have landed and stayed overnight in French territory.
Balbo reported to Rome that the region had been "practically abandoned by
the French." France vigorously denied these allegations, and one scholar has
commented that the coordinates given by Balbo put his landing and campsites
within Italian, not French, territory.37
In 1934 Italy gained British recognition that the Sarrah Triangle, a chunk
of land directly north of Ennedi and Borku, belonged to Italy. France claimed
that the exchange of notes memorializing this accord constituted implicit Italian
recognition of the boundary claimed by France, ending at 19'30' north latitude
on the twenty-fourth parallel (the boundary of the French possessions with
364. Id. at 108; PICHON, supra note 161, at 237.
365. LANNE, supra note 11, at 116. Italy also hoped to build a trans-Saharan railway linking Lake
Chad to Tripoli. Comarin, supra note 11, at 7.
366. See Cornitd de I'Afrique frangaiseReMotionsfranco-italiennes, 42 B.C.A.F. 501, 501-03 (1932);
see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 120.
367. LANNE, supra note 11, at 99; Lemarchand, A propos du Tchad, supra note 1, at 22; Martine
Muller, Frontiers: An Imported Concept, in LIBYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC AND POLmCAL
DEVELOPMENT 166 (J.A. Allan ed., 1982).
368. CLINE, supra note 18, at 22; LANNE, supra note 11, at 99.
369. LANNE, supra note 11, at 117, 123, 175.
370. See id. at 118.
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Sudan to the east).37' The French arguments were not entirely persuasive
because the 1934 agreements stated only that the southern boundary of the
Sarrah Triangle was "the frontier of French possessions," without specifying
the location of that frontier.372
3. The Mussolini-Laval Accords
In 1934-1935, seeking to prevent an Italo-German alliance, France finally
decided to appease Italy in Africa. The resulting set of agreements, called the
Mussolini-Laval Accords, gave Italy a free hand in Ethiopia and included a
treaty (the Treaty of Rome) that transferred to Italy the strip of land that would
later be called the Aouzou Strip. The intended cession of that land in 1935,
although it never became effective, constitutes a major foundation for the
present Libyan claims.373
The French government defended these accords before the Chamber of
Deputies. Three ministers, including Laval, the Prime Minister, explained that
the boundary set forth in the agreement was a strategically sound one, keeping
to the line of mountain crests in Tibesti.374 In fact, the line fixed in the ac-
cords was supposedly suggested by a French officer stationed in B.E.T. to
assure the highest degree of security in the region. 7 The commission report
noted that the accords left Italy the northern parts of Tibesti, where the popula-
tion had relations with Kufrah and Fazzan, while reserving to France the tribes
who traveled south in their nomadic migrations.376
After 1936, maps of French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa
showed the boundaries of Chad at the lines fixed in 1935.11 Nevertheless,
the souring of Franco-Italian relations following Mussolini's invasion of
Ethiopia in 1935 prevented France from ever ratifying the agreements.378
Italy never occupied the ceded territories before it denounced the agreements
in December 1938, and French troops never left the posts France established
371. See id. at 124. For a discussion of the border with Sudan and its impact on the French, and later
the Chadian, claims to the Aouzou Strip, see infra notes 825-827.
372. Exchange of Notes, July 20, 1934, U.K.-Egypt-Italy, art. 2, 155 L.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter 1934
Exchange of Notes]; see also infra notes 833-836 and accompanying text.
373. For a more thorough discussion of these agreements, see infra notes 898-919 and accompanying
text.
374. LANNE, supra note 11, at 139. According to Lanne, the generals and other officers who opposed
the 1935 agreements exaggerated the military value of the territory ceded, since the actual line of the crests
was further south. Id. at 152.
375. Id. at 151.
376. Id. at 140. The commission, playing on the French desire to keep Italy out of Hitler's orbit, did
not fail to remind the Chamber of the disturbing recent events in Germany, either. Id. at 141.
377. Id. at 139.
378. See infra notes 914-921 and accompanying text.
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there.379 These posts included Moya, ten kilometers north of Aouzou, and
Rocher Noir (Black Rock), forty-five kilometers south of the boundary in the
east, on the road from Ounianga Kebir to Kufrah. Italian troops, visiting these
posts periodically between 1935 and 1938, always found French troops there.
French forces encountered a group of Libyan workers that Italians had brought
to Rocher Noir in March 1939, and escorted them back to Libya.80 In the
summer of 1939, as relations between France and Italy deteriorated, France
prepared to defend against Italian advances into Chad, reinforcing its posts in
the zone that was to have been ceded.38'
4. Summary
The interaction of France and Italy between 1915 and 1939 sheds interest-
ing light on the problem of the Aouzou Strip. First, the Sanusi did not wel-
come either colonial power in the area and prevented both of them from
establishing a continuous presence there before 1929. Sanusi-led revolts drove
Italian troops from Fazzan in 1915, and the French initially abandoned Tibesti
in 1916 in the face of Sanusi-instigated raids. Despite the submission of the
Derde in 1920, France did not reoccupy the region until 1929. Italian troops
returned to Fazzan from the Libyan coast at about the same time.
Second, France resisted Italian territorial demands, and its one capitulation
in 1935 was never consummated. As the Italians arrived from the north,
France took steps to prevent them from encroaching on French lands. Although
the abortive 1935 agreement would have ceded the Aouzou Strip to Italy,
French forces did not abandon the area, and Italian forces never sought to
occupy it. Instead, by the outbreak of World War II France had strengthened
its presence in the frontier region.
D. From World War II to Libyan Independence
On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on France. Between this date and
the armistice two weeks later no fighting took place in the Chadian region. The
armistice required France to reduce the number of troops in northern Chad and
to evacuate the border zone. 82 However, in August Governor F6lix tbou6
decided to bring Chad into the war on the side of Free France. (Niger and all
of French West Africa stayed aligned with the Vichy government.) General
379. Lp.NNE, supra note 11, at 166; Habib Boular s & Hamza Kaldi, Lautre affaire du Sahara, JEuNE
AMIQUE, Oct. 22, 1976, at 30.
380. LANNE, supra note 11, at 176; Comarin, supra note 11, at 7.
381. LANNE, supra note 11, at 175; Comarin, supra note 11, at 7-8.
382. Armistice, June 24, 1940, Italy-Fr., arts. III, IV, V, 56 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) 197, 197-
98; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 177.
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Leclerc mobilized and led a Free French column that reoccupied the front,
passing on to Fazzan. By early 1943 Leclerc had arrived in Tripoli. In Septem-
ber, he turned Fazzan over to Algerian colonial authorities, who governed the
province through Fazzanese intermediaries until Libya became indepen-
dent. 8s
By the terms of its peace treaty with the Allies, signed in February 1947,
Italy renounced all claim and title to its former possessions in Africa.'" In
Article 23 and Annex 11 of the treaty, the four Great Powers pledged to decide
the fate of Italy's former African possessions within one year, or, failing that,
to submit the matter to the United Nations General Assembly."' The Allies
also agreed to adjust the boundaries of these territories, taling into consider-
ation the concerns of the inhabitants and the views of other interested govern-
ments." 6 In the meantime, the possessions would remain under their present
administration, with France governing Fazzan and Great Britain administering
Tripoli and Cyrenaica." 7 Although only the fate of the territories was to be
submitted to the General Assembly, the ambiguity of Article 23 and Annex
11 permitted the General Assembly to consider the question of boundaries as
well. 3
88
In May 1949 a plan negotiated by Great Britain and Italy, which would
have given Fazzan to France for the six years before Libyan independence,
failed by one vote to gain the two-thirds majority necessary for General
Assembly approval. 89 Six months later the General Assembly passed Resolu-
tion No. 289(IV), recommending the creation of an independent and sovereign
Libyan state by the beginning of 1952 and asking the special commission
handling the Libyan question "to study the procedure to be adopted to delimit
the boundaries ...in so far as they are not already fixed by international
agreement .... ,,390 This resolution effectively ended French hopes for a
looser federation that would have allowed France to preserve some influence
in Fazzan."9' At the end of 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution
383. See LAmNE, supra note 11, at 178-79; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 49; see also THOMP-
sON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 12; Muller, supra note 367, at 173. France, hoping to link Algeria more
closely with its other African possessions, attempted to integrate Fazzan with Algeria. WRIGHT, LIBYA,
supra note 343, at 49.
384. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 23(1), 49 U.N.T.S. 3, 139.
385. Id. art. 23(3), 49 U.N.T.S. at 139; id. Annex 11, paras. 1, 3, 49 U.N.T.S. at 214.
386. Id. Annex 11, para. 2, 49 U.N.T.S. at 214.
387. Id. art. 23(2), 49 U.N.T.S. at 139; see also LAMM, supra note 11, at 182.
388. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 190.
389. Id.; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 54-55.
390. G.A. Res. 289(M), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949).
391. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 191-92; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 58-59.
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392(V), which stated that the Libyan boundaries would be set by negotiations
between Libya and France after Libya attained independence.39
Sanusi influence persisted in the formation of the new Libyan state. In
1920, Italy had recognized Idris al-Sanusi, the son of Muhammad al-Mahdi
and successor of Ahmad al-Sharif, as the Amir of Cyrenaica. 31 Idris's status
as undisputed leader of Cyrenaica was in large part due to his position within
the Sanusi movement. 94 Idris cooperated closely with the British during
World War II, and from June 1949 he held authority over internal affairs in
the provisional government of Cyrenaica. 39' The Libyan constitutive assem-
bly unanimously named Idris the King of Libya in December 1950.396 Thus,
the grandson of Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi headed the new Libyan state,
which formally proclaimed its independence on December 24, 1951 .
3
'
Franco-Libyan relations had deteriorated by the end of 1954, and Libya
asked France to withdraw its forces from Fazzan. Libya also began asserting
that its true frontier had been fixed in the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords
between France and Italy. French patrols intercepted several teams of U.S.
nationals exploring for petroleum for Libya and carrying maps showing the
1935 line as the boundary. The French promptly escorted these teams back to
the border claimed by France. 95 In February 1955 French troops took simi-
lar actions with Libyan motorized troops who penetrated the Aouzou Strip at
392. G.A. Res. 392(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 22, U.N. Doe. A11775 (1960);
see LANNE, supra note 11, at 208; Muller, supra note 367, at 174. The French felt that the boundary had
already been "fixed by international agreement" and thus, under Resolution 289(M, did not need to be
negotiated. However, the confusion was of their own making. In response to an inquiry by the U.N. Secre-
tariat, the French delegation had stated that the boundary between Libya and the French colonial possessions
to the south of it had been fixed by a Franco-Italian protocol of January 10, 1924, which was still in force.
The document to which they were referring was the Anglo-French convention of that date; however, the
French diplomats failed to mention the Anglo-French agreements of 1898, 1899, and 1919, which the 1924
convention completed. LANNE, supra note 11, at 206-07.
The mention of a Franco-Italian agreement was enough to remind the Secretariat of the Mussolini-
Laval Accords of 1935. In memorandum AIACI18-103, addressed to the interim commission in January
1950, the Secretariat referred to the 1935 Accords as setting the southeast border of Libya. In addition to
reporting the French assertions that these accords had lapsed and possessed no juridical value, the
Secretariat noted that there was no record of a 1924 Franco-Italian agreement, but that there was an Anglo-
French agreement. Id. at 206-07.
In December 1950 the French representative to the General Assembly requested the floor in order
to correct the error and to state that the boundary in question was set by agreements in 1899, 1902, and
1919. Id. at 207-08. By this time, however, the damage had been done.
For a discussion of the content of the various agreements mentioned, see infra notes 825-827, 898-921
and accompanying text.
393. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 98-99; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 32.
394. See Salaheddin HasanSury, The PoliicalDevelopment of Libya 1952-1969: Institutions, Policies
and Ideology, in LIBYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 121, 125 (J.A.
Allan ed., 1982).
395. LANNE, supra note 11, at 192; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 55-56.
396. LANNE, supra note 11, at 194.
397. Id. at 195; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 73.
398. LANNE, supra note 11, at 209; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 84-85.
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Moya with similar maps; France also made two official protests to Tripoli.3
In addition to sponsoring these expeditions, Idris also provided Chadian insur-
gents with arms, food and bases in Fazzan until Chad's independence in
1960. 0
In August 1955, however, Libya signed a treaty with France fixing the
boundaries according to the lines claimed by France. 1 Libya's acceptance
of the French claims contradicts its claim that it genuinely held title to the
Aouzou Strip. Possibly, Libya may not have believed that its right to the
territory was beyond dispute. Another explanation for the inconsistency-the
one relied on by Libya today-argues that Idris's government, beholden to
colonial powers for its creation and dependent on their good favor and largesse
for its survival, simply lacked the power or the will to oppose the demands
of those powers. In other words, Libya asserts that France forced Idris to
accept in 1955 a colonial boundary that deprived Libya of territory it rightfully
owned.
E. The Chadian Revolt and Libya's Occupation of the Aouzou Strip, 1960-1973
Within ten years of Libyan independence Chad, too, would assume full
sovereignty. Here, however, the process occurred under the aegis not of the
United Nations, but of France. By the end of 1958 the Territorial Assembly
declared, by a unanimous vote, that Chad was an autonomous republic within
the French Community, which conducted the republic's foreign relations. Chad
achieved full independence and sovereignty in August 1960. ° Although the
new state was not obligated to accept boundaries previously negotiated by
France, it chose not to contest its inherited frontiers.'
This decision was consistent with general postcolonial practice in Africa.
The Charter of Addis Ababa, which gave birth to the Organization of African
Unity (O.A.U.), recognizes "the territorial integrity of each State," i.e., the
inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries.' In July 1964 the O.A.U.
voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution declaring that "all the member
399. LANNE, supra note 11, at 210; see also MARY-JANE DEEB, LIBYA's FoREION PollcY IN NORTH
AFRICA 42-43 (1991); BENYAMIN NEUBERGER, INVOLVEMENT, INVASION AND WITHDRAWAL: QADH-
DHAFI'S LIBYA AND CHAD, 1969-1981, at 23 (Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Occasional Papers Series No. 83, 1982); RONALD BRUCE ST. JOHN, QADDAFI'S WORLD DESIGN: LIBYAN
FOREIGN PoLiCY, 1969-1987, at 93-94 (1987). Comarin puts the date of this incident in January 1955.
Comarin, supra note 11, at 8.
400. DEEB, supra note 399, at 42-43.
401. Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness, With Exchange of Notes, Aug. 10, 1955, Fr.-
Libya, J.O., Apr. 7, 1957, at 3661, reprintedin BRowNLIE,supra note 12, at30 [hereinafter 1955 Treaty];
see also infra notes 783-784 and accompanying text.
402. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 221.
403. Id. at 221-22.




states undertake to respect the existing boundaries at the moment they acceded
to independence."' 5 This resolution would preclude Chad and Libya from
challenging the borders unless one of the countries asserted that the boundary
was still in dispute at the time of its independence.
Chad was independent for only four years before a revolt broke out against
the government of President Franqois Tombalbaye. Tombalbaye, like almost
all of his government, came from the more populous south of Chad, and the
regime was dominated by the black Christian Sara tribes of that region. The
revolt began in central Chad, in Ouadai and the neighboring prefecture of
Batha, areas populated by Muslim Arabs.' In 1966, the rebels formed the
Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad, or FROLINAT, with the goal of
uniting the north "under the banner of Islam" and liberating it from southern
dominance.4 7
Meanwhile a separate uprising was brewing in B.E.T. After Chadian
independence, French military authorities continued to govern the area, but
in January 1965, Tombalbaye took control of the region. The Sara troops he
installed there merely exacerbated resentment against his regime. In March
Toubou rebels responding to alleged brutalities drove the Sara troops in
Aouzou from their post, forcing Tombalbaye to appeal to France for aid.
However, the unrest in B.E.T. remained separate from the FROLINAT revolt
until 1968.1' The Libyan government began wooing the Toubous, and in
December 1966 the Derde, Oueddei Kichidemi, fled to Tripoli.'
In March 1968, Toubou guards at Aouzou revolted and massacred the
regular garrison, which was composed of troops drawn from the south. After
an unsuccessful attempt to retake the town and another request for French aid,
Tombalbaye's troops briefly recaptured Aouzou in September, but it fell again
to the rebels soon afterward. The revolt continued to spread throughout B.E.T.
in 1969, and Tombalbaye's government lost control over the entire region
except for posts at Faya, Fada, Bardal, and Ounianga.41°
Tibesti, however, entered the rebellion partly as a result of its own internal
schisms, which pitted the sons and partisans of Derde Oueddei Kichidemi
against adherents of the former Derde, Chai. An arrangement between Chai's
supporters and the government forced Oueddei's side into rebellion. When the
older son of Oueddei and the grandson of Chai both died in combat, leadership
405. O.A.U. Res. AHG/16(I), July 21, 1964 [hereinafter Cairo Resolution], reprinted in BA ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 143.
406. LANNE, supra note 11, at 226.
407. JOHN K. COOLEY, LIBYAN SANDSTORM 196 (1982); see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 226.
408. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 226.
409. LANNE, supra note 11, at 226; see also THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 47. According
to Comarin, the Derde fled in 1965. Comarin, supra note 11, at 8.
410. LANNE, supra note 11, at 226; THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 55; Comarin, supra
note 11, at 8.
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of the rebel movement in Tibesti, now calling itself the Forces Armdes du
Nord (F.A.N.) or the Second Liberation Army (to distinguish it from the First
Liberation Army operating in the east and center of Chad), devolved in April
1969 upon Goukouni Oueddei, the younger son of Derde Oueddei. n
At this point, F.A.N. joined forces with FROLINAT.412 King Idris had
been supplying material aid to FROLINAT, under the leadership of 'Abu
Siddiq, the head of the rebellion, and had been allowing F.A.N. to operate out
of Tripoli." 3 In August 1971 Colonel Mu'ammar 'al-Qaddafly, who had
seized control of Libya from King Idris in a coup in September 1969, spon-
sored an attempt at Kufrah to unite FROLINAT's two armies. This initiative
failed as a result of the Second Army's refusal to accept Siddiq, Qaddafiy's
candidate, as the secretary-general of the organization. As a result, Qaddafly
imprisoned Goukouni Oueddei, Siddiq's rival, in Tripoli until April 1972.111
Although he expelled approximately one thousand "rebels "-former Toubou
bodyguards of King Idris-from Libya into Chad in June 1970,415 Qaddafiy
redoubled Libya's efforts to forge ties with the Chadian north. In August 1971
Tombalbaye accused Libya of fomenting a coup against his government and
severed relations with Libya, offering aid to anyone who would overthrow
Qaddafly. Libya responded by recognizing FROLINAT as the true representa-
tive of the Chadian people.4"6 Early in 1971 Qaddafly also published Libyan
claims to the area, based on the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords.1?
However, the rupture between Tombalbaye and Qaddafly lasted only six
months. In 1972, Tombalbaye made an abrupt about-face, breaking off rela-
tions with Israel in November and immediately travelling to Tripoli on Qad-
dafly's invitation. In December, he signed a treaty of amity, cooperation, and
mutual assistance with Qaddafiy, hoping to end Libyan support for the
rebels.41 8
Libyan military vehicles had crossed the border into Aouzou in April and
November of 1972 and again in January 1973, when the Libyans distributed
411. CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 272.
412. See CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note 46, at 272, at 55-56.
413. Id. at 121; NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 23; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at
128-29; Younbs Berri & Saleh Kebzabo, Quefair Kaddafi au Tchad?, JEUNE AFRIQUE, Sept. 26, 1975,
at 20.
414. THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 60; see also CHAPELLE, PEUPLE TCHADIEN, supra note
46, at 273; KAYE WHrrEMAN, MiNoRtY RIGHTs GROUP, CHAD 7 (1988).
415. LANNE, supra note 11, at 227; WHITEMAN, supra note 414, at 7. In the summer of 1970
opponents of Qaddafly, including one member of the Sanusi family, used Chad as a base in an unsuccessful
conspiracy aimed at ousting him. The incident may account in part for Qaddafly's obsession with Chad.
See Lemarchand, The Case, supra note 50, at 109-10.
416. LANNE, supra note 11, at 227; see also THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 122.
417. Nourredine Abdi, Common Regional Policy for Algeria and Libya: From Maghribi Unity to
Saharan Integration, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LIBYA 215, 224 (E.G.H. Joffd & K.S.
McLachlan eds., 1982).
418. LANNE, supra note 11, at 227-28; ST. JOHN, supra note 399, at 97; Berri & Kebzabo, supra
note 413, at 20; see also NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 27-28.
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provisions and inoculated the population. Between January and March the
Libyans settled permanently in Aouzou, installing a new administration and
distributing Libyan identification cards to the population.4"9 In 1973 Libya
built an airstrip defended by ground-to-air missiles.42 Reports circulated in
1975 that Libya had annexed the Aouzou Strip and attached it to the Libyan
administrative center at Kufrah, 670 kilometers away,421 but Libya denied
annexing the territory.' Since 1976 official Libyan maps have shown the
area as part of Libya.4' The occupation was entirely unannounced, and
neither Chad nor Libya made any official statements.424 The circumstances
surrounding the Libyan occupation, including the preceding agreement between
Tombalbaye and Qaddafly and the silence of both governments, have given
rise to speculation that Tombalbaye essentially sold the Aouzou Strip to
Libya.4' Indeed, in 1987 Libya released a letter allegedly written by
Tombalbaye in which he purported to cede the Aouzou Strip to Libya.426
Thus, the Chadian rebellion presented King Idris and then Colonel
Qaddafiy with an opportunity to extend Libyan influence southward and
possibly to acquire some territory. The involvement of Idris supports Libyan
claims to the Aouzou Strip as longstanding, based on kinship and tribal ties
arising from shared history and the influence of the Sanusi movement. Al-
though Qaddafiy's policy of exploiting anarchy in Chad to harass Tombalbaye
and build ties to the Toubous did allow him to occupy the Aouzou Strip
unnoticed and unprotested, the shifting alliances and fortunes of the civil war
in the subsequent years would quickly change the situation.
419. LANNE, supra note 11, at 228; Abdi, supra note 417, at 224; Dial Torgerson, Chad Officials
AdmitLibyans Occupy 27,000 Square Miles, INT'LHERALD TRIB., Sept. 26, 1975, reprinted in DOMniQuE
SOULAS DE RUSSEL, TSCHAD-OBEKT NATIONALER UND INTERNATIONALER MACHTKAMFE 44 (1981);
see also Berri & Kebzabo, supra note 413, at 18, 20. Chad complained to the United Nations that the
Libyan military presence in the area actually began in 1971. According to Chad, by 1973 Libya was
occupying the area ceded by France in the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords. Memorandum concerning the
occupation of ibesti by Libya, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., Supp. for Jan.-Mar. 1983, at 65, U.N. Doc.
S/15649, Annex 2 app. (1983) [hereinafter Chad Menwrandum].
420. WRiGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 130.
421. LANNE, supra note 11, at 228; Kellner, supra note 11, at 1. The annexation was announced in
the Tripoli newspaper Al-Fadih but not in sources traditionally monitored by Western states. Id.
422. Libya Denies News Report She Annexed Part of Chad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1975, at A9.
423. New Libyan Maps Annex Territory from 3 Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1976, § 1, at 3.
According to the maps, distributed by the Information Division of the Libyan Foreign Ministry, Libya
owned not only 37,00 square miles of formerly Chadian territory but also 7,500 square miles of Algeria
and 7,500 square miles of Niger. Id.; see also Le litige entre le Tchad et la Libye, AFRIQUE CONTEMPOR-
AINE, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 17, 18 [hereinafter Le litige].
424. LANNE, supra note 11, at 228-29.
425. For a discussion of these allegations, see infra notes 847-851 and accompanying text.
426. See infra notes 844-846 and accompanying text.
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F. Changing Alignments and Attempts to Resolve the Dispute, 1973-1991
1. Overview
The years after 1973 saw Chad descend further into chaos. The Libyan
annexation widened the schism within F.A.N. between Siddiq and Goukouni
that had thwarted attempts to unify FROLINAT in 1971. Because the occupa-
tion discredited Siddiq among the Toubous, Libya sought a new ally in its
former prisoner, Goukouni, who commanded F.A.N. along with Hiss~ne
Habr6.427 Much to Qaddafiy's chagrin, Goukouni's refusal to accept the
Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip ultimately broke up this alliance. Habr6
eventually emerged as the sole ruler of Chad. In 1987, he expelled the Libyan
forces that had invaded B.E.T. from almost all of northern Chad, except the
Aouzou Strip. Numerous attempts to resolve the Aouzou Strip dispute during
this period all failed, until Habr6 and Qaddafiy finally decided in 1990 to
submit the question of the Aouzou Strip to the International Court of Justice.
2. The Malloum Government, Bilateral Discussions, and the Bongo
Committee, 1975-1978
In April 1975 a military coup drove Tombalbaye from power and created
a new government led by General FM1ix Malloum. The Malloum government,
however, was no more successful in ending the rebellion than Tombalbaye's
government had been. In 1976, Goukouni, who had in October deposed Habr6
as sole leader of F.A.N. (which he renamed Force Arm6e Populaire (F.A.P.)),
controlled the northern half of Chad.42
The Malloum government, which upon taking power had not mentioned
the Aouzou Strip, chose to try to negotiate a solution with Libya while consoli-
dating its control over Chad. According to Chad, the first bilateral discussions
had taken place in 1974, before the overthrow of Tombalbaye. Two high-
ranking Chadian officials travelled to Tripoli, met with Libyan officials, and
brought up the matter of Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip. Libya
asserted that its police forces, not military units, had entered Aouzou to
maintain order there. It further claimed that a 1966 treaty of friendship (1966
Treaty) between Libya and Chad permitted this action. Chad countered that
the Libyan units were in fact military forces, and that even if they were police
units the occupation was impermissible, because the 1966 Treaty required
427. CoOLEY, supra note 407, at 197.
428. The split between Goukouni and Habrd mirrored tribal divisions; Goukouni held the support of
the Teda, while Habr retreated to Borku with several hundred Anakazza followers. NEUMERoR, supra




cooperative bilateral efforts to maintain order along the border.4' The meet-
ings ended without any decision.
Following Malloum's coup, Algeria and Niger attempted mediation of the
dispute, but their efforts were in vain.430 Malloum sent one of his ministers
to Tripoli in late July 1976, where discussions again turned to the Aouzou
Strip. Libya denied that there was a boundary problem but offered to discuss
the matter if Chad insisted. Libya then claimed title under the Mussolini-Laval
Accords and produced a map from the 1956 Oxford Atlas showing the Aouzou
Strip in Libya. Chad responded that the Mussolini-Laval Accords had never
entered into force. These meetings, too, ended inconclusively, with the two
parties agreeing to create a Joint Technical Commission to study the matter
and propose solutions. 431
The Joint Technical Commission met in N'Djamena to discuss the matter
in late June 1977. Libya again denied the existence of a problem, and repeated
that international agreements, in particular the Mussolini-Laval Accords,
supported its claim to the territory. Chad again denied the effectiveness of that
agreement and asserted its own claims based on the 1955 Treaty. Libya
responded that it had not been truly free between 1951 and 1969 (the years of
the monarchy under Idris), and the meeting again broke off without any
result.432 Rebel activity in northern Chad began to intensify during this
period, making negotiation increasingly difficult.
As Goukouni's forces continued to press southward with Libyan-supplied
arms, the French air force eventually had to act to stop his advance.433 After
the French intervention Goukouni quarreled with a faction of the F.A.P. led
by a Qaddafiy prot6g6, Acyl Ahmad. Although Qaddafly looked to Goukouni
as a potential ally, Goukouni criticized Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip
and even proposed a truce with Malloum so that their combined forces could
expel the Libyans from the area.434 Indeed, it was Goukouni's forces that
429. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 65-66; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2429th
Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2429th mtg. at 52, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2429 (1983) [hereinafter 2429th
Meeting] (statement of Mr. Barma). In Article 1(1) of the agreement Libya and Chad each promised to
"take all possible measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security [on their frontier] through
liaison and co-operation between their security services." Agreement on Good Neighborliness and
Friendship, Mar. 2, 1966, Chad-Libya, quoted in Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68 [hereinafter
1966 Treaty].
430. Le litige, supra note 423, at 17.
431. The parties did not draw up minutes of the meeting or issue a communiqud. Chad Memorandum,
supra note 419, at 66; 2429th Meeting, infra note 429, at 52-53 (statement of Mr. Barma); see also
THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 124-25.
432. The parties again left no minutes of the meeting and did not issue a communiqu6. ChadMemoran-
dum, supra note 419, at 66; 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 53-56 (statement of Mr. Barma).
433. THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 125; see also NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 38.
434. Jean Gueyras, Le diff,4rendfrontalier entre Tripoli et N'Djamena, LE MONDE, July 28, 1977,
at 2; see also COOLEY, supra note 407, at 197. Goukouni claimed in an interview that he had "circulated
several pamphlets" and affirmed that "Aouzou is an integral part of Chad. We will never accept the Libyans
staying in this district." However, Goukouni felt that the Aouzou Strip had to take a second priority to the
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defeated Qaddafly's Islamic Legion, composed of Muslim mercenaries from
other countries, when it tried to capture Faya in June.435
Frustrated by the failure of attempts to reach a negotiated settlement, the
Malloum government brought the matter to the O.A.U. The time was oppor-
tune because the recent rebel operations at Bardai, Zouar, and Ounianga had
made it obvious that Qaddafiy was supplying F.A.P.436 At the meeting of
the O.A.U. Council of Ministers on June 29, 1977-immediately after the end
of the Joint Technical Committee meeting in N'Djamena-Lieutenant-Colonel
Wadal cAbd-al-Qadar (Abdelkadar) Kamougu6, the Chadian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, requested that the question of "Libyan aggression against
Chad and occupation of a part of Chadian territory by Libya" be placed on the
agenda of the upcoming Fourteenth Conference of Heads of State.4" After
"lively" debates, the Council of Ministers acceded to Chad's request.438 At
the Conference of Heads of State (or Summit) at Libreville in July 1977,
General Malloum charged Libya with aggression against Chad and outlined
Chad's claims to the Aouzou Strip. The Libyan representative presented the
Libyan side of the matter but failed to produce any direct evidence in support
of Libya's claims.439 The O.A.U. then decided to form a committee com-
posed of delegates from six nations, the Bongo Committee. 440
The Bongo Committee first met in Libreville on August 10-12, 1977. It
issued a resolution reaffirming the principle of the inviolability of colonial
frontiers and establishing a Sub-Committee of Experts, made up of jurists and
cartographers. 4" The subcommittee met in January 1978, 441 but Libya's
refusal to participate in the meeting and to provide documentation to support
its claim scuttled the subcommittee's efforts. 3 Chadian President Malloum
success of the revolution, and he therefore continued to maintain close relations with Tripoli. Lemarchand,
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stated, "We're waiting for Libya to defend its position with texts in support.
It has done nothing. It contents itself with presenting maps."' While the
pressure from the rebels in the north continued to mount, other negotiations
taking place in Niamey, Niger proved equally fruitless.
Finally, on February 6, while these negotiations were in progress, Malloum
suspended diplomatic relations with Libya, again citing Libyan aggression
against Chad and the occupation of the Aouzou Strip. 5 Malloum also
brought the matter of Libya's occupation of Tibesti before the U.N. Security
Council." 6 Colonel Kamougu6 appeared before the Security Council shortly
afterward and presented Chad's side." 7 Libya denied occupying the Aouzou
Strip and asserted that the real problem was the Chadian rebellion." Suda-
nese President and incoming O.A.U. Chairman Jafar Numairiy offered his
mediation services to both Chad and O.A.U. Chairman Bongo." 9 This effort,
too, came to naught. Before the Security Council could act, however, Malloum
had reached an agreement with the rebels and with Libya in which he agreed
to withdraw the complaint and to resume ties with Libya.4"°
This sudden turn of events stemmed from the exigencies of the Chadian
rebellion, which began to overshadow the legal question of the boundary.
Under increasing pressure from Goukouni Oueddei's Libyan-backed rebels,
Malloum attended conferences convened by Qaddafiy with the support of Niger
including an ordinance prohibiting the movement and freezing the assets of Libyan nationals in Chad.
2060th Meeting, supra note 441, at 3 (statement of Mr. Kamougud), 9 (statement of Mr. Kikhia); Chad
Memorandum, supra note 419, at 69; see also JoUvE, supra note 437, at 156.
444. Le gngral Malloum "fair conflance l'O. U.A. 'pour rdsoudre le diffirendfrontalier du Tchad
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U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 23, U.N. Doc. S/12554 (1978); Letterfrom the Representative
of Chad to the President of the Security Council (Feb. 8, 1978), U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 1,
at 23-24, U.N. Doc. S/12553 (1978).
447. Specifically, Kamougu6 stressed, on one hand, the 1955 Treaty and the colonial treaties to which
it refers, and, on the other, the invalidity of the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords. He also noted that Libya
had agreed to respect colonial boundaries by signing the Cairo Resolution. See 2060th Meeting, supra note
441, at 2 (statement of Mr. Kamougu6). The Chadian Government also argued that Libya's failure to
cooperate with the O.A.U. Sub-Committee of Experts necessitated his resort to the Security Council. Telex
from President Malloum to the President of the Security Council (Feb. 8, 1978), U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 24, U.N. Doec. S/12555 (1978); see also N'Djamena accuse la Libye d'etre intervenue
militairementaux c6t&s de FROLINATd Faya-Largeau, LE MONDE, Feb. 12, 1978, at 3.
448. 2060th Meeting, supra note 441, at 6, 9 (statement of Mr. Kikhia).
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450. See infra note 451 and accompanying text; see also Letterfrom the Representative of Libya to
the President of the Security Council (Feb. 18, 1978), U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. 1, Jan.-Mar. 1978,
at 40-41, U.N. Doec. S/12568 (1978); Letterfrom the Representative of Chadto the President of the Security
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and Sudan in Sebha and Banghazi in early 1978. Malloum and Goukouni
signed a cease-fire in which Malloum agreed to withdraw his complaint at the
O.A.U. and the Security Council, but once Chad had complied the cease-fire
never took effect. 451
3. Goukouni, Habrg, and the GUNT, 1979-1982
In August 1978 Sudanese mediation had led to an accommodation between
Habr6 and Malloum, and the new government continued to charge Libya with
aggression throughout 1978.452 Malloum again submitted the dispute at the
fifteenth O.A.U. Summit, held in Khartoum in 1978. The O.A.U. appointed
a new ad hoc committee to negotiate a cease-fire between the Chadian govern-
ment and FROLINAT.5 3 These efforts were fruitless.454
Six months later, in February 1979, Chad experienced yet another change
of government as the Malloum-Habr6 coalition s5 disintegrated and plunged
the country once more into chaos.456 In March, the mediation of the ad hoc
committee arranged a temporary cease-fire between the warring Chadian
factions.457 The so-called Kano Accords united Habr6 and Goukouni, the two
Toubou leaders, in a National Transitional Union Government (GUNT) that
excluded pro-Libyan Arab factions." 8 The GUNT never achieved stability.
At the O.A.U. Summit in Monrovia in July, talks focused on ending the
fighting and foreign intervention and on encouraging a national unity govern-
ment.45 9 The O.A.U. sponsored further meetings at Lagos, Nigeria in Au-
gust, which produced the Lagos Accord."6 This agreement expanded the
GUNT to include the pro-Libyan factions and, like its predecessor, proclaimed
a cease-fire and established a second GUNT. The Lagos Accord also called
for the O.A.U. to send a peace-keeping force to Chad." I
However, the broad support gained in the Lagos Accord was not enough
to sustain the GUNT, and the O.A.U. peacekeeping force proved to be a paper
451. Joint Communiqu6, Mar. 27, 1978, reprinted in MICHAEL P. KELLEY, A STATE IN DISARRAY:
CONDITIONS OF CHAD'S SURVIVAL 155-56 (1986); see also NEUBEROER, supra note 399, at 33-35;
WHrrEMAN, supra note 414, at 10; Legum, supra note 440, at 54.
452. THOMPsoN & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 126; see also NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 39.
453. JouvE, supra note 437, at 156. The states represented on the committee-Sudan, Cameroon,
Niger, and Nigeria-all shared borders with Chad and thus had a stake in the matter.
454. LANNE, supra note 11, at 233.
455. See WHrrEMM, supra note 414, at 10.
456. NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 40-41.
457. Kano Accords on National Reconciliation, Mar. 14, 1979 [hereinafter Kano Accords], reprinted
in KELLEY, supra note 451, at 157-61.
458. Id.; see also COOLEY, supra note 407, at 197-98; JoUVE, supra note 437, at 157; KELLEY, supra
note 451, at 69-71; NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 43.
459. Legum, supra note 440, at 54.
460. Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad, Aug. 18, 1979 [hereinafter Lagos Accord],
repinted in KELLEY, supra note 451, at 162-66.
461. Id.; see also WHITEMAN, supra note 414 at 11; JouVE, supra note 437, at 157.
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tiger. Only the Congo provided its quota of troops, promised funds never
materialized, and the O.A.U. forces stood aside as Habr6's forces battled the
GUNT for control of Chad. By the next O.A.U. summit in Freetown in July
1980 Goukouni had ousted Habr6 from the GUNT, the GUNT had disin-
tegrated, and the civil war had intensified. 2
The Bongo Committee met several times in late 1980 and hammered out
with Goukouni a five-point agreement that basically reiterated the formula of
the Lagos Accord. But Habr6 refused to participate or to sign a cease-fire so
long as Libyan forces remained in Chad. 3
While these meetings were taking place Libya was massing its forces in
collaboration with Goukouni, who turned to Qaddafiy and signed a treaty of
friendship in June 1980'" that would serve to justify increasing Libyan inter-
vention in Chad later that year." 5 In October up to 7,000 Libyan soldiers,
supported by the Libyan air force, struck into territory held by Habr6. By
December Qaddafiy's forces had reached N'Djamena, which they captured
shortly before the meeting of the Bongo Committee on December 23-24.16
Habr6 finally signed the five-point agreement but insisted that the GUNT,
which had just driven him from power, was illegal." 7 The Bongo Committee
issued a communiqu6 that once again reaffirmed the principles of the Lagos
Accord and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad."
Undeterred by the criticism, Qaddafly proceeded within two weeks to sign an
agreement of merger with Goukouni. 4 9
Qaddafiy, however, had moved too quickly. African leaders, galvanized
by this sudden development, vigorously denounced Libya and prompted the
O.A.U. to call a meeting of its Chad subcommittee within a week. The
subcommittee, meeting in Lom6, Togo, voted to condemn Libya as a violator
462. Legum, supra note 440, at 54-55; see also CooLEY, supra note 407, at 198; JouVE, supra note
437, at 158; KELLEY, supra note 451, at 51; NEUBERGER, supra note 399, at 45-50; WHrTEMAN, supra
note 414, at 11.
463. Legum, supra note 440, at 55; see also JOUVE, supra note 437, at 158-59; KELLEY, supra note
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464. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, June 15, 1980, Libya-Chad, reprinted in KELLEY, supra note
451, at 143-45.
465. Sr. JOHN, supra note 399, at 100; see also COOLEY, supra note 407, at 198; WHrrEMAN, supra
note 414, at 12.
466. CooLEY, supra note 407, at 205-06; Legum, supra note 440, at 56; see also NEUBERGER, supra
note 399, at 49-50.
467. Jouv, supra note 437, at 159-160; KELLEY, supra note 451, at 73.
468. Final Comnuniqug, Dec. 24, 1980, Annex IV, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/104 (XVIII) Annex IV,
reprinted in KELLEY, supra note 451, at 170-71; see also Legum, supra note 440, at 56.
469. Comnuniqu6 on Unification, Jan. 6, 1981, Chad-Libya, reprinted in NEUBERGER, supra note
399, at 69-72; see also Les 2 pays vont s'unir totalement en une seule Jamahiriya, CAMEROON TRIB.,
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of Chad's sovereignty.47 The conference put off a final decision until the
eighteenth O.A.U. Summit, to be held in Nairobi in June.471
The Libyan move also disturbed France, which had improved its relation-
ship with Libya as a result of Libya's efforts to secure the release of Frangoise
Claustre, a French archaeologist whom Habr6's forces had kidnapped in Bardal
in 1974 and held as a hostage for three years. The French stance hardened
notably after the Libyan intervention in 1980-1981; France strongly denounced
the action and offered aid to Chad's francophone neighbors. 4' Faced with
a blizzard of protest, Libya quickly backed away from the merger project.473
The O.A.U. moderated its tone somewhat in the summer of 1981. The
Nairobi summit issued a resolution calling for an O.A.U. force to replace the
Libyan troops in Chad. Later in the year, Goukouni announced that he had
asked the Libyans to leave. Prodded by O.A.U. threats to boycott the 1982
O.A.U. Summit, which was slated to meet in Tripoli, Qaddafiy began to
withdraw his forces.474 As the Libyans commenced an orderly withdrawal,
three thousand soldiers under the O.A.U. aegis replaced them.475 In February
1982 the Bongo Committee called on Goukouni to negotiate with Habr6, but
Goukouni refused.476 The O.A.U. force, however, seemed more intent on
sidestepping conflict than on preserving peace, and it proved to be utterly
worthless. 4' Habr6, sensing the disappearance of obstacles, and benefitting
from material help and training provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.), entered N'Djamena in June 1982 to assume the leadership
of Chad once again.4 78 The Bongo Committee was reconvened amid O.A.U.
calls for a cease-fire.479
470. Final Communiqud of the Conference of Lom, Jan. 14, 1981, Annex V, O.A.U. Doc.
AHG/104(XVIII) [hereinafter Lomd Communiquel, reprinted in KELLEY, supra note 451, at 172-73; see
also NEtBERGER, supra note 399, at 53-54; THOMPSON & ADLoFF, supra note 45, at 138; Legum, supra
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Libyan attempts to subvert several other African governments. See Colin Legum, African States and the
Middle East, in CRisis AND CoNFLicrs iN THE MEDDL EAST 111, 112-13 (Colin Legum ed., 1981);
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4. The HabrJ and Deby Governments, 1982-1991
At an O.A.U. meeting in Tripoli in November 1982, Qaddafly continued
to promote Goukouni as the legitimate Chadian head of state and to block the
seating of Habr6's delegation, but he was thwarted by protests from the
francophone African leaders.48 The meeting then broke up, frustrating
Qaddafiy's bids to have the next summit held in Tripoli and to become the next
O.A.U. chairman.4"' Qaddafly tried again, without success, at the Addis
Ababa summit in June 1983. At this point Libya changed tactics. It stepped
up its aid to Goukouni, who, supported by Libyan air strikes, briefly took
Faya-Largeau and Ab6ch6 from Habr6 in July.482 In the meantime the
O.A.U. held further unsuccessful talks on Chad, at Addis Ababa in January
and at Brazzaville in July.483
While Libyan aid to Goukouni was escalating in the spring of 1983, Habr6
complained to the U.N. Security Council and requested action to remove the
Libyan troops from the Aouzou Strip.4" Appearing on behalf of Chad, For-
eign Minister Idris Miskine presented the Chadian case as Colonel Kamougu6
had done in 1978, relying on the 1955 Treaty and the colonial agreements to
which it referred, and asserting the invalidity of the Mussolini-Laval Ac-
cords.48 ' Chad circulated a memorandum in support of its position, with the
essential treaties annexed, reciting the various agreements on which its claim
rested and the history of past attempts to settle the dispute. 48
6
Libya at first refused to address the complaint, since it was submitted by
a government it did not recognize as legitimate. It accused Habr6 of
obstructing peace in Chad in a quest for personal power.48 7 It then moved
to counter the Chadian claims. First, Libya pressed claims of historical unity
between the Libyan and Chadian peoples.488 It asserted the validity of the
480. WHrEMAN, supra note 414, at 13.
481. Ross, supra note 478, at A22.
482. WHnTMAN, supra note 414, at 13. Habr6 filed a complaint with the Security Council, but no
action was forthcoming. See infra note 496.
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tative of Chad to the President of the Security Council (Mar. 17, 1983), U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., Supp.
for Jan.-Mar., at 61-62, U.N. Doc. S/15644 (1983). Libya responded that it was not occupying any
Chadian territory, and that "[tihe Aouzou sector is an integral part of Libyan territory, its inhabitants are
Libyan and they have held Libyan identity cards since independence." Letterfrom the Representative of
Libya to the President of the Security Council (Mar. 17, 1983), U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 1,
at 62, U.N. Doc. S/15645 (1983).
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6-11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2419 (1983) [hereinafter 2419th Meeting] (statement of Mr. Miskine); see also
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488. Id. at 16 (statement of Mr. Treiki).
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Mussolini-Laval Accords" 9 and attacked the validity of the 1955 Treaty,
claiming that its rejection by the Libyan legislature proved it did not represent
the wishes of the Libyan people.4' Libya denied that France or Chad had
ever exercised sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip and asserted that the area
belonged to the Ottoman Empire when the French arrived.4 91 Finally, Libya
urged the Security Council to refrain from considering the boundary issue, both
because the O.A.U. was dealing with the matter and because the Security
Council lacked competence to resolve this kind of dispute.4"
Contrary to the expectations of commentators,4 93 Chad did not request
a resolution urging Chad and Libya to take the dispute to the I.C.J.4 94 The
draft resolution submitted by Chad did provide, however, for continued
Security Council monitoring. The Soviet Union, espousing Libya's cause,
defeated the draft resolution, and the Security Council directed the parties to
settle their dispute through the O.A.U.49
Except for one incident not directly concerning the boundary dispute,496
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at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2430 (1983). The decision, opposed by the United States (Security Council President
Kirkpatrick promised that she would "follow the development of the situation" in her capacity as President),
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settle purely regional disputes. Under this system the O.A.U. has "exclusive first jurisdiction" over such
disputes. KELLEY, supra note 451, at 52.
The U.N. Charter grants regional agencies priority in settling regional disputes. U.N. CHARTER arts.
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CHARTER arts. 34, 36, 37. See generally KELLEY, supra note 451, at 45.
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the international community made no further efforts to resolve the conflict until
after Habr6's summer 1987 counter-offensive dislodged the Libyan forces from
all of northern Chad except the Aouzou Strip. In part this was because, from
1978 to 1982, the internal condition of Chad had attracted most of the O.A.U.
attention. Chad used the boundary issue to publicize Libya's involvement in
the civil war. As Habr6 consolidated his power after 1982, and the fighting
in Chad died out, international attention to Chad also faded.
Between 1983 and 1987 sporadic fighting erupted in Chad south of the
Aouzou Strip. Nevertheless, Habr6's government proved the most stable since
Chad's independence. However, Libyan troops remained in the Aouzou Strip,
and Libya reinforced its military presence in Chad, controlling the northern
forty percent of the country.497 France again intervened to stabilize the situa-
tion,498 and, in November 1984 Libya and France negotiated a mutual phased
withdrawal. 4 Within a week, though, France was forced to admit that Qad-
dafly had left a sizeable force in northern Chad.' ° French forces intervened
again in 1986 after Libyan-backed forces struck south of the sixteenth parallel,
the "red line" declared by President Mitterand. 0' In 1987 Habr6's forces,
under the command of Idris Deby and acting in concert with former rebels who
had switched sides when Goukouni was again arrested in Libya,5' scored
a stunning series of victories in northern Chad, capturing large amounts of
equipment and driving the Libyans from the region in a few weeks. The
Chadian forces briefly dislodged the Libyans from the Aouzou Strip in August,
but Libya regained the area a few weeks later, and the two countries agreed
to a cease-fire. 5°3
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The dramatic events of August 1987 highlighted the boundary dispute, and
the O.A.U. regained interest in settling the matter. In September Chad and
Libya signed a cease-fire agreement, and the Bongo Committee agreed to
create a new committee to study cartographical and other evidence bearing on
the Aouzou Strip. Little was accomplished.5' In October Sudan offered to
mediate the dispute; Habr6, suspicious of Sudanese sympathy for Libya,
rejected the offer.5"5
Beginning in 1988, however, mediation efforts by the O.A.U. began to
bear fruit. The Bongo Committee renewed its efforts in May with a meeting
in Addis Ababa.s"s Qaddafly initially rejected Habr6's offer to bring the
matter to the I.C.J., arguing that the Aouzou Strip was "an indivisible part of
the Libyan Arab land" and "never was, is not now, and never will be the
subject of negotiations, international arbitration, or concessions. "' Howev-
er, Libya did extend diplomatic recognition to the Habr6 government and
professed a willingness to settle "all outstanding disputes between it and
Chad.""'8 By October a Chadian official expressed confidence in the outcome
of the negotiations, stating that the O.A.U. committee was "in charge of the
Aouzou Strip issue."'  In July 1989 Habr6 and Qaddafiy met in Bamako,
Mali, holding four hours of private talks on the Aouzou Strip but failing to
reach agreement. At the same time, Habr6 and Qaddafiy met with four other
African heads of state (including O.A.U. Chairman Moussa Traore of Mali)
and failed to resolve the issue. Libya at this time still refused to submit the
dispute to the I.C.J. 510
Shortly afterward, amid festivities in Libya marking the twentieth anniver-
sary of Qaddafly's September Revolution, the Algerian government issued an
official announcement stating that Libya and Chad had signed an agreement,
known as the Algiers Accord, to settle the Aouzou Strip "by all political
Agree to Ceasefire in Aouzou Strip, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1987, § 1, at 3; see also WHITEMAN, supra
note 414, at 15.
504. WHrraMAN, supra note 414, at 15.
505. Chad Reportedly Rejects Sudanese Mediation on Aouzou Strip (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Oct. 31, 1987), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
506. Chad Foreign Minister on OAU Meeting (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 7, 1988),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter Chad Foreign Minister].
507. La Libye annonce qu'elle ne ndgociera pas d propos de la bande d'Aozou, LE MoNDE, Apr. 14,
1987, at 6; see also ST. JOHN, supra note 399, at 104.
508. See Libyan Leader on OAUAnniversary: Qaddafi Says Dispute with Chad Over (BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, May 27, 1988), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
509. Chad Envoy in Abidjan Comments on Resumption of Ties iith Libya, New Prioritiesfor Country
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 6, 1988), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
510. Mali: Qadhafi and Habr6 Meet; Summit Ends Without Agreement, (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, July 24, 1989), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. At this point Chad's official
position was that further meetings would be pointless until Libya withdrew from the Aouzou Strip. Chad
Foreign Minister on Aouzou Strip Dispute With Libya, April Coup Attempt (BBC Summary of World





means" within one year or, failing that, to submit the dispute to the I.C.J.511
The agreement also committed the two states to withdraw their forces from
the positions they occupied at the time of signing and to cease interfering in
each other's internal affairs."' 2 Finally, the agreement designated the Bongo
Committee to oversee the implementation of these measures.513
By March 1990 the parties still had not reached a political solution, and
Libya sought a one-year extension of the deadline at a meeting mediated by
Bongo in Libreville, Gabon. Chad successfully resisted this request, and the
parties later issued a communiqu6 stating that they had agreed to create a joint
commission to demarcate the boundary and ensure implementation of the
withdrawal provisions of the Algiers Accord. 14 However, the deadline ap-
proached without a consensus, and even last-minute efforts by King Hassan
of Morocco were unsuccessful in bringing about a final resolution.5  On
September 1, 1990 the deadline expired, and the parties agreed to submit their
dispute to the I.C.J.1 6
In April 1989 Habr6's Commander in Chief, Idris Deby, participated with
two other members of the government in an unsuccessful coup attempt. Deby
was apparently motivated by tribal enmity and the recent appointment of a
former enemy as Foreign Minister. After the attempt, Deby fled with some
troops loyal to him and eventually turned up in Sudan."1 7 Deby invaded Chad
from Sudan with Libyan-supplied equipment in November 1990 and reached
N'Djamena within three weeks, inflicting heavy losses on Habr6's army and
driving Habr6 into exile in Cameroon."1 8
511. Fundamental Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute, Aug. 31, 1989,
Chad-Libya, arts. 1, 2, 29 I.L.M. 15, 16 (1990) [hereinafter Algiers Accord]; see also Alan Cowell,
Qaddafi's Rule is Celebrated; Libya and Chad in Peace Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1989, at A3.
512. Algiers Accord, supra note 511, arts. 2, 4, 29 I.L.M. at 16-17.
513. Id. art. 6, 29 I.L.M. at 17.
514. Chadian-Libyan Meeting in Gabon onAouzou Strip Dispute (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 31, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
515. Gadhafi, Habri May Settle Border Row, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1990, at A2.
516. Libya filed a copy of the Algiers Accord with the Registry of the Court on August 31 as a
notification under Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court. The notification put to the Court the question
of "the limits of [the] respective territories [of Libya and Chad] in accordance with the rules of international
law applicable in the matter." Chad sent a copy of its Application to the Registry by telefax on September
1, asking the Court "to determine the course of the frontier between the Republic of Chad and the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, in accordance with the principles and rules of international law applicable in the matter
as between the Parties." On October 24 the Court met with the representatives of Chad and Libya and fixed
a deadline of August 26, 1991 for the filing of each party's memorials. Territorial Dispute (Chad v. Libya),
1990 I.C.J. 149, 149-51 (Order of October 26) [hereinafter October 26 Order]. On August 26, 1991, the
Court met again with the parties and set March 27, 1992 as the deadline for the filing of the Counter-
Memorials. Territorial Dispute (Chad v. Libya), 1991 I.C.J. 44 (Order of August 26), available in
WESTLAW, International Court of Justice Database.
517. See Michaud, supra note 50, at 40; Chad Foreign Minister, supra note 506.
518. See Chad's President Flees Country, Says Ambassador, Reuters Library Report, Dec. 1, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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The decision to submit the dispute to the I.C.J. has stood despite the
overthrow of Habr6 by Deby, who is considerably more pro-Libyan than
Habr6. Although Chad's relations with Libya immediately improved once Deby
took power,519 Deby does not appear to be a Libyan puppet and has vowed
to continue to press for the return of the Aouzou Strip. 20 On taking power,
Deby affirmed his belief in the "integrity" of Chad's territory and expressed
confidence that the I.C.J. would deliver a workable solution to the dispute.5 '
Libya, too, has reiterated its commitment to refer the Aouzou Strip question
to the I.C.J. 52
Deby's insistence on Chadian sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip highlights
the very limited success that Libya has achieved through its involvement in the
rebellions and civil wars of Chad. The various prot6g6s of Libya have not
proved to be puppets. Rather, they have taken advantage of Libya's interests
and wealth in order to gain power and then have snubbed Libya after succeed-
ing. Despite large human and material costs, Libya is no closer to gaining an
official Chadian recognition of its claims to the Aouzou Strip than when it
occupied the region in 1973. The realization, over the course of eighteen
years, that they cannot resolve the quarrel by political means prompted the
parties to refer their dispute to the I.C.J. In turning to the Court, Libya and
Chad have put their faith in a judicial resolution. Abstracted from the myriad
political factors, the dispute may be less intractable. Nevertheless, the Court
faces a complex challenge.
IV. THE OPERATIVE LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN THE Aouzou STRIP DisPuTE
The ebb and flow of various powers over the Aouzou Strip region and their
tangled relations with the Toubous and with each other are a fertile source of
legal arguments justifying each side's claim to the area. This part of the article
discusses the legal principles upon which those arguments rely.
Each side is likely to advance claims that draw upon the legal requirements
for acquiring sovereignty over territory. Chad can be expected to argue that
519. See Nicholas Kotch, Friendship Between Chad and Old Enemy Libya Blossoms Under Deby,
Reuter Library Report, Dec. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
520. See Nicholas Kotch, Ousted Chad Leader Habrd Reflects on Ironies of Life, Reuter Library
Report, Dec, 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (French President Mitterand says
Deby is not Qaddafly's puppet even if Libya supplied him with arms); Richard Dowden, Chad's New
Leader is 'His Own Man,' THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 4, 1990, at 9; Kenneth B. Noble, In Chad, Talk of
a Libyan Resurgence, N.Y. TIM, Dec. 6, 1990, at A3.
521. IdrissDeby on Recent Events in Chad; Chad-Libyan Relations; Other Issues (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Dec. 12, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Chad: Deby Denies
Relations with Libya Harmed by POWs Issue (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 24, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Chad Minister on Relations With Libya; Deby to Paris
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 12, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
522. Chadian Government Blames Libya and Sudan for Attack; Libya Denies Involvement (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 12, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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France occupied the Aouzou Strip, acquiring the area in accordance with the
principles of international law. Libya may respond that the territory could not
be acquired by occupation since it was under the sovereignty of the Toubous.
Alternatively, Libya may argue that Turkey or the Sanusi exercised sovereignty
over the area, either by occupation or as a hinterland of Tripolitania. Chad can
be expected to deny these assertions, and it could plead that even if the area
was not open to occupation by France, France nonetheless acquired valid title
by occupying the region after Turkey abandoned it.
Evaluating such claims requires an understanding of the law governing the
acquisition of territory. Section A of this Part examines occupation as a method
of gaining title, focusing on the acts a state needed to perform in order to
perfect title by occupation. It also analyzes a crucial question left unsettled by
the international law of the colonial period: whether indigenous tribes not
recognized as states possessed rights of sovereignty over the territory they
inhabited. It then considers other methods states used to reserve territory for
themselves: the sphere of influence, the hinterland, and the "colonial protector-
ate." Sections B, C, D, and E discuss other methods for acquiring or losing
title to territory, including prescription, conquest, cession, and abandonment.
Libya may also urge the I.C.J., in evaluating arguments of Sanusi or
Turkish sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip area, not to apply the traditional
Western criteria of sovereignty, which developed in a geographical, social, and
political milieu far different from that of the Sahara. Using this argument,
Libya may request the Court to apply criteria that developed in North Africa.
These standards, which respond to the enormous distances and the necessity
of nomadic migration, perceive sovereignty as fundamentally personal-arising
from relations of allegiance-rather than territorial. The Islamic theory of the
state, where temporal and spiritual power reside in one leader who commands
the allegiance of all Muslims, is, under this argument, the political structure
that was best adapted to this milieu. Section F explores the Islamic principles
of sovereignty and analyzes a previous attempt (ultimately unsuccessful) to
convince the I.C.J. to apply them in a North African territorial dispute.
Both Chad and Libya claim title to the Aouzou Strip derivatively. Chad
claims title as the successor of France; Libya could claim title as the successor
of either Turkey or the Sanusiya. An understanding of the principles of state
succession, provided in Section G, is essential in order to appraise these
claims. Chad will likely support its claim to the territory by invoking the
principle of uti possidetis, which holds that colonies, upon acceding to state-
hood, inherit the boundaries of the former colony. Libya may counter by
urging the I.C.J. to apply the norm of decolonization, which rejects utipossi-
detis and seeks to return territories and peoples to the political status quo that
existed prior to colonization. Sections H and I discuss the law underlying these
arguments.
Yale Journal of International Law
Both Chad and Libya can also be expected to rely on treaties to support
their versions of the boundary. As it has in the past, Chad will likely invoke
the 1955 Treaty of Friendship between France and Libya, which defined the
boundary by reference to lines drawn in agreements from the colonial period.
Libya can be expected to attack this agreement as a coercive product of grossly
unequal bargaining power between France, a militarily and economically
powerful imperial state, and Libya, an impoverished and weak former colony
dependent on Western aid. Libya may also invoke the 1935 Mussolini-Laval
Accords, in which France agreed to cede the Aouzou Strip to Italy. Chad will
undoubtedly argue that this treaty lacks effect because it was never ratified and
because Italy later denounced the agreement without trying to take possession
of the territory. Sorting out these claims requires an understanding of the
relevant principles of the law of treaties. Section J introduces these principles,
beginning with a discussion of the law of coercion in treaty formation. It also
considers the role of ratification in the entry of treaties into force.
The Aouzou Strip dispute implicates two legal meta-issues concerning the
choice of a relevant body of law to apply. The first, mentioned above, arises
from a cultural gulf, pitting Western against Islamic legal principles. Its
resolution will necessarily move the Court into relatively uncharted territory.
The second meta-issue arises from a temporal gulf: after the passage of so
much time, which period's legal norms and requirements will govern the
dispute? Here, the legal territory is much more familiar. Under the so-called
intertemporal law, enunciated in the classic statement by the Swiss jurist Max
Huber in the 1928 Island of Palmas arbitration, "[a] juridical fact must be
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law
in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be set-
tled. ,,I Under the intertemporal law, an act that was sufficient to confer title
at the time it was performed will establish title even if the law subsequently
changes and the act is no longer sufficient under the new law. The practical
effect of this rule is to freeze title as soon as it crystallizes.
However, the Island of Palmas award stated that where the act required
to confer title imposes a continuing obligation, the fulfillment of that obligation
by the state is evaluated according to the current law at each stage:
[A] distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of
rights. The same principle which subjets [sic] the act creative of a right to the law
in force at the time when the right arises, demands that the existence of the right,
in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by
the evolution of the law.524
523. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928). In the
Western Sahara case, the I.C.J. applied the intertemporal law to the question whether Western Sahara was
a terra nullius at the time of colonization by Spain. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 38-39 (Oct. 16).
524. 2 R.I.A.A. at 845.
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Thus, if the principle of "effective occupation" governed the acquisition of
sovereignty over territory at the time a state first took possession of a territory,
the state's title to that territory thereafter would depend on its adherence to the
evolving principles of international law, at least to the extent that occupation
involved continuing obligations.
The intertemporal law had been espoused by international legal scholars
before the Island of Palmas case. In 1904 John Westlake wrote that "[t]itles
must be judged by the state of international law at the time when, if at all, they
arose." 5" And in 1925, shortly before the Island of Palmas award, Paul
Fauchille also enunciated the principle, reasoning that a state cannot be held
to comply with requirements which international law does not yet impose.'
Thus, the principle was generally recognized at the time when France, Turkey,
and the Sanusiya were all seeking to expand into Borku, Ennedi, and Tibesti.
Accordingly, the analysis now turns to an examination of the relevant law
concerning the acquisition of territorial sovereignty during that time.
A. The Law of Occupation
The subject of occupation as a means of acquiring territory attracted a great
deal of scholarly attention during the colonial era. Publicists unanimously
agreed that occupation was a valid-in fact, desirable 27 -means of acquiring
territory if it was performed in accordance with the conditions prescribed by
international law. However, they disagreed substantially as to the content of
those conditions.
This section explores the legal norms that governed the acquisition of
territory by occupation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The discussion begins by tracing the basic requirements of occupation under
customary international law: the simultaneous display, over a sufficient period,
of both the intention and the ability to exercise effective control over the area.
It then reviews various attempts during this period to set out these requirements
525. 1 JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 (1904) [hereinafter WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW].
526. 1 PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRA1Tft DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuBLIc (pt. 2) 745-46 (1925).
527. Publicists justified occupation as a means of putting unutilized or underutilized resources to a
higher use. Raoul Gen~t, Notes sur lacquisition par occupation et le Droitdes Gens traditionnel, 15 REVUE
DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL ET DE IGISLATION COMPAPtE 285, 291-92 (3d ser. 1934); see also 1 FAUCH-
ILLx, supra note 526, at 681-84 ("it is in the general interest that a thing not remain unused: he who
occupies it truly renders a service to all mankind"). These ideas had been current at least since Vattel, who
held that a people could not rightfully occupy more territory than it needed or could use. See GASTON JftZE,
LTUDE THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE SUR L'OCCUPATION 108-09, 108 n.1, 109 n.2, 111 (Paris, V. Giard &
E. BriWre 1896); CHARLES SALOMON, L'occUPATION DES TERRITOIPES SANS mkm 202-03 (Paris, A.
Giard 1889). Occupation was also preferable to rival bases for title, such as priority of discovery, since
its greater visibility and precision reduced the possibility of conflict. Andrd Decencibre-Ferrandibre, Essal
historique et critique sur loccupation comme mode d'acqudrir les territoires en droit international, 18
REVUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Er DE L±GISLATION CONTARtE 362, 379 (1937).
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in positive international law. The discussion next turns to one issue that divided
contemporary jurists: whether "savage" tribes not formally recognized as states
had a right of sovereignty over the territory they inhabited. The discussion then
considers the extent of territory a state could claim through occupation. In
particular, it examines various hinterland theories, such as proximity or
contiguity, advanced by states to lay claim to more territory then they effec-
tively occupied. This section then concludes with an analysis of two theories
used to circumvent the requirement of effective occupation: the spheres of
influence and the colonial protectorate.
1. The Confluence of Animus Domini and Corpus:. Intention and Ability
to Exercise Effective Control Over Territory
Scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally agreed
that occupation required both an intention to occupy (the animus domini or
animus possidendi) and a physical manifestation of that intention (the corpus
or apprehensio). According to William Edward Hall, a state could obtain valid
title to a territory when it performed an act "which amounts to an actual taking
of possession, and at the same time indicate[d] an intention to keep the territo-
ry seized." The intention to acquire, coupled with the fact of possession, was
a "sufficient ground of proprietary right."528 In 1933 the Permanent Court
of International Justice (P.C.I.J.), in the Eastern Greenland case, gave what
has come to be regarded as the classic formulation of this requirement: "a
claim to sovereignty based ... upon continued display of authority, involves
two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to
act as sovereign and some actual exercise or display of such authority. "529
The animus domini required the "intention... to exercise over the terri-
tory the rights attached to sovereignty, in particular the rights of administra-
tion, jurisdiction, etc. "530 Therefore, since only a state could exercise sover-
528. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-07 (4th ed. 1895); see also
HENRY BONFILS, MANUEL DE DROrT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 303 (Paul Fauchille ed., 3d ed. 1901); Jzm,
supra note 527, at 227; M.F. LINDLEY, Tim ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (1926); 1 L. OPPENEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-77 (1905); cf. T.J.
LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (Boston, D.C. Heath & Co. 1895) [hereinafter
LAWRENCEI]; T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (4th ed. 1910) [hereinafter
LAWRENCE 4th] (occupation requires annexation, which signals intention to occupy, and settlement, the
physical taking of possession).
529. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45-46
(Apr. 5). A precedent for this statement may be found in the Walflsch Bay case, where the arbitrator stated
that "the evidence of a wish to acquire, and of an effective occupation," would suffice to establish
sovereignty. Southern Boundary of the Territory of Walfisch Bay (Gr. Brit. v. Ger.), 104 Brit. & Foreign
St. Pap. 50, 101-02 (May 23, 1911).
530. JPzE, supra note 527, at 175.
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eignty, the demonstration of animus domini had to be the act of a state.531
Some contemporary publicists held that a sufficient manifestation of the animus
domini was the erection of a post, the raising of a flag, or the public reading
of an official proclamation claiming the territory in the name of the
sovereign.532 In general, any act demonstrating an intention to exercise sover-
eignty-even the very act of claiming the territory-satisfied the animus
requirement. 533
The second element necessary to create title by occupation, the corpus,
required effective or real occupation. 34 According to the Island of Palmas
award, "[t]his demonstration consists in the actual display of state activities,
such as belongs only to the territorial sovereign." 35 " [W]hat is essential in
such a case is the continuous and peaceful display of actual power in the...
region. " 36
The Aouzou Strip dispute raises issues whose resolution will depend on
the meaning ascribed to "continuous and peaceful display of power." Libya
can be expected to argue that either the Sanusi or the Ottoman presence in
Tibesti, Borku, or Ennedi constituted occupation within the meaning of this
phrase. Chad will likely argue that they did not, but that the activities of
French forces in the region were sufficient to establish a valid title by occupa-
tion. To evaluate these conflicting arguments, the inquiry must turn to the
531. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 284; see also JkZE, supra note 527, at 176-77. Theoretically, any
state, regardless of its degree of civilization or independence, could occupy territory. Id. at 209-13; see
also SALOMON, supra note 527, at 121-25. A taking of possession by a private individual without a
commission from his government did not suffice to establish the animus domini unless his state subsequently
ratified the act. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 287.
532. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 147; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 152; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 528, at 276-77. Whereas the flag or post was clearly meant to be a visible sign
of the occupying state's intention to representatives of other states who arrived in the future, it is difficult
to see how the public reading of a proclamation, in a land that was ostensibly uninhabited or sparsely
inhabited, could provide to future explorers any permanent evidence of such intention. Most likely the
requirement of such physical manifestations of the sovereign's animus domini persisted simply as a vestige
of the former doctrine, under which discovery coupled with constructive occupation, such as the erection
of a monument or the raising ofa flag, was sufficient to confer title without real occupation of the territory.
533. See Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 48.
534. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Europeans were discovering vast lands but
possessed relatively meager means to exploit and govern any but a small portion of those lands, priority
of discovery sufficed to confer a valid title to territory. However, as the amount of unappropriated land
grew smaller and the means of putting it into use and governing it improved, the law adapted to require
a greater showing of ability to control territory: the occupying power had to be really present there. See
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 83-84 (Apr. 5)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti); see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 688-89; 2 PASQUALE
FIoRE, NouvEAu DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC sUIVANT LES BESOINS DE LA CIVILISATIONMODERNE 146-
47 (Charles Antoine trans., 2d ed. 1885); SALOMON, supra note 527, at 82-83.
535. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928).
536. Id. at 857. In the Clipperton Island case, the arbitrator stated that Mexico, which claimed a title
derived from Spain, would have to prove that Spain "had effectively exercised [its] right" to incorporate
the island into its possessions. Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Mex. v. Fr.)
(King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, Arb., 1931), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 393 (1932).
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publicists and to international case law to clarify the rather nebulous meaning
of this standard.
The Argentinean jurist Charles Calvo stated that an occupation, to be
effective, "must be accompanied or followed by the commencement of admin-
istrative organization or of commercial or industrial exploitation in the coun-
try.""' For others commentators, the test was the ability to exclude compet-
ing states.5"' M.F. Lindley argued that the essential criterion was the occupy-
ing state's ability to maintain order and security in the territory.539 This test
proved to be the most widely accepted, and was usually phrased as requiring
"a local administration sufficient to assure the regular exercise of its authori-
ty.
540
This test was essentially practical, as it required consideration of whether
the occupying power possessed the means to assure the unhindered develop-
ment of the territory. This standard was consistent with the ostensible aim of
the colonial system: bringing previously unexploited land and resources into
the global economy. If the state was unable to maintain order in the territory
and thus unable to protect the investments made and the enterprises operating
there, then the state had no right to claim the territory to the exclusion of
others. 54'
537. 1 CHARLES CALVO, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL THlORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 389 (Paris, Librairie
nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1896).
538. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 310-11.
539. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 141 ('There is now a general agreement that the essential point
to look to is not whether there is present sufficient force to repel foreign intrusion, or whether the land
is in fact being effectively exploited, but whether there has been established over it a sufficient govern-
mental control to afford security to life and property there.*).
540. See, e.g., BONFiLS, supra note 528, at 309; AMos S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1912); see also Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island
(Mex. v. Fr.) (1931), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 394 (1932) (occupying state must establish "an organization
capable of making its laws respected'); cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 53, at 83 (Apr. 5) (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti) (noting "disproportion between
the claim to sovereignty over all Greenland and the effective exercise of that authority;* while Denmark
may have passed laws ostensibly applying to non-colonized as well as colonized parts of Greenland, "there
were perhaps laws in force but no authority to enforce them" in non-settled parts).
This requirement remained the law throughout the colonial period. In 1945 Norman Hill wrote that
occupation required "the establishment of governmental control sufficient to provide security to life and
property." NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS To TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 147 (1945).
541. Another way of stating the effectiveness requirement was to phrase it in terms of the obligations
that occupation imposed on the acquiring state. Essentially, these obligations simply mirrored the conditions
for effectiveness described above. For example, the Island of Palmas arbitral award stated that territorial
sovereignty brings with it an obligation to protect the rights of other states and their nationals. Island of
Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928); see also SALOMON, supra
note 527, at 331-37 (occupying state assumes obligation to assure existence of sufficient authority and to
respect rights acquired by foreign governments and nationals, nationals of occupying state, and natives).
This is essentially the same as the requirement that the occupant maintain order in the territory. Westlake
advanced a similar but more specific view: the occupation was not effective until the occupant established
a sufficient authority to protect the natives and to guarantee the enjoyment of "civil rights essential to
European or American life." JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914) [hereinafter WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS]; I
WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 107. Westlake's view reflects his conception of native
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In practice, however, the international system could not effectively police
these requirements. Logistically, states were simply unable to know what was
occurring in the territory of others, frequently leaving the occupying state as
the sole judge of its actions. As a result, state practice did not always conform
to the standards put forth by the jurists.54
International law imposed less stringent requirements on the occupying state
in the case of isolated or desolate areas. As Max Huber recognized in Island
of Palmas, "the manifestations of sovereignty over a small and distant island,
inhabited only by natives, cannot be expected to be frequent."543 In these
cases the law imposed a lesser obligation, requiring acts that were closer to
the symbolic acts that the law of previous centuries had required to create a
constructive occupation. This flexible test essentially tailored the effectiveness
requirement to the exigencies and realities of each particular situation. 5'
sovereignty. Essentially, Westlake held that Europeans were not obliged to recognize the sovereignty of
native tribes unless the tribes possessed a "civilized" government-that is, one structured along European
lines, or in the end, one capable of keeping Europeans out by force. See infra notes 584-584 and accompa-
nying text.
542. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 366-67.
543. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 867 (Huber, Arb., April 1928); JkZE,
supra note 527, at 237; see also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 159; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 317-19;
Gen~t, supra note 527, at 441. Again, the classic statement of the law in this regard appears in the Island
of Palmas award:
[l]n the exercise of territorial sovereignty there are necessarily gaps, intermittence in time and
discontinuity in space. This phenomenon will be particularly noticeable in the case of colonial
territories, partly uninhabited or as yet partly unsubdued. The fact that a State cannot prove
display of sovereignty as regards such a portion of territory cannot forthwith be interpreted as
showing that sovereignty is inexistent. Each case must be appreciated in accordance with the
particular circumstances.
2 R.I.A.A. at 855; see also Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 46 (Apr. 5) (noting that tribunals have "been satisfied with very little in the way of actual
exercise of sovereign rights .... particularly... in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly
populated or unsettled countries"); Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Mex.
v. Fr.) (King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, Arb., 1931), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 394 (1932) (stating that
it is "unnecessary to have recourse" to effective occupation "if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was
completely uninhabited, is, from the moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the
absolute and undisputed disposition of that state").
Although such statements certainly embodied the view of the majority of scholars at the time, they
did not receive unanimous assent. For those writers who insisted that the true mark of effective occupation
was the ability to exclude other states, a lesser presence would not suffice. Regardless of the nature of the
territory and the people who inhabited it, a state had to maintain "local power sufficient to permit it to
exercise its exclusive authority." 1 FAUCHILL, supra note 526, at 715. The recognition that the occupation
of sparsely populated or desolate areas imposed a lesser obligation lent support to claims that states
occupying an area could also claim its hinterland. See infra notes 623-651 and accompanying text.
544. See Robert D. Hayton, The Nations and Antarctica, 10 0STRREICnSCHES ZErrsCHR~r FOR
6FENTLIcHEs REC-T 368, 392-93 (1960); see also HILL, supra note 540, at 149-151; LINDLEY, supra
note 528, at 158 (in "uninhabited lands which are not suitable for settlement," the occupying state need
only establish "any organization (however rudimentary) or... any system of control, which, having regard
to the conditions under which the area appropriated was being used or was likely to be used, was reason-
ably sufficient to maintain order among suchpersons as might resort there") (emphasis added); Gen6t, supra
note 527, at 441-42. One scholar has suggested that "such factors as the broad features of the territory,
the length of time during which state authority has been displayed, the presence or absence of adverse
claims, and the attitude of third states are relevant" in assessing effectiveness. SURYA P. SHARMA,
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International tribunals deciding boundary disputes have supplied some
examples of the type of acts a state must perform to have its occupation
recognized as effective. The cases have mostly concerned relatively isolated,
small, or sparsely populated regions. In these cases, tribunals have been
willing to recognize the performance of relatively routine and mundane govern-
ment functions as a sufficient demonstration of state authority. 45 Such func-
tions include the punishment of an illegal act and the arrest of an offender;5"
the granting of concessions; s' 7 the passage of legislation relating to the terri-
tory;548 the dispatch of scientific and hunting expeditions;549 and the issu-
ance of permits to persons visiting the area.5"° Where the disputed territory
was a group of small islets lying off the coast of one of the state's national
territory, even lesser acts have sufficed: the assessment of property taxes; the
holding of inquests; the licensing of boats; the establishment of a customs
house; and the completion of various construction projects."
These precedents have ambiguous value for resolving the Aouzou Strip
dispute. On one hand, the cases cited involved territory much like Tibesti,
Borku, or Ennedi-sparsely populated and not very easily accessible. This
similarity would argue for assigning some precedential value to these decisions.
On the other hand, these cases involved land with populations that were
generally passive, or with no population at all. A much greater display of state
authority might be required to demonstrate effective control over an area
inhabited by a people as hostile and anarchic as the Toubous.
Once a state had maintained the animus and corpus for a period sufficient
to prove its control over the territory, international law imposed no further
conditions on it. In particular, the law did not require that other states recog-
nize the occupation to make it valid. 5' In 1885 the Conference of Berlin,
which had been convened to regulate the acquisition of territory on the African
coasts, rejected a proposal that would have made the recognition by other
1NTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DIspUTEs AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 94
(1976).
545. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 176:
546. Southern Boundary of the Territory of Walfisch Bay (Gr. Brit. v. Ger.), 104 Brit. & Foreign
St. Pap. 50, 100 (May 23, 1911).
547. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at48 (Apr.
5); see also Walflsch Bay, 104 Brit. & Foreign St. Pap. at 100.
548. Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 62.
549. Id. at 62-63.
550. Id. at 63.
551. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 65-66, 69 (Nov. 17).
552. JlzE, supra note 527, at 298.
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states of the effectiveness of an occupation a condition of its validity.553 The
legitimacy of an occupation depended solely on its realization.5'
2. Codification of the Requirement of Effective Occupation
The law of occupation did not spring solely from the writings of eminent
jurists and from arbitrations and cases decided after the fact. In 1885 and 1919
European states entered into two agreements among themselves governing the
requirements of effective occupation. In 1888, the leading scholars of interna-
tional law, under the aegis of the Institut de Droit International, issued a
declaration on the principles of occupation. These attempts to codify the law
of occupation point to the emergence and acceptance, at least in theory, of an
international norm on the subject.
a. The Final Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885
At the end of 1884 representatives of Europe's major powers, as well as
Turkey and the United States, convened the Conference of Berlin to decide
the status of the Congo and to set down rules for the future acquisition of
territory in Africa. The final act of the conference (the Berlin Act),' 5 issued
in February 1885, fixed two important rules for the occupation of territory.
First, the occupation had to be effective, and second, the occupying state had
to notify other powers of the occupation.
Article 35 of the Berlin Act set out the requirement of effective occupation.
Each signatory recognized "the obligation to assure, in the territories occupied
by [it], on the coasts of the African continent, the existence of an authority
sufficient to assure respect for acquired rights and, if necessary, freedom of
commerce and movement. 556 Under Article 34, the signatories pledged to
553. Report of the Commission charged with Examination of the Project of Declaration Respecting
the New Occupations on the Coasts of Africa, in THE SCRAMBLE FOR ARICA 245-51 (R.J. Gavin & J.A.
Betley eds. & trans., 1973) [hereinafter ScRAMBLE].
554. Genlt, supra note 527, at 440.
555. General Act of the Conference of Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, art. 35, 165 Consol. T.S. 485, 501
[hereinafter Berlin Act].
556. Id. According to some authors, "acquired rights" included rights acquired by the indigenous
population. Frantz Despagnet, Les occupations des teritoires et le procd de l'hinterland, 1 REVUE
OdNdRALEDEDRorrINTERNATioNALPUBLIC 103, 105 (1894). These rights probably were limited to private
rights-for instance, land ownership.
The final version of Article 35 imposed less stringent conditions than Germany had originally
proposed. Whereas the initial draft required states to "establish and maintain" authority, Article 35 as
adopted required them to "assure the existence" of authority. This language permitted states to adopt native
institutions of governance. In addition, recognizing the difficulty of assuring peace during the first stages
of an occupation, the delegates changed the draft to prevent other states from seizing upon this difficulty
in order to challenge the validity of the occupation. Whereas the original draft imposed an obligation to
assure peace, the final version imposed a lesser obligation to assure order. See LINDLEY, supra note 528,
at 146-47; see also JAZE, supra note 527, at 262-63; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 333.
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give each other notice of any future occupation or the establishment of any
protectorate on the African coasts, so that other states could make whatever
protests or claims they might have to the same territory. s57 Whereas the
notification requirement extended to protectorates, the provisions of Article
35 applied by their terms only to "territories occupied" by the signatories and
not to protectorates 5 58
However, the juridical status of these two requirements was uncertain. By
its terms the scope of the Berlin Act was limited in three respects: 1) it applied
only to future occupations; 2) it applied only to the coasts, and not the interior,
of Africa;559 and 3) it applied only in the reciprocal relations of the signatory
states."' 0 The arbitrator in the Clipperton Island case, noting these three
restrictions, refused to apply the Berlin Act to the dispute before him.' t
However, almost all commentators argued that the Berlin Act had, in reality,
much wider application, because its terms represented an emerging consensus
as to all occupations regardless of location and the parties involved.562 Fur-
557. Berlin Act, supra note 555, art. 34, 165 Consol. T.S. at 501. Commentators hailed notification
as a means of preventing disputes and providing for the orderly allocation of territory. See Jbza, supra
note 527, at 272-73; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 291-92; Decenciare-Ferrandi4re, supra note 527, at
632.
558. Although Bismarck submitted an initial draft of the Berlin Act that required protectorates and
occupations to fulfill identical conditions, the delegates at the Conference dropped the effectiveness
requirement for occupations at the insistence of Great Britain. Telegram from Sir Edward Malet to Lord
Granville (Feb. 21, 1885), in ScRAMLE, supra note 553, at 114; see also S.E. CROWE, TBE BERLIN WEST
AFRiCAN CONFERENCE, 1884-1885, at 177-81 (1942).
559. Great Britain feared that vague requirements for occupations of the African interior might allow
states with coastal possessions to encroach inland on its interior territories. As a result, Great Britain
inquired whether the rules of Articles 34 and 35 might apply to the interior as well as the coasts. Germany
and France defeated this proposal. CROWE, supra note 558, at 181-82; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 263.
Their resistance might have arisen from the fact that the interior was still largely unexplored by Europeans,
and from the difficulty of establishing an effective occupation there. See MALCOLM SHAW, T=TLE TO
TERRrrORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEwAL ISsUES 49 (1986). As a result of these considerations,
colonial states used other devices that did not require effective occupation, such as theories of proximity
and the delimitation by treaty of spheres of influence, to lay claim to interior lands in Africa. Id.; see also
infra notes 623-661 and accompanying text.
560. 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 689-90; see also BONFILS, supra note 528, at 303; 1 CALvO,
supra note 537, at 401; JXzE, supra note 527, at 30-34; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 262; Decencibre-
Ferrandi~re, supra note 527, at 636-38.
561. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394. The arbitrator also stated that Article 35 "imposes an obligation which
presupposes an occupation which has already taken place and is already valid." Id. Under this view, Article
35 imposes continuing duties on occupying states but has nothing to with the initial taking of possession.
Such a view seems contrary to the intentions of the nations who convened at Berlin. It can be reconciled
with those intentions only by taking account of the general recognition among states that no occupation
could be completely effective from the start, i.e., at the initial taking of possession.
562. See Despagnet, supra note 556, at 106 ('[lit is beyond doubt that the rules of the Act of Berlin
are the minimal expression of international legal theory at present.'); see also JkzE, supra note 527, at
35; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 145-46; 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 105.
Some commentators argued for the universal application of these rules but conceded that they had not yet
become part of the general law of nations. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 272.
Arguments supporting universal application of the principles of the Berlin Act received a boost in
1888, when the Institut de Droit International adopted a declaration embodying substantially the same
principles as the Berlin Act. See infra notes 569-574 and accompanying text. Otherjurists pointed out that
the application of the principles of the Berlin Act in places other than on the African coasts demonstrated
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thermore, the principle of effective occupation antedated the Berlin Act, not
only in the writings of jurists but also in international arbitrations. 563 Later
scholars looking back on the period following the Berlin Act concluded that,
Clipperton Island notwithstanding, states had in fact accepted the principles
of the Berlin Act as an expression of contemporary customary international
law. 564
The arguments favoring universal application of the Berlin Act undoubtedly
correctly expressed the state of international law at the time, at least with
respect to the requirement of effective occupation. However, the notification
requirement had just been instituted,565 and international law did not require
its universal application. Although some states moved to make notification of
new acquisitions of territory a standard part of their practice,56 they consti-
tuted a minority. Even the most vigorous advocates of applying the Berlin Act
universally conceded that international law probably did not require notification
anywhere except on the coasts of Africa.5 67 The arbitrator in the Island of
Palmas case took this view.5 68
b. The Declaration of the Institut de Droit International, 1888
Some scholars felt that the Berlin Act had left notable gaps in certain areas
and set out to fill those gaps. These efforts came to fruition in the adoption
by the Institut de Droit International of a resolution on occupation in 1888 (the
I.D.I. Declaration). 69
that states accepted Articles 34 and 35 as "the expression of customary international law." 1 FAUCHILLE,
supra note 526, at 690.
Lindley argued that the rules of the Berlin Act were general rules of international law, and that only
the limited purposes of the Conference of Berlin prevented the delegates from announcing a broader
application of the rules. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 145. In the 1885 Caroline Islands arbitration between
Germany and Spain, for example, Pope Leo XIII as arbitrator applied the principles of the Berlin Act to
Pacific islands by inviting Spain to make its occupation of the islands more effective. See Gen~t, supra
note 527, at 419-20; see also 1 CALVo, supra note 537, at 402-03.
One notable exception was Hall, who drew a distinction between the Berlin Act and the principles
of customary international law. According to Hall, only the latter applied in the interior of Africa. HALL,
supra note 528, at 120.
563. In the Delagoa Bay arbitration between Great Britain and Portugal, Marshal MacMahon, the
President of France, denied Great Britain's claim based on treaties concluded with the natives during a
temporary interruption of Portugal's occupation of the area, and awarded title to Portugal based on its
occupation of the area before and after the British appearance. See Gen~t, supra note 527, at 417-19; see
also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 135-36.
564. Genlt, supra note 527, at 313.
565. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 294; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 273.
566. For example, Germany and Great Britain agreed in 1890 to notify each other of any treaties they
concluded with Central African chiefs. 1 FAUCHLLE, supra note 526, at 690; see also LINDLEY, supra
note 528, at 294.
567. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 295; see also BONFILS, supra note 528, at 310-11.
568. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 868 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928).
569. Projet de d6claration internationale relative aux occupations de territoires [hereinafter I.D.I.
Declaration], adopted in Examen de la thorie de la confdrence de Berlin sur l'occupation des territoires,
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Article I of the I.D.I. Declaration set forth the conditions for the validity
of an occupation:
The occupation of a territory by title of sovereignty can be recognized as
effective only if it combines the following conditions:
1. The taking of possession of a territory enclosed within certain limits, done
in the name of the government;
2. Official notification of the taking of possession.
The taking of possession is accomplished by the establishment of a responsible
local power, provided with sufficient means to maintain order and to assure the
regular exercise of its authority within the limits of the occupied territory. These
means can be lent to the existing institutions in the occupied country.
Notification of the taling of possession is done either by publication in the form
that, in each State, is in use for notification of official acts, or by diplomatic means.
It shall contain the approximate determination of the boundaries of the occupied
territory
70
Article I represented a modification of a draft proposal submitted by tdouard
Engelhardt, which emphasized the need to establish local power, in contrast
to a competing draft submitted by F. de Martitz, which required only the
taking of possession and notification.5 71 The adoption of Engelhardt's propos-
al over that of de Martitz effectively precluded the possibility of title arising
from symbolic acts or constructive occupation. Article II of the I.D.I. Declara-
tion applied the same rules to protectorates. 57
Scholars perceived the I.D.I. Declaration as a summary of enlightened
opinion at the time of its adoption.573 The applicability of the I.D.I. Declara-
tion is, however, limited in two respects. First, although the members of the
Institut agreed on the conditions required to make an occupation effective, they
were unable to agree on a definition of the land that was subject to occupa-
tion-that is, territory that was terra nullius (i.e. land belonging to no one).
In particular, the members disagreed as to whether savage tribes had a recog-
nized right of sovereignty that would remove their land from the domain of
terra nullius.574 Second, unlike the Berlin Act, the I.D.I. Declaration was
the product not of negotiation among states but rather of the deliberation of
scholars. Many publicists maintained, in a strict positivist stance, that although
10 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTrruTr DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL 173, 201-04 (1888-1889) [hereinafter Eamen].
570. Id. art. I; see also HYDE, supra note 618, at 172.
571. Examen, supra note 569, at 187; see also id. at 182 (comments of G. Rolin-Jaequemyns,
Secretary General).
For copies of the original drafts by Engelhardt and de Martitz, see tdouard Engelhardt, tude sur
la diclaration de la Confirence de Berlin relative aux occupations, 18 REvuE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL
(pt. 2) 573, 582-86 (1886); de Martitz, Occupation des territoires, 19 RvuE DE DROrr iNTERNATIONAL
371, 373-76 (1887).
Article IV of de Martitz's proposal also required the establishment of a sufficient local power, but
the members of the Institut felt that the proposal did not place enough emphasis on this point. De Martitz,
supra, at 374-75; Examen, supra, at 187.
572. I.D.I. Declaration, supra note 569, art. II.
573. HYDE, supra note 618, at 172.
574. See Examen, supra note 569, at 177-84; JkZE, supra note 527, at 39; see also infra notes 581-591
and accompanying text.
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the I.D.I. Declaration might represent the contemporary state of opinion, it
was not binding on states because no state had signed it.
c. The Convention of St.-Germain-en-Laye, 1919
The next declaration on occupation came in 1919 with the Treaty of St.-
Germain-en-Laye (the St.-Germain Treaty). 5 Under Article 10 of the Trea-
ty, the signatories "recognize[d] the obligation to maintain in the regions
subject to their jurisdiction an authority and police forces sufficient to ensure
protection of persons and of property and, if necessary, freedom of trade and
transit." 76 Unlike the Berlin Act (which it superseded for its signa-
tories5 ), the St.-Germain Treaty did not by its terms restrict its application
to the African coast. Thus, it applied the standard of effective occupation to
all regions of the world.57 However, whereas in the Berlin Act the effective-
ness requirement took the form of a condition for the acquisition of sovereignty
over territory, it appeared in the St.-Germain Treaty as an ongoing requirement
of sovereignty already acquired. 79
3. The Definition of Terra Nullius
One of the most crucial questions in the Aouzou Strip dispute concerns the
definition of territory that was lawfully subject to occupation. Libya may argue
that France could not lawfully have occupied the Aouzou Strip because if the
land was not under Turkish or Sanusi sovereignty, it was under the sovereignty
of the Toubous. Chad may respond that the Toubous, as a political body,
lacked the cohesiveness necessary to exercise rights of sovereignty.
These contentions echo a division among legal scholars of the colonial
period. Writers were unanimous in stating that any land that was terra nullius
was open to occupation. They differed among themselves, however, in defining
terra nullius. In general, terra nullius was any part of the earth's surface that
575. Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin of 26 February 1885 and the Declaration of
Brussels of 2 July 1890, Sept. 10, 1919, 8 L.N.T.S. 25. Signatories included the United States, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Portugal.
576. Id. art. 10, 8 L.N.T.S. at 35.
577. Id. art. 13, 8 L.N.T.S. at 37.
578. See LIDLEY, supra note 528, at 149.
579. Decencire-Ferrandi6re, supra note 527, at 660. Some authors viewed the St.-Germain Treaty
as regressive. Since it abrogated the Berlin Act and effectively did not replace Articles 34 and 35, they
feared that states would interpret the treaty as an implied repeal of the effectiveness requirement. These
authors argued that the abrogation of the Berlin Act was only an acknowledgment that the Act was no
longer useful, since all the African coast had been occupied. See 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 690-91.
Others saw the St.-Germain Treaty as complementary to the Berlin Act. Gent, supra note 527, at 314.
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was not yet appropriated and was susceptible of occupation.80 The require-
ment that the land be as yet unappropriated caused considerable difficulty.
Scholars agreed that uninhabited land and abandoned land, as well as land
inhabited only by scattered individuals without any political organization, was
terra nullius. They also agreed that land belonging to a recognized non-Europe-
an state, such as Turkey or Japan, was not terra nullius.51 They could not
agree, however, whether the land possessed by "savage" or "barbaric" tribes
with a rudimentary organization qualified as terra nullius or whether, on the
contrary, such tribes were deemed to be sovereign and their rights entitled to
respect.5 82
Jurists attempted to avoid this difficulty by looking to the degree of "civili-
zation" of the native tribe. If a terra nullius was a territory characterized by
a lack of civilization, then the question whether a particular area was terra
nullius could, in theory, be answered by reference to the degree of civilization
of its inhabitants. This effort, however, proved similarly incapable of yielding
definitive results, since the process of defining civilization and terra nullius
was essentially circular. Commentators could not agree on a definition of
"civilization," and each supplied a definition that best supported his conclu-
sions.
a. The Three Schools of Thought on Tribal Sovereignty
Scholarly opinion on the sovereignty of "savage" tribes was essentially
divided into three schools of thought." 3 The first school, relying on the state
practice of occupying the land of such tribes, held that such tribes possessed
no rights of sovereignty under international law and that civilized states could
580. Genet, supra note 527, at 429; see also HYDE, supra note 618, at 167 (occupation "is only
available for use in relation to lands not subjected to a claim of sovereignty deemed entitled to respect");
J ZE, supra note 527, at 59. The requirement that the object of appropriation be susceptible of occupation
was included primarily to exclude from terra nullius the high seas. Genet, supra note 527, at 434-36; see
also JAZE, supra note 527, at 59-62.
581. See BoNFIs, supra note 528, at 303-08; 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 692-708; lAZE, supra
note 527, at 71-86. In the Western Sahara pleadings Mauritania presented the same view of the contempo-
rary European conception of terra nullius. Written Statement of Mauritania, 1981 I.C.J. Pleadings (3
Western Sahara) 28-32 (Mar. 27, 1975).
582. Distinguishing tribes that possessed a degree of organization sufficient to be deemed entitled to
sovereignty from those that did not prompted one scholar to note that defining terra nullius was easy in
theory but very difficult in practice. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 191-92. A further complication in
deciding whether international law recognized sovereign rights in native tribes arises from the disparity
between the insistence of some writers that natives' sovereignty be respected and the occasional practice
of some states of ignoring any claims of tribal sovereignty. See id. at 191-92.
583. For summaries ofthese three schools, see Written Statement of Mauritania, 1981 1.C.J. Pleadings
(3 Western Sahara) 32-37 (Mar. 27, 1975); BoNFEs, supra note 528, at 303-08; 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note
526, at 697-99; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 11-20; see also JAZE, supra note 527, at 87-112; Genet, supra




therefore occupy their land at will."' These writers argued that international
law was meant to regulate only the conduct of the members of international
society, and that since "uncivilised natives" were not members of international
society, international law did not recognize or protect them.5 5 Civilization
was defined as the ability "to supply a government adequate to the white men's
needs or to [the natives'] own protection.""S Essentially, this view required
natives of a territory to achieve a degree of development equivalent, or nearly
so, to that of Europe. In practice, this view sanctioned occupation in any case
where the natives were unable to resist a European intrusion-in effect making
any occupation, once achieved, legal.5"7 Members of this school strongly
disapproved of the practice of concluding "glass-bead" treaties of cession with
native tribes. They preferred occupation to such treaties because they believed
that the natives, having no conception of what Europeans meant by "sovereign-
ty," were simply incapable of comprehending what they were ceding and thus
were not competent to cede it.
588
584. See LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 18; see also HERSHEY, supra note 540, at 185; JiZE, supra
note 527, at 88, 90-103; LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 58-59; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 57.
As one commentator stated:
Tracts roamed over by savage tribes have been again and again appropriated, sometimes after
some kind of compensation has been given to the natives ... , sometimes with no regard for
their claims and wishes. And even the attainment by the original inhabitants of some degree of
civilization and political coherence has not sufficed to bar the acquisition of the territory by
occupancy.
LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 146; see also LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 151.
Representative members of this school included Westiake, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, and Rivier.
Lindley wrote that most of his contemporaries also shared this view. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 20.
Malcolm Shaw provides some corroboration, reporting that the first school dominated at the end of the
nineteenth century. SHAW, supra note 559, at 32. Although Calvo favored a rule of absolute respect for
native sovereign rights, he seemed to recognize that the law permitted states to occupy the lands of "savage
or barbaric tribes." See 1 CALvO, supra note 537, at 389.
585. While contemporary legal theory recognized that the natives certainly possessed moral rights-i.e.
rights that should be respected as a matter of conscience, not a matter of law-it left the appreciation of
those rights to the occupying state. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 136; WESTLAKE, COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 541, at 138; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 146 ("All territory not in the
possession of states who are members of the family of nations and subjects of International Law must be
considered as technically res nullius and therefore open to occupation. The rights of the natives are moral,
not legal. International Law knows nothing of them, though International Morality demands that they be
treated with consideration.'); LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 151; de Martitz, supra note 571, at 373-
74.
586. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 105. Westlake elaborated on this
definition, stating that a civilized government should protect the life of its people "from being disturbed
by contests between different powers for supremacy on the same soil" and guarantee the natives "a security
and well-being at least not less than that they enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers." WESTLAKE,
CHAmERS, supra note 614, at 141; see also WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 143.
587. The same result followed from these scholars' view of the duties of the occupying state. Since
such a state had to supply an organization that was capable of excluding any other power, and the natives
did not possess such an organization, they could not be deemed to have a right of sovereignty over the
territory they inhabited.
588. See John Westlake, Le conflit anglo-portuguais, 23 REVuE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 243, 248
(1891) [hereinafter Westlake, Le conflft]; see also WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 149-55;
Examen, supra note 569, at 180-81 (stating that European states must guard against treaties with local chiefs
selling rights of sovereignty for "bottles of rum") (comments of Alphonse Rivier, President of commission
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The second school held that such tribes possessed a right of sovereignty
that was circumscribed by the superior rights of civilization and coloniza-
tion.5" 9 In effect this theory produced the same results as the first school:
if a European state wanted to take the land, it had only to assert its superior
rights. It was essential to the advocates of this view, however, that the occupy-
ing state actually need the territory and be able to utilize it more effectively
than the natives; that is, it must actually try to colonize and civilize the terri-
tory.5' In reality, this requirement posed no obstacle to an appropriation of
territory. Whatever its results, the theory at least permitted its advocates to
salve their consciences by claiming to treat natives as sovereign states. Among
the best-known jurists in this school were Vattel, Bluntschli, Phillimore, Fiore
and G.F. de Martens. This school had largely died out and possessed few
proponents by the late nineteenth century.
The third school5 9' held that "savage" tribes possessed a right of sover-
eignty that was entitled to absolute respect as long as the members of the tribe
were "connected by some political organization, however primitive and
crude."' 92 Any other view, they argued, would sanction the principle that
might makes right.59 They insisted that the only permissible means of
acquiring the land held by such tribes was the use of treaties of cession
executed in full conformity with all tribal customs and rules.59
charged with producing I.D.L. Declaration). Writers in this school also argued that since such peoples did
not constitute states in international law, and that only states could cede sovereignty, any treaties of cession
concluded with "savage" tribes were ipsofacto void. See de Martitz, supra note 571, at 373-74.
589. See LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 17; see also JXZE, supra note 527, at 89-90.
590. 2 FiORRE, supra note 534, at 134-35, 151; cf. JzE, supra note 527, at 108-12.
591. Writers in the third school included Fiore, Despagnet, Bonfils, Salomon, Lindley, Calvo, and
J~ze. Malcolm Shaw contends that "[s]tate practice of the period reveals that Africa was not regarded as
terra nullius and that occupation was not therefore available as a mode of acquiring legal title to territory."
SHAW, supra note 559, at 33. However, Shaw contradicts this point on the previous page by acknowledging
that the view of the first school dominated the scholarship of the period. Id. at 32.
592. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 12-17; see also JkZE, supra note 527, at 112-17. M.F. Lindley gave
perhaps the best statement of the view of this school:
Many of the so-called "savage" races ... possess organized institutions of government, and it
cannot be truly said that the territory inhabited by such races is not under any sovereignty. Such
sovereignty as is exercised there may be of a crude and rudimentary kind, but, so long as there
is some kind of authoritative control of a political nature which has not been assumed for some
merely temporary purpose, such as a war, so long as the people are under some permanent form
of government, the territory should not, it would seem, be said to be unoccupied.
LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 20; see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 697 ("any organization
whatsoever, however imperfect and rudimentary one may consider it, must remove a territory from the
possibility of occupation"); SALOMON, supra note 527, at 200 ("the beginnings, however rudimentary and
imperfect, of political organization" remove tribe's land from terra nullius).
593. See LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 15-17; JXzE, supra note 527, at 88-89,103-08; SALOMON, supra
note 527, at 208-09.
594. The members of the first school criticized this method as unworkable. They argued that instead
of producing certainty in titles, which was the purpose of the Berlin Conference, treaties of cession created
uncertainty because they permitted any state at any time to raise a challenge based upon a simple procedural
deficiency. See WESTrLAK, CHAMfeRS, supra note 614, at 139-40.
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According to this school, only "a tract of country... inhabited only by
isolated individuals who were not united for political action" could be subject
to occupation. 95 Lindley cites Australia as an example of such a territory,
since the natives had no form of "civil polity" and the British found "no
political society to be dealt with. "96 These statements imply that the true test
in the view of the third school was the capacity of the natives to deal as a
political body with Europeans. If the territory possessed no community capable
of binding its members in the community's relations with foreign powers, the
community lacked sovereignty and thus was terra nullius.5 97
Writers in this school defined "civilization" broadly. They believed that
the European model was not the only form a state could take. So long as the
community in question was able to get its members to conform their behavior
to a standard, whether by punishment, custom, or fear of supernatural conse-
quences, these writers were willing to recognize it as a sovereign state."' 8
They invoked state practice in support of their views, arguing that the conclu-
sion of treaties with tribal chiefs implied a recognition of sovereign rights.' 9
However, the Berlin Act contradicts the position of the third school. Article
35 of the Berlin Act, which applied only to occupations, allowed states to
adopt and make use of native institutions of governance in establishing the
necessary authority in the territory.' The delegates at Berlin therefore could
not have viewed the existence of such institutions as an automatic bar to
occupation.
Neither of the nineteenth-century efforts to codify the law of occupation
resolved the question of native sovereignty. At the Conference of Berlin the
U.S. delegate, John A. Kasson, attempted to have the conference adopt the
view of the third school. Kasson put forward a proposal stating that
[m]odern international law follows closely a line which leads to the recognition of
the right of native tribes to dispose freely of themselves and of their hereditary
territory. In conformity with this principle [the United States] government would
gladly adhere to a more extended rule, to be based on a principle which should aim
595. 1 FAUCMLLE, supra note 526, at 697; see also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 23; SALOMoN, supra
note 527, at 200; SHAW, supra note 559, at 31.
596. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 40-41.
597. This same test was sanctioned by the I.C.J. in the Western Sahara case. See infra notes 605-607
and accompanying text.
598. LiND EY, supra note 528, at 21-22.
599. 1 CALVO, supra note 537, at 207; see also BoNIs, supra note 528, at 308; 1 FAUCHILLE, supra
note 526, at 700-01; JAZE, supra note 527, at 128-31, 142-45. This view of civilization found some support
in the Barotse arbitral award, which defined a "Paramount Ruler" as "he who exercises governmental
authority according to [customary law]," essentially by appointing and deposing subordinate chiefs, by
deciding disputes between them, and by obliging them to recognize his paramount status. Quoted in SHAw,
supra note 559, at 40. These writers also recognized, however, that states often deviated from the principles
ostensibly enshrined by the conclusion of treaties with natives, because the natives frequently did not
understand the import of their actions and because the states often ignored their treaty obligations. See JftZE,
supra note 527, at 147-61.
600. See supra note 556.
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at the voluntary consent of the natives whose country is taken possession of, in all
cases where they had not provoked the aggression."0
While the conference did not adopt a contrary statement, it "hesitated to
express an opinion" on Kasson's proposal, noting that it "touched upon delicate
questions."" But the amendment of Article 35, which permitted occupying
states to make use of existing native institutions of governance, implicitly
rejected Kasson's proposal."ra The Institut de Droit International was also
unable to reach a consensus on this question, and it decided not to issue any
definition of terra nullius.6° Thus the question of indigenous tribes' sover-
eignty remained an unsettled aspect of the law of occupation.
b. The View of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara
Case
The 1975 Western Sahara case6es called upon the International Court of
Justice, in assessing the legal ties between Western Sahara on one hand and
the "Mauritanian entity" on the other, to determine the European opinion on
tribal sovereignty. The Court bypassed the scholarly debate and decided the
question on the basis of state practice: "Whatever the differences of opinion
there may have been among jurists, the State practice of the relevant period
indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and
political organization were not regarded as terra nullius."6°6 The Court then
601. Quoted in WEsTLAKE, CHAPTERs, supra note 614, at 138.
602. Id. (quoting comments of Mr. Busch, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Germany,
presiding at meeting); see also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 33-34; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 210-16.
603. See supra note 556 and accompanying text.
604. Id. at 184. De Martitz's draft declaration proposed that terra nullius include "any region that
does not find itself effectively under the sovereignty or under the protectorate of one of the States forming
the community of the law of nations, whether this region is inhabited or not." Examen, supra note 569,
at 177. De Martitz's draft also stated that "it is an exaggeration to speak of sovereignty of savage or semi-
barbaric peoples." Like Westlake, de Martitz felt that such peoples were not members of the community
of nations and consequently had no rights under international law. Similarly, because such peoples did not
constitute a state, they could not validly cede sovereignty over territory through a treaty. De Martitz, supra
note 571, at 373-74; see also Gen~t, supra note 527, at 317-18.
Several members of the Institut objected to this definition, contending that the concept of the
community of the law of nations" was vague and difficult to apply and would lead to the "invasion and
spoliation" of less advanced peoples. Eramen, supra note 569, at 178 (comments of tdouard Engelhardt),
180-81 (comments of Louis Renault). Others claimed that this definition did not accord with the practice
of states. Id. at 180 (comments of L. de Bar). The argument contended that de Martitz's definition would
have placed the American Indians, whom the European explorers viewed as within the "community of the
law ofnations," outside the community. Therefore, de Martitz's proposal defined terranullius more broadly
than did state practice.
Alphonse Rivier, the president of the commission charged with producing the declaration, attempted
to salvage de Martitz's proposal by stating that it meant to exclude from the "community of the law of
nations" only those tribes which, by their lack of organization, were not capable of concluding treaties.
Id. at 180. Rivier would have defined a state as "an organized political body; a nomadic tribe is not a
state." Id. at 181.
605. 1975 I.C.J. 10 (Oct. 16)
606. Id. at 39.
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determined that Western Sahara was not a terra nullius at the time of Spanish
colonization because it was inhabited by peoples "which, if nomadic, were
socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to
represent them," and because Spain concluded treaties with local chiefs, thus
indicating that Spain did not view their territory as terra nullius.Y Such a
test creates a high obstacle for any state seeking to prove that an area was terra
nullius at the time it or its predecessor took possession of the territory.
The Court's reasoning was badly flawed as a matter of history. The Court
based its conclusion on the contemporary practice of concluding treaties of
cession with the native rulers, but this practice does not provide a stable
foundation for the argument the Court built upon it. True, the colonial powers
did rely on such treaties to enforce the rights of sovereignty they claimed over
the land thus acquired. But the Court's conclusion is vulnerable because such
treaties were intended merely to demonstrate a state's interest in an area and
to warn other states to stay away. They were not meant to be "documents of
a central character" in international law.60 8 In a related argument, Max
Huber, the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case, held that such documents
were better viewed as contracts assigning the grant of various rights of indus-
trial and commercial exploitation, and not as treaties capable of creating rights
and obligations in international law.6"9 Huber likely based his conclusion on
a belief that uncivilized tribes were not persons subject to international law and
thus could not conclude treaties. 610
It also seems odd, to say the least, that the European states would have
gone to the trouble of defining the conditions for the future occupation of
607. Id. at 81. Unfortunately, once the Court found on these grounds that Western Sahara was not
terra nullius, it relieved itself from the obligation of deciding whether the territory's ties to the Moroccan
Sultanate or to the Bilad Shinguitti removed it from the domain of terra nullius. Id. at 39-40. Had the court
decided these questions, it would have introduced some certainty into the law that could provide guidance
in the Aouzou Strip dispute.
608. SHAW, supra note 559, at 37. For a similar view see SHARMA, supra note 544, at 97-101. In
discussing protectorate treaties concluded by Great Britain with Somali tribes in 1884-1886, Sharma notes
that the treaties themselves, under a purely textual reading, could be taken as proof that "the British
Government regarded the Somalis as independent peoples capable of entering into agreements with other
sovereign states." Id. at 100. However, Sharma cautions that the expectations of the parties
have to be interpreted in the light of the full context and realistic objectives of the parties. The
main purpose of the British Government in concluding treaties with the tribesman was.. . "to
exclude any other European State from the [area"], and ... the supposed independence of the
tribes was largely a matter of legalistic and political convenience. This appraisal of the shared
expectations of the parties is reinforced by the subsequent conduct of the Great Britain as
manifested in the establishment of British administration carried out through . . . an advisory
council which actually ruled most of the regions occupied by these tribes. . . . [The British
Government did not regard the tribes of Somaliland as sovereign, or even as semi-sovereign,
but it considered them as no more than subjects of the British Crown.
Id. (citation omitted).
609. For a discussion of this argument, see Written Statement of Mauritania, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings
(3 Western Sahara) 3, 51 (Mar. 27, 1975); see also SHAW, supra note 559, at 37.
610. Sharma draws a parallel between the British agreements with the Somalis and the Dutch
agreements with the local rulers in Island of Palmas. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 100-01.
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territory in Africa at the Conference of Berlin if they had not believed that any
part of Africa was even subject to occupation in the first place. Nor would they
have amended the draft of Article 35 of the Berlin Act to allow occupying
states to make use of existing native institutions of government if the land
inhabited by these natives could not be legally occupied. The Court's conclu-
sion is therefore historically incorrect.
In all fairness, the Court in Western Sahara was operating within narrow
confines, given the politically sensitive nature of the dispute. The Court felt
that the General Assembly had called upon it not to furnish an opinion that
would enable the General Assembly to settle a "dispute or legal controver-
sy, 611 but rather to supply "an opinion which the General Assembly deems
of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions concerning the
decolonization of the territory."612 The Court was also acutely aware that
the fate of Western Sahara would be determined by "the population of Western
Sahara. .. by their own freely expressed will," notwithstanding the General
Assembly requesting the Court's advisory opinion.613 The Court did not
perceive itself as free to render a decision outside these constraints. If the
Court had found that Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of the
Spanish colonization, it would essentially have prejudged the question of
Moroccan or Mauritanian sovereignty over Western Sahara, thus limiting its
own freedom to explore the legal ties between Western Sahara and the claim-
ants. By disposing of the terra nullius question peremptorily, the Court stayed
within the confines imposed by the General Assembly.
c. Summary
In conclusion, late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars were
deeply divided over whether the lands of "savage" tribes could be subject to
occupation. Nor does the practice of colonial powers settle the question
definitively, notwithstanding the decision of the I.C.J. in Western Sahara. The
evidence appears to support an alternative conclusion-namely, that states
viewed land inhabited by disorganized natives as open to occupation. In any
event, it seems clear that if a community was incapable of binding its members
in its relations with foreign powers through a treaty, even the most generous
publicists would have considered its land a terra nullius.
611. 1975 I.C.J. at 26.
612. Id. at 27.




4. Time Required to Complete an Occupation
As discussed above, three powers-the Sanusi, Turkey, and France-were
present in the Aouzou Strip for varying lengths of time between 1900 and
1916. The dispute can therefore be expected to raise issues as to the length of
time required to perfect a title by occupation. If Turkey or the Sanusi exercised
effective control over the area, and did so for a long enough time, then absent
an abandonment or transfer of title by cession, conquest, or prescription,
France could not lawfully have acquired sovereignty over the area through
occupation. Although the jurists of the period were able to define with some
degree of clarity the conditions required for an effective occupation, they were
unfortunately not as successful in defining the period in which those conditions
had to be satisfied. Instead, the scholars simply shrank from the question and
stated that each case had to be appreciated on its own facts. Consequently the
law here was murky and unpredictable, and it left states no guidance.
Much of the scholarly discussion drew upon the principles of inchoate title,
first elaborated in previous centuries when states acquired territory by dis-
covery, and extended them to occupation.614 A state that was occupying
territory obviously could not be expected to create overnight the kind of
administration required by the law.615 In that sense, all occupations were
initially constructive. 616 Therefore, although the initial acts of occupation
could not be said to create an effective occupation in themselves, they did
confer an inchoate title for a certain period.617 The state would then have a
limited period in which to perfect its title by continuous and undisturbed
possession of the territory.18 Other states were not precluded as a matter
614. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 283-84. Although discovery alone (or coupled with symbolic acts
constituting a constructive occupation) was formerly said to confer a complete title, by the nineteenth
century the opinion of most jurists had shifted to hold that discovery sufficed to create only an "inchoate"
title, which the occupying state then had to perfect by an effective occupation within a reasonable time.
WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 161; see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 715;
2 FIORE, supra note 534, at 145; Decencibre-Ferrandi re, supra note 527, at 378.
Jurists were careful to distinguish inchoate title, which they viewed as a political consequence of
discovery and a matter of comity, from a right conferred by law. The state with inchoate title did not have
a legal right to exclude others; rather, the inchoate title served as notice to other states of the occupant's
intention, so that any attempt by another state to acquire the territory would be considered a hostile act.
JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (Cambridge, Cambridge
U. Press 1894) [hereinafter WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS]; Westlake, Le conflit, supra note 588, at 256; see also
HERSHEY, supra note 540, at 186-87; LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 146; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528,
at 152.
615. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 159-60; 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 525, at 108; Westlake, Le conflit, supra note 588, at 257.
616. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 283-84.
617. This inchoate title, whether based on discovery or occupation, could not defeat a rival claim
"founded on continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty." Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2
R.I.A.A. 829, 869 (1928).
618. Id. at 846; CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 194 (1922); 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 107-09.
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of law from attempting to acquire the territory during this time, but such
attempts would be viewed as unfriendly acts. If the state with inchoate title
failed to perfect its title within the period, the international community could
presume that the state no longer desired to occupy the territory, and the
territory would revert to terra nullius and become open to occupation by other
states.
619
However, scholars could not agree on any fixed time in which the occu-
pying state had to perfect its title. Some suggested twenty-five years, 6 0 but
the overwhelming majority of opinion rejected any attempt to impose a fixed
limit on all occupations. 62 1 The predominant view held that the occupying
state had a "reasonable" period in which to complete its occupation, and that
the meaning of "reasonable" necessarily varied with the circumstances of each
case. Such circumstances included the manner in and circumstances under
which acts of possession were performed, "the state of the arts of communica-
tion and transportation at the time," the size of the territory, the volume of
enterprise flowing into the region, and any other factor that would make
occupation unusually difficult or especially easy.62 If the time required to
complete an occupation does become an issue in the pending case, such
considerations will have ambiguous implications. On one hand, the relative
inaccessibility of the region supports an argument for permitting a longer
period in which to complete an occupation. On the other hand, the knowledge
that other powers had designs on the area would militate in favor of leaving
occupying powers a shorter period.
5. The Extent of the Occupied Territory: Hinterland Theories
The definition of terra nullius was not the only issue on which international
legal scholars disagreed. As Amos Hershey noted in 1912, "there is a wide
difference of opinion when it comes to the difficult question of determining
the area within which an effective occupation operates."623 According to one
619. See, e.g., SALOMON, supra note 527, at 283-84; THOMAS A. WALKER, A MANUAL OF PUBLIC
IMTERNATiONAL LAW 28 (Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press 1895); cf. 2 FIORE, supra note 534, at 145.
620. See, e.g., 2 FIORE, supra note 534, at 151. Fiore's proposal of a fixed period for all cases is
somewhat inconsistent with his statementin the same work that the time required to complete an occupation
must vary with the circumstances of each case. See infra note 622 and accompanying text.
621. WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 166-69; see also JRZE, supra note 527, at
242-43; WESTLAKE, CIAPrERS, supra note 614, at 163-65; Westlake,Le conflit, supra note 588, at 259-60.
622. Hayton, supra note 544, at 394; see also BoNFILS, supra note 528, at 310; 2 FIORE, supra note
534, at 143-44; WESTLAKE, CHAMsFra, supra note 614, at 165-66; Westlake, Le conflit, supra note 588,
at 260.
623. HERSHEY, supra note 540, at 187; see also SALOMON, supra note 527, at 319-20. Not only
scholars but states, too, could not agree on the matter. At least one commentator believed that the position
states took on this question depended solely on self-interest and thus varied in different situations. Decen-
ci~re-Ferrandi~re, supra note 527, at 646.
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view, a state could claim no more territory than it effectively occupied.624
This was the view adopted in the I.D.I. Declaration.6' The other view held
that a state was entitled to occupy not only the land under its effective adminis-
tration, but also a hinterland6' comprising all territory within the "natural
boundaries" of the area that was "essential to the independence and security"
of the settlement.627 This difference of opinion may become relevant to the
Aouzou Strip dispute if Libya argues that the area now constituting northern
Chad was actually an Ottoman hinterland.
624. HERSHEY, supra note 540, at 187; 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 721, 734; J3zE, supra note
527, at 288-90; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 528, at 279; see also SALOMON, supra note 527, at 324-27;
WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 166; WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 170.
Of course, jurists recognized that any occupation was necessarily constructive at first. See supra notes
614-619 and accompanying text; see also HALL, supra note 528, at 107; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 271.
Consequently, even those most in favor of limiting the territory that could be claimed to the area that was
effectively occupied allowed the occupying state to assert an initial claim to more land than it had occupied.
The state would then have "not only a reasonable, but ample, time" to complete the occupation of the entire
area. During that time, its inchoate title to the region would be exclusive, and no other state could occupy
any part of the region claimed. This view had the virtue of preventing conflicts between rival occupants.
1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 726-29, 734; HALL, supra note 528, at 108; HERSHEY, supra note 540,
at 188; WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 163-65; Examen, supra note 569, at 174-75
(comments of John Westlake). TheIsland of Palmas award agreed with this view, recognizing the necessity
of relaxing the effectiveness requirement at early stages of an occupation, but holding that after this phase
the display of sovereignty "must make itself felt throughout the whole territory." Island of Palmas Case
(Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 855 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928).
Under the opposing view, a state could notify other states of its taking of possession only when the
occupation had become effective throughout the entire extent of the territory. Until that time any other state
could occupy another part of that territory. Examen, supra note 569, at 174-75 (comments of John
Westlake).
625. See supra note 570 and accompanying text.
626. Some confusion may arise between two meanings ascribed to the term "hinterland." As used here,
hinterland denotes the unoccupied back country that, for reasons of security or history, is considered
appurtenant to nearby occupied territory. Jurists occasionally used the term to refer to a process of defining
by treaty with other interested powers an area in which one state would have exclusive rights. Such an area
is better described as a sphere of influence. See infra notes 805-817 and accompanying text.
627. HERSHEY, supra note 540, at 187 & n.22; see also BoNFILS, supra note 528, at 309; 1 CALVo,
supra note 537, at 408-09; 2 FIORE, supra note 534, at 149; LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 149;
LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 155. Even these publicists agreed that the territory so claimed had to
be reasonable in relation to the size of the occupied territory. See LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 149-51;
LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 156-57; WALKER, supra note 619, at 29-30.
The notification requirement contained in the Berlin Act created a further question: whether the
notification, where the law required one, had to contain a determination of the limits of the territory
occupied. Such a requirement, its supporters argued, would have produced certainty and avoided territorial
disputes. BONFILS, supra note 528, at 302-03. Great Britain had proposed at the Conference of Berlin that
notifications should always contain such a determination. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
525, at 106. This proposal would have encountered some problems in application since the territory was
largely unknown and the occupying state could not be expected to give a very precise description of the
area. Despagnet, supra note 556, at 108; Genft, supra note 527, at 320. The Berlin Act did not adopt the
British proposal as a formal requirement of notification. However, Annex I to Protocol 8 of the Berlin Act
stated that "it remained understood that notification was inseparable from a certain determination of limits"
and that other concerned powers could require the notifying state to be specific in order to protect their
own rights and interests. Berlin Act, supra note 555, Protocol 8, Annex I, reprinted in SCRAMBLE, supra
note 553, at 245, 247; see also WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 167; WESTLAKE, COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 541, at 170; 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 106.
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Those publicists who favored relaxing the effectiveness requirement
advanced several theories to justify their position. These theories arose from
three considerations: geographical proximity, natural features, or economic or
strategic need.62 They were rather vague in defining the exact amount of
territory a state could claim without having to occupy it. In general, the
publicists disfavored such theories, arguing that they had no real legal basis
and that their only justification lay in convenience.629 However, states contin-
ued to advance such claims-Turkey's 1890 and 1899 notes are examples-and
hinterland arguments gained some recognition from international tribunals,
especially in cases where no other power disputed the title of the state claiming
the hinterland.
a. The Restrictive View of the Publicists
States sometimes invoked the first class-theories of proximity and contigu-
ity-to justify claims to an unoccupied hinterland that was close or adjacent
to territory that had been occupied. Such theories were particularly common
in the case of two islands near each other or in the case of an island lying close
offshore. Yet jurists generally denied that proximity without an effective
occupation could support a valid title. They argued that if proximity conferred
upon a state superior faculties for occupying a territory, that state should
exercise those faculties.630 Thus any effect of proximity was purely political,
not legal.
In the Island of Palmas award Max Huber addressed the contiguity theory
and concluded that it had "no foundation in international law.""63 Huber
noted that the principle was "by its very nature... uncertain and contested,"
that it conflicted with the requirement of effective occupation, and that its
application would "lead to arbitrary results."632 Huber therefore stated that
even isolated displays of sovereignty would defeat a claim based on territorial
continuity.6 33
Under a second theory, based on natural boundaries, states invoked geo-
graphical features in order to claim more territory than they had effectively
occupied. A state relying on this theory could assert a claim to a hinterland
628. See WESTLAKE, CHAMrEs, supra note 614, at 168-74.
629. See LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 234-35. According to Lindley, states were more tolerant of
such claims when unoccupied territory was relatively abundant, but as the amount of such territory shrank
international law changed to require more precise methods of asserting claims, such as the sphere of
influence doctrine discussed below. Id.; see also infra notes 652-663 and accompanying text.
630. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 228-29; see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 725-26;
SALOMON, supra note 527, at 324-27; Gen~t, supra note 527, at 442.
631. Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.L.A.A. 829, 869 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928).
632. Id. at 854-55.
633. Id. at 855; see also 1 OPPENEIM, supra note 528, at 280 (stating that tribute from remote tribes
or police sweeps of remote areas can show extent of effective occupation).
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containing all the territory adjacent to the occupied land within the natural
boundaries of the region-rivers, mountain ranges, and other prominent
features that acted as barriers. This theory has some intuitive appeal, at least
insofar as it advances certainty, but it was scarcely more successful than
proximity theories in gaining recognition as a rule of international law.
Lindley supported this genre of hinterland theories and cited with approval
the arguments made by Great Britain in its boundary arbitration with Vene-
zuela. In that case Britain pointed out that natural boundaries are both easy to
distinguish and hard to cross.634 Lindley also favored the use of ethnic and
racial divisions as natural boundaries. He noted that such divisions had not "in
the past been given the consideration they deserve" but were "being taken more
frequently into account in fixing international boundaries in Africa" at the time
of the publication of his book in 1926.63 He nevertheless concluded that
these principles could not be said to be a rule of international law, and that
the area a state could claim was still limited to the area it effectively occu-
pied.636 Only where the claimed additional area formed a "physical unit" with
the occupied territory and bore "a reasonable relation" to it in size could the
state gain some rights to the additional area. But even in that case the state had
to take possession of the area "within a reasonable time," or else its rights
would lapse and the area would again be open to occupation by other
states.
637
Under the third theoretical justification for a hinterland, states invoked
considerations of security or necessity for the development of their settlement.
Italy advanced such reasons in support of its claims to northern Chad in the
1920s, arguing that the territory and the caravan routes that crossed it were
necessary to the economic development of its Libyan colony. 638 During the
negotiations at the Conference of Berlin the British government instructed its
delegate that, as a "general principle... if a nation has made a settlement it
has a right to assume sovereignty over all the adjacent vacant territory which
is necessary to the integrity of the settlement. "639 In addition to its political
appeal, this argument gained some acceptance, at least as long as the occupy-
634. LNDLEY, supra note 528, at 273. The Venezuela-British Guiana arbitration was highly irregular
Venezuela's counsel reported that the President of the tribunal had applied improper pressure on him in
order to arrive at a consensus award, and alleged that the President might have made a secret deal with
Great Britain. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 288-93; Clifton J. Child, The Venezuela-British Guiana
Boundary Arbitration, 44 AM. J. lNT'L L. 682 (1951); William Cullen Dennis, Editorial Comment, The
Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 720 (1951).
635. Id. at 282.
636. Id. at 283.
637. L.; see also WESTLAKE, COU.EcMD PAPERS, supra note 541, at 172.
638. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
639. Telegram from Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet (Jan. 14, 1885), in SCRAMBLE, supra note
553, at 103-04 [hereinafter Granville Telegram].
Yale Journal of International Law
ing state, at the initial stages of the occupation, could not know which addition-
al land would be necessary for the security of the occupied territory.
However, jurists were scarcely more receptive to these claims than to other
hinterland arguments. Lindley denied that economic or political considerations
could furnish a basis for title."' At a time when colonizing states had ample
knowledge of the geography of the region, claims based on strategic impor-
tance made after the occupation rang hollow, because the state could have
occupied all the necessary land from the beginning." This implies that when
states did not have such knowledge, the reason for denying additional territory
claimed on grounds of necessity disappeared, and therefore that the law might
recognize such a claim.
b. The Permissive View Embodied in State Practice
Although the majority of jurists denied the validity of hinterland claims,
state practice presents quite a different picture. The British felt, regarding the
necessity principle, that "no nearer approach to a general abstract rule can be
collected from the writings of jurists" or from international disputes." 2
Indeed, several jurists supported this claim." 3 France and Great Britain in
1890 and 1899 recognized that Turkey could claim a "reasonable" hinterland
appurtenant to Tripolitania.6 Moreover, the hinterland was often difficult
to distinguish from the desolate or sparsely inhabited areas for which the law
required lesser displays of state authority. "' If a state possessed a settlement
that provided the sole means of easy access to more remote regions-as was
often the case with hinterland claims-that state might feel justified in claiming
the remote regions as a hinterland and displaying lesser acts of authority than
the law would otherwise require, since no other state was likely to challenge
its claim.
The Eastern Greenland case illustrates these principles, particularly the
lesser requirement of state authority where no other state challenged the claim.
The P.C.I.J. determined, largely on the basis of Danish legislation concerning
640. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 231-32.
641. Id. at 233-34.
642. Granville Telegram, supra note 639, at 103.
643. See HALL, supra note 528, at 110; cf. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at
114-16 (expressing some support for such theories).
644. See supra notes 161, 260 and accompanying text. During the negotiations preceding the 1898
sphere of influence agreement, France also referred to the 1890 agreement as fixing the respective limits
of 'the Hinterland of our Mediterranean possessions and the British sphere of influence .... " Letter from
Gabriel Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron de Courcel, French Ambassador to Great Britain
(Jan. 18, 1898), in FRANCE, MINIsTtRE DES AFFARES ETRANatRES, DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES:
CORRESPONDANCEET DocuMENTSRELATIFS A LA CONVENTIONFRANCO-ANGLAISE Du 14 JUIN 1898, 1890-
1898, No. 15, at 24 (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1899).
645. See supra notes 543-551 and accompanying text.
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the disputed territory and with almost no evidence of the actual display of
sovereignty on the spot, that Denmark had displayed sovereignty over Eastern
Greenland.' In framing its decision the Court noted the need to take into
account "the extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by some other
power." 7 The Court emphasized that until 1921 no other state had disputed
Denmark's claim, and until 1931 no other state had advanced a competing
claim."5 Given the "absence of any claim to sovereignty by another Power,
and the Arctic and inaccessible character" of the region, Denmark's modest
acts were sufficient to create "a valid claim to sovereignty. "649
Eastern Greenland thus sanctioned the state practice of claiming territory
as a hinterland, at least where no other state was asserting title to the territory.
In such a situation a state could acquire sovereignty over the territory without
having to display the full authority required in other contexts. In effect, a state
claiming a hinterland enjoyed a presumption of sovereignty over the territo-
ry."' However, under the principles announced in the Island of Palnas
arbitration, a hinterland could not defeat an opposing claim based on continu-
ous and peaceful possession of the same territory. 651
6. Spheres of Influence
Whatever legal status the hinterland possessed, states discovered another
convenient way to determine the extent of the territory a state was entitled to
claim: the sphere of influence. 652 By reaching reciprocal agreements with
646. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 48-50,
62-63 (Apr. 5).
647. Id. at 46.
648. Id.; see also id. at 48 (lack of challenge to claims of King of Denmark and Norway).
649. Id. at 50-51; see also SHARMA, supra note 544, at 176-77 (comparing Eastern Greenland with
Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17) and concluding that Court required lesser
acts to establish sovereignty in Eastern Greenland because territory there was "remote and inhospitable,"
whereas territory in Minquiers and Ecrehos was "the subject of constant activities and interests').
The Court further noted that, wholly apart from questions of estoppel against Norway, its holding with
regard to Danish displays of state authority was by itself a sufficient basis on which to award title to
Denmark. Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 64.
650. See Marcel Paisant, Les droits de la France au Niger, 5 REUVE GgNtRALE DE DROT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 5, 28 (1898)
651. See id. at 28; Georg Schwartzenberger, Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge, 51 AM. J.
INT'L L. 308, 312, 318 (1957); cf. Robert W. McKeon, Jr., Note, The Aouzou Strip: Adjudication of
Competing Territorial Claims in Africa by the International Court of Justice, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 147, 159 (1991) (noting that hinterland claims alone cannot vest title to territory).
To be peaceful the possession must have been free from challenges. If a state claiming a hinterland
protested another state's occupation of the territory in question, the occupying state's possession would
not be peaceful. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 180.
652. Another proposal would have required a state, in its notifications to other states, to give a precise
determination of the limits of the territory it was claiming. See 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 734-35;
LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 159. This was also the proposal advocated by the Institut de Droit
International in Article I of the I.D.I. Declaration. See supra note 570 and accompanying text.
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other states in which each party pledged not to attempt to acquire sovereignty
over certain areas reserved to the other, a state could effectively "fence off"
an area which it could occupy later at its leisure. The exclusive area thus
created was known as a sphere of influence or sphere of interest. 53
Spheres of influence played an important role in the origins of the Aouzou
Strip dispute. The Franco-British agreements of 1890, 1898, 1899, 1919, and
1924 defined the boundaries of a French sphere of influence. Chad will likely
argue that the lines drawn by these agreements became the boundaries of Chad
through acceptance by Italy and Libya. Libya might argue that the Bonnel de
M6zi~res letters, purporting to leave northern Chad to the Sanusi and southern
Chad to France,6" created a Sanusi sphere of influence that France was
bound to respect and refrain from occupying.
States quickly recognized the sphere of influence as "a precious find of
contemporary colonial policy,"'65 and it became an increasingly common
means of appropriating territory at the end of the nineteenth century. 6S6 The
attractiveness of the process lay in its ability to allocate land among the
colonial powers without conflict 657 and without the need for effective occupa-
tion.658
The proposal proved to be impractical because states often lacked sufficient knowledge of the regions
they occupied at the time of the occupation. See supra note 627.
653. Despagnet, supra note 556, at 109; 1 FAUCMLI-LE, supra note 526, at 735-36; LAWRENCE, supra
note 528, at 153; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 158; 1 OPPENBaE, supra note 528, at 281; see also
WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 191-92; WESTLAKE, CHAITERS, supra note 614, at
187; Pasquale Fiore, Duprotectorat colonial et de la sphare d'influence (Hinterland), 14 REVUE OI IRALE
DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PuBLIc 148, 155-56 (1907) [hereinafter Fiore, Du protectorat]; A.G. de
Lapradelle, Chronique internationale, 17 REVuE DU DRorr PutLiC 498, 522 (1902); Cf. Decencibre-
Ferrandi~re, supra note 527, at 652 (discussing mutual agreements determining each state's frontier).
International law recognized other forms of spheres of influence, but these are not relevant to the
Aouzou Strip dispute. See LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 207-08 (discussing three types of spheres of
influence).
654. See supra notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
655. Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 156.
656. See Despagnet, supra note 556, at 110 and examples cited therein.
657. Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 157; see also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 210.
Decenci~re-Ferrandire felt that the sphere of influence was in this respect superior to effective occupation
as a means of acquiring territory, since the difficulty of specifying effectiveness inevitably led to disputes
and tensions. Decencibre-Ferrandi~re, supra note 527, at 631.
658. Although states recognized that the sphere of influence was nothing but an end run around the
requirement of effective occupation, they could not restrict each other's liberty to renounce their interests
in certain areas, see Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 157, even if they had wanted to. Yet states
did not want to restrict this process; in fact, its popularity proves quite the opposite.
The circumvention of the effectiveness requirement earned the sphere of influence the special
opprobrium ofjurists who insisted on respect for native rights. See, e.g., BowNs, supra note 528, at 315;
1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 738. Many scholars noted that in this respect, the sphere of influence
was merely a return to the days when territory was allocated by Papal bulls without regard for the
effectiveness of the occupation. See Despagnet, supra note 556, at 109. Westlake, in opposition to this
view, argued that the sphere of influence did not obviate the need for effective occupation at all, since the
state that had earmarked a sphere of influence still had to occupy the area at some point, lest other states
who were not signatories to the treaty and thus not bound by it occupy the territory themselves. 1
WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 128. But this argument ignores the possibility of
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Jurists who discussed the sphere of influence constantly reminded their
audience that the rights obtained by such agreements were strictly circum-
scribed. Since the sphere of influence treaty was an agreement between states,
it could not bind other states that were not parties to it-it was res inter alios
acta. It could not be asserted by third parties or against them.659 Although
other states might be obliged out of comity to respect a sphere of influ-
ence,' ° they were under no legal obligation. By the same principle, a right
granted by a sphere of influence treaty could not extinguish any rights of the
inhabitants of the territory." 1 In sum, the sphere of influence could not con-
fer a superior title valid erga omnes because it did not fulfill the objective
conditions for title-the continued display of sovereignty or effective occupa-
tion. 2 Thus, for instance, Italy would not be bound to respect French rights
eliminating all realistic competition by concluding sphere of influence treaties with all the states that were
likely to covet the territory. Once the state had done this, it gained an uncontestable right to the territory
without having to fulfill the requirements of occupation.
659. Despagnet, supra note 556, at 115; see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 736; JXZE, supra
note 527, at 165-70; LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 153; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 158;
LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 212; WESTLAKE, CHAPTERs, supra note 614, at 188. See generally LORD
McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 309-10 (1961) (noting that treaties are not binding on third parties).
Despagnet noted that states could easily circumvent this feature by establishing a protectorate over, or
concluding a treaty of cession with, native tribes, and then using the notification mechanism to make this
act binding erga onmes. Despagnet, supra note 556, at 115.
Some scholars argued that over time, the hinterland treaty could bind other states. According to this
argument, the lapse of a long period without protest or other actions to contest the rights to the territory
could create an estoppel that would bar other states from asserting rights to the territory. This argument,
however, did not succeed, because the law imposed no duty to speak on third parties, so their silence could
not be taken as tacit assent. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNAmTIONAL LAW, supra note 525, at 129.
660. Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 158; see also HALL, supra note 528, at 135 (sphere
of influence "rather implies a moral claim than a true right').
661. See LiNDLEY, supra note 528, at 211; Despagnet, supra note 556, at 116-17; cf. Fiore, Du
protectorat, supra note 653, at 158 (arguing that treaty should not be read as granting state limitless and
arbitrary power over natives).
662. SHAW, supra note 559, at 49-50 (claim founded on sphere of influence cannot stand up to
opposing claim founded on actual occupation); see also Despagnet, supra note 556, at 117-18 (despite
irregularity of treaties concluded with native chiefs, such treaties confer title superior to claim founded on
sphere of influence without more); cf. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 212-13 (reporting remarks of U.S.
Secretary of State that spheres of influence are "unknown in international law'); id. at 217 (states may
consolidate sphere of influence into valid title by performing further acts showing sovereignty over
territory).
Some went further and criticized the sphere of influence doctrine as not resting on "any rational
foundation" since it ignored the distribution of native peoples. For this reason they also considered the
doctrine dangerous and likely to lead to conflicts. See BONFRnS, supra note 528, at 315.
Andr6 Decencibre-Ferrandire argued that once territory was divided by means of a sphere of influence
treaty, any dispute concerning the territory should be resolved by reference to the intent of the parties to
the treaty, rather than the extent and nature of the occupation. By the act of assigning the territory by treaty,
he contended, the parties had removed occupation as a faetor in determining title. Decencire-Ferrandi~re,
supra note 527, at 657. Thus, the intentions of France and Great Britain in the 1899 Declaration and the
intentions of France and Italy in the 1902 Barr~re-Prinetti letters would be dispositive in resolving
allegations that France later occupied territory beyond that to which it had agreed to limit itself in those
two earlier agreements. See infra note 791-794, 806-824 and accompanying text. In general, Decenci6re-
Ferrandi~re's view would be true only in a dispute between the two signatory states or their successors,
since a party to the treaty could not invoke it against a non-party, and vice-versa.
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arising from the Franco-British sphere of influence agreements unless France
secured Italy's assent" 3 or obtained valid title by some other means. France's
obligations in the latter case would depend on whether the Toubous possessed
rights of sovereignty over the territory. France would have to occupy the
territory if it was terra nullius, or obtain consent of the Toubous if it was not.
7. Disguised Occupation: The Colonial Protectorate
One means of securing the consent of the inhabitants was the colonial
protectorate. This device extended the principles of the protectorate-first
applied in the context of relations between two states-to relations between
states and "savage" tribes. 6" However, the colonial protectorate possessed
only dubious legal status because it was really an expedient designed to circum-
vent the effectiveness requirement. 5 It also cynically manipulated the con-
cept of native sovereignty because the colonial power pretended to recognize
sovereign rights of the natives by concluding an agreement with them, but later
proceeded to ignore any sovereign rights by annexing their land.666 Libya
may argue that if they did not amount to an occupation, Turkey's dealings with
663. Chad will likely argue that the Barr~re-Prinetti letters of 1902 performed this function. See infra
notes 806-820 and accompanying text.
664. 1 FAUCHLLE, supra note 526, at 776. The protectorate, an alternative to occupation, allowed
a state to assume control of another state's foreign relations while leaving to the protected state control
over its internal affairs. Granville Telegram, supra note 639, at 104; CROWE, supra note 558, at 186
(quoting Sir Edward Hertslet). The territory that the protecting state thus acquired included all the land
inhabited or occupied by the people of the protecting state. Granville Telegram, supra note 639, at 104.
Almost inevitably, the establishment of a protectorate over a state was a mere prelude to the later
annexation of its territory. As a means of acquiring territory, this method proved more attractive than
occupation, because the protectorate entitled the protecting state to exclude other states but did not entail
the obligation of effective occupation. Although the Berlin Act did not extend the requirement of effective
occupation to protectorates, Berlin Act, supra note 555, arts. 34, 35, 165 Consol. T.S. at 501; see also
BoNFIIS, supra note 528, at 312; CROWE, supra note 558, at 179, 186-90; SALOMON, supra note 527,
at 222, the I.D.I. Declaration of 1888 did require the protecting state to consummate an effective occupation
of the territory. I.D.I. Declaration, supra note 569, art. I. Many scholars took the same view. JbZE, supra
note 527, at 239; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 148-49; WEsTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 181;
WEsTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERs, supra note 541, at 185.
However, strictly speaking a valid protectorate could arise only from a treaty between two states.
SALOMON, supra note 527, at 226-27; LAWRENcE 4th, supra note 528, at 169-170. If the protected society
did not constitute a state, it had no sovereignty, and therefore it could not alienate that part of its sovereign-
ty concerned with foreign relations. The colonial protectorate permitted states to retain these attractive
features but at the same time avoid the requirement that the object of the protectorate be a sovereign state.
665. Id. at 778; Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 152 ('just a disguised mode of occupation
that permits, by means of a simple diplomatic notification, [a state] to acquire territories and to absorb by
a progressive attraction the protected populations'); see also WESTLAXE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at
181; cf. LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 168.
According to Decencibre-Ferrandibre, the attitudes of states changed after the Conference of Berlin.
Those states that had the most to gain at Berlin by imposing strict standards for occupation later found those
standards increasingly burdensome as they rushed to absorb territory faster than their competitors. As a
result, all states began to slide away from the effectiveness requirement through such devices as the sphere
of influence and the colonial protectorate. Decenci~re-Ferrandi~re, supra note 527, at 639, 642-45, 651-52.
666. Cf. Fiore, Du protectorat, supra note 653, at 155.
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the Toubous-in particular, Derde Chai's acceptance of an Ottoman stipend
and the dispatch of small detachments to Tibesti-effectively created a colonial
protectorate.
Like a sphere of influence, a colonial protectorate could not by itself confer
title, since it did not fulfill the requirement of effective occupation." 7 The
colonial protectorate served to warn off nonsignatory states, but it did not
create a right against them. The protecting state had to occupy the territory
if it wanted to gain title to it."8 Thus if another state effectively occupied
the territory covered by a colonial protectorate, that state had a superior title.
As in other cases, effective occupation trumped.
B. Prescription
Occupation permitted a state to acquire territory only when no other state
had perfected a title to it. When the land was under the sovereignty of another
state, international law provided other means for the acquisition of sovereignty
over it. For example, the law permitted a state to gain title to territory through
prescription (sometimes called usucapion).69 Prescription, analogous to the
common-law property doctrine of adverse possession, generally required the
same conditions. The possession had to be open, uninterrupted, and uncon-
tested by the original possessor.67 As might be expected, the two doctrines
shared common purposes as well: preserving a stable state of affairs and
avoiding the disappointment of established expectations. 67 Accordingly,
prescription could sanction an initial wrong if the effects of that wrong had
become "part of the established international order."6I Generally, however,
667. In a dispute with Great Britain over title to territory in southern Africa, Portugal advanced a
variation of the colonial protectorate based on its efforts to civilize the natives. Portugal argued that the
maintenance of "rudimentary relations" and "rudimentary commerce" with the natives demonstrated an
intention to acquire and acts sufficient to confer title. 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 525,
at 140. Westlake vigorously denied that such activity could create a valid title. First, efforts to civilize
provided too unstable a base on which to found title, since other nations would probably not assign the
same value to them as the state that made those efforts. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS, supra note 614, at 175-76;
WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 179. Second, since "commerce finds its recompense
in itself," it could not'be used to acquire sovereign rights over a people. WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 541, at 179. Essentially, this amounts to saying that commerce was too commonplace an activity
to establish a pattern of state activity. This result would augur poorly for potential Libyan arguments in
the present case that trans-Saharan trade routes linking Tripolitania with the African interior formed a
sufficient foundation for claims of sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip area.
668. See Paisant, supra note 650, at 29-30.
669. 1 CALVo, supra note 537, at 386; HALL, supra note 528, at 123-24; HYDE, supra note 618, at
192; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 178; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 528, at 293-96.
670. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 178-80; see also BONFELs, supra note 528, at 299; 1 OPPEN-EIM,
supra note 528, at 294-95.
671. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 178; see also 1 CALvo, supra note 537, at 386.
672. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 178; see also HALL, supra note 528, at 123; LAWRENCE, supra
note 528, at 159; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 166; 1 OPPENl-EuM, supra note 528, at 294.
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prescription operated only between states.6' Where the party deprived of
possession was not a state and thus possessed no sovereign rights, the territory
was terra nullius and the acquiror took possession by occupation, not prescrip-
tion. As a result, one observer has commented that states did not use the
doctrine in Africa during the colonial period.674 However, if the Aouzou
Strip belonged to Turkey when the French took possession of it, this conclu-
sion may be open to doubt.675
C. Conquest
A state could also acquire territory by conquest. Title by conquest arose
by virtue of a military occupation during war between two states.676 Some
scholars denied that simple military subjugation, without a treaty of cession
or the passage of time sufficient to give rise to prescriptive title, could transfer
territorial sovereignty.' Others, however, held that conquest by itself con-
ferred a valid title, provided that the victor annexed the territory.67 Ulti-
mately, this dispute became irrelevant before it could be settled. With the
increasing disapproval of war as a policy tool after World War I, conquest lost
favor in international law.679
Because conquest was a valid means of occupation only between states, it
did not apply to the military subjugation of peoples who, in the eyes of Euro-
peans, did not constitute states."' It might apply, however, to the rights Italy
claimed by virtue of its military victory over Turkey in 1912.
A state could claim by conquest only the land it conquered and occu-
pied.68' However, if the invader won so complete a victory that no effective
opposition remained, it had an exclusive right to claim all the territory of its
opponent, regardless of whether the invader occupied that land at the end of
the war.682 Accordingly, after defeating Turkey, Italy could claim by con-
673. HYDE, supra note 618, at 192.
674. SHAW, supra note 559, at 283 n.149.
675. See mfra notes 799-801 and accompanying text.
676. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 47 (Apr. 5).
677. 1 OPPE E , supra note 528, at 287; BoNFI.S, supra note 528, at 300; 1 FAUcHILLE, supra
note 526, at 763-66; HYDE, supra note 618, at 175-76; JZE, supra note 527, at 45. Some jurists required
in addition that the war in which the territory was conquered be just. 2 FIom, supra note 534, at 155-56;
see also 1 FAUcH.ILE, supra note 526, at766-67 (requiring war to bejust, but allowing victorious defender
to claim territorial compensations from vanquished aggressor).
678. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 47, 160; see also HILL, supra note 540, at 161-62; LAWRENCE,
supra note 528, at 158; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 165; WALKER, supra note 619, at 33.
679. See 1 FAIUCHLLE, supra note 526, at 769-76.
680. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, at 47
(Apr. 5); see also HYDE, supra note 618, at 175-76 (state may conquer territory, but "[i]f the inhabitants
... are an uncivilized people, deemed to be incapable of possessing a right of property and control,"
source of title is really occupation; "conquest" refers to merely military effort and not to source of title).
681. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 164.
682. Id. at 164; SHAW, supra note 559, at 45.
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quest only the land under its control, i.e., the coastal strip, because the Arab
tribes remained in control of the interior."s However, the Treaty of Lau-
sanne in 1912 ceded to Italy all the land Turkey formerly controlled, a much
larger area, and in 1923 Turkey further agreed to renounce all the rights it
enjoyed in Libya by virtue of the 1912 treaty."'
D. Cession
Cession by treaty provided a final means of acquiring sovereignty over
territory. Like prescription and conquest, however, cession operated only
between states. On this point the debate between the different schools of
thought on terra nullius resurfaced.685 To those jurists who held that native
tribes had no rights of sovereignty and thus lacked the competence to cede it,
an agreement by which a people not recognized as a state ceded territory to
a state fell under the rubric of occupation.6 ' International law did not recog-
nize such agreements as valid cessions.6 ' On the other hand, those jurists
who maintained that tribes did possess rights of sovereignty held that such
agreements not only were valid, but also constituted the sole legitimate means
by which a state could acquire the territory inhabited by such peoples.688
Thus, if a tribe refused to sign a treaty, any acquisition of its land by a state
would be illegal. This debate, like the underlying one on indigenous tribes'
rights of sovereignty, was never resolved during the colonial period.
E. Abandonment
If a state subsequently abandoned territory after acquiring it, that territory
reverted to terra nullius. However, the law was unsettled as to what acts and
circumstances sufficed to imply an abandonment. The question deserves
attention because either side in the Aouzou Strip dispute could claim that the
other's predecessor abandoned the disputed territory. Libya could claim that
683. LiNDLEY, supra note 528, at 163.
684. Id. at 164.
685. See supra notes 581-591 and accompanying text.
686. 1 OPPENEIM, supra note 528, at 268-69; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 155. According
to Salomon (who believed that tribes did possess competence to cede territory), when an entity that was
not a person in international law purported to cede territory, the agreement constituted only a renunciation
of that entity's rights to such territory but did not transfer those rights to the other party. Instead, the
territory became terra nullius, and title arose by occupation. SALOMON, supra note 527, at 232-37. Thus,
although Salomon would not permit a state to occupy the land of such tribes outright, the state could achieve
the same result by means of a treaty.
687. Such agreements could not be "exhibited as an international title" but could support an otherwise
valid title against objections. WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 541, at 146; see also Westlake,
Le conflit, supra note 588, at 248, 251-52.
688. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 34-39; BoNFILS, supra note 528, at 319; 1 CALVO, supra note 537,
at 410; SALOMON, supra note 527, at 217, 219-20.
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France abandoned Tibesti between 1916 and 1929, while Chad could claim
that Turkey abandoned Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi in 1912-1913.
Most commentators held that abandonment required both the physical
abandonment of possession and the loss of the animus domini.8 9 However,
unless a state explicitly renounced its desire to possess the territory, others had
to infer the loss of animus domini from the circumstances. 6" Except in the
case of relatively minor possessions the uncertainty created by such rules
generated numerous conflicts.69'
In accordance with the general recognition of the difficulty of establishing
an effective occupation immediately, the law allowed states some latitude. In
particular, jurists agreed that a temporary loss of possession, such as might
result from a native uprising that drove the colonial state's forces from the
area, did not imply an abandonment.692 However, a withdrawal accompanied
by an expressed intention to return later could not prevent an inference of
abandonment if a sufficiently long period elapsed without the state's
return.
693
F. Principles of Islamic Law and the Arguments in Western Sahara
The analysis has focused so far largely on international law as viewed by
Western jurists. However, the Aouzou Strip dispute also involves claims based
on Islamic principles of international law. Western publicists in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century generally conceived of a state along
strictly European lines: if a political community did not display the full attrib-
utes of sovereignty and means of governance possessed by European or
689. See SALOMON, supra note 527, at 248; see also 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 694; JIZE,
supra note 527, at 68; LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 48; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 528, at 298. The
arbitrator in Clipperton Island took this view. Although France had not manifested sovereignty over the
island once it had validly acquired it, the arbitrator awarded the island to France because France "never
had the animus of abandoning the island." 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394.
690. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 48; Gengt, supra note 527, at 433.
691. The most serious example was the Fashoda Crisis, in which France, arguing that the withdrawal
of the British from Sudan during the Mahdist uprising constituted an abandonment, sought to occupy part
of Sudan herself. The confrontation between French and British forces at Fashoda in 1898 brought the two
countries to the brink of war until France backed down.
692. See 1 FAUCHILLE, supra note 526, at 694; see also LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 48-49; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 528, at 299; SALoMoN, supra note 527, at 338-39; WALKER, supra note 619, at
28. Such a temporary withdrawal was not an abandonment because the state preserved its animus. JhZE,
supra note 527, at 68. The Delagoa Bay arbitration applied these principles. Marshal MacMahon, the
arbitrator, held that the momentary interruption of Portugal's control over the territory did not imply an
abandonment. See LAWRENCE, supra note 528, at 149; LAWRENCE 4th, supra note 528, at 154-55;
WALKER, supra note 619, at 29.
693. LINDLEY, supra note 528, at 50. In that case, the lapse of time implies a loss of animus. The
length of time varied according to the circumstances, including: 1) the urgency of the need for governmental
control in the area; 2) the degree of control exercised in the area by the rival state; 3) the difficulty of the
original possessor's regaining possession or of the rival state's effectively occupying the territory; and 4)
the relations that other states had with the area. Id. at 51-52.
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American states, it was not a state in international law.694 Muslim jurists had
a quite different perception of sovereignty. So long as the political community
practiced Islam, it was part of the Islamic state (or state system). Thus,
whereas Western observers would not have deemed a nomadic Muslim tribe
to belong to any state, Muslim jurists would certainly have asserted that the
tribe belonged to the Islamic state and that its land was consequently not
susceptible to lawful appropriation.
1. Principles of the Islamic Law of Nations
The Islamic conception of the state derives from the concept of Islam itself.
Islam is a compact between each individual and Allah.69 The theory of the
Islamic state in the nineteenth century was therefore "a human community
whose sole true link [was] the Muslim religion."696 Islamic law accordingly
"had a personal rather than a territorial character and was obligatory upon the
Muslims as individuals or as a group, regardless of the territory they resided
in."'697 The Islamic conception of sovereignty thus extended primarily to
persons, not territory: "Mhe state's jurisdiction is essentially dependent on
the individual's religion which entitles him both to membership in the Muslim
brotherhood as well as to citizenship of the Muslim state. "69
To be sure, Islamic law had a conception of territorial sovereignty: the Dar
al-Islam, or land of Islam. However, Islamic legal theory defined the Dar al-
Islam in terms of people: it was the land where Muslims could practice their
religion freely.6 Accordingly, the extent of the Islamic state was not fixed
by rigid boundaries, but expanded and contracted according to the spread or
decline of Islam among the people in the territory.'
The Islamic state was theoretically a universal one, embracing all Muslims.
It was bound by one law and ruled by one ruler."0 Continuing the tradition
of Muhammad's original leadership in both temporal and spiritual matters, the
Islamic state was a political and a religious entity at the same time-the
community of all believers. The caliph, or commander of the faithful, com-
bined the temporal and spiritual leadership of the Muslim community; divine
694. See supra notes 584-588 and accompanying text.
695. MAID KHADDURI, WAPt AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 8-9 (1955) [hereinafter KHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE].
696. Maurice Flory, La notion de territoire arabe et son application au problime du Sahara, 3
ANNUAiRE FRANgAiS DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 73, 76 (1957).
697. KHADDUR, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 695, at 45 (citation omitted).
698. Id. at 147.
699. Id. at 155; Flory, supra note 696, at 76; see also Joff, supra note 2, at 27. All other territory
was the Dar al-Harb, or land of war.
700. Flory, supra note 696, at 77-78; I. William Zartman, Maghrebi Politics and Mediterranean
Implications, in THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 149, 151 (Giacomo Luciani ed., 1984).
701. KHADDURi, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 695, at 45.
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law determined his powers, but he governed as a result of a fictional, second
contract with that community.7 'a Thus, for example, as one judge argued in
the Western Sahara case, the Sultan of Morocco, as the holder of all legisla-
tive, executive and spiritual powers, "personified the State," and allegiance
to the Sultan was therefore allegiance to the state.7" The caliph possessed
authority to represent all Muslims in their foreign relations with non-Muslim
states, and he could delegate this authority to field commanders and governors
whom he appointed.7'
Under this conception, if the people of the Aouzou Strip were Muslims and
recognized the authority of the Ottoman Sultan or his representative in Tripoli,
they formed part of the Muslim state. It was not necessary that they submit
to the payment of taxes, accept the presence of the Sultan's military forces,
or show any other sign that Western law required as a manifestation of sover-
eignty. As long as they practiced Islam their land was within the Dar al-Islam.
2. The Western Sahara Case
In the Western Sahara case,7 5 Morocco in particular invoked non-West-
ern legal principles. Morocco made innovative arguments to the I.C.J. con-
cerning sovereignty and state structures that the Western conception of interna-
tional law had not previously recognized. The U.N. General Assembly had
asked the Court for an advisory opinion on the "legal ties" existing between
Western Sahara and the State of Morocco and between Western Sahara and
the Bilad Shinguitti, or Mauritanian entity. The Court interpreted "legal ties"
"as referring to such 'legal ties' as may affect the policy to be followed in the
decolonization of Western Sahara. "' This interpretation allowed the Court
to move away from a Western definition of sovereignty based on the sover-
eign's ties to the land only, and toward a broader definition that included the
sovereign's ties to the people on the land.7' Ultimately, however, the Court
stopped short of fully embracing Islamic conceptions of sovereignty.
Of the three Islamic states arguing before the Court-Morocco,
Algeria,"' and Mauritania 7 -Morocco relied most heavily on principles
702. Id. at 10-12; ANWAR A. QADPJ, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD 271, 273
(2d rev. ed. 1973); Joffd, supra note 2, at 27; Zartman, supra note 700, at 151; see also Written Statement
of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Western Sahara) 178-79 (Mar. 27, 1975).
703. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 83 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun); see also
QADUr, supra note 702, at 272.
704. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 695, at 152-53.
705. 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
706. Id. at 41.
707. Id. at 40-41.
708. Algeria ilso advanced innovative arguments, but the Court did not really address them. Algeria
first contended that Western Sahara was not terra nullius because it was within the Dar al-Islam. SHAW,
supra note 559, at 55. As noted above, however, the Court did not reach this issue, having found that
Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of colonization because the people there were organized
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of Islamic law. It requested the Court to consider the personal nature of
allegiance in the Moroccan state and the religious significance of the Sultan
to Muslims. The Court pronounced itself willing to entertain notions of the
state that differed from the traditional model, but it insisted upon proof of a
display of political authority. It did not consider the evidence of Moroccan
influence in Western Sahara sufficient to support a finding of sovereignty under
that standard.
a. Arguments Based on the Special Character of the Moroccan State
Morocco began its argument by urging the Court to reject the Western
notion of terra nullius that prevailed at the time of colonization. Morocco
presented a narrower view of terra nullius that would exclude territory when
some power exercised sovereignty over it "in the traditional systems of the part
of the world in question."71o
It then argued that the Court could appreciate the juridical ties between the
Sultanate and Western Sahara only by taking account of the conditions of the
Sahara. The European notion of the state did not apply because Morocco
into tribes with chiefs competent to represent them. Id. at 81; see also supra note 607.
709. Mauritania contended that the Mauritanian entity constituted a distinct cultural entity, and that
nomadism, with its patterns of migration and system of allocating to specific tribes rights to certain areas
and resources, linked the people with the land in a legal sense. 1975 I.C.J. 12, 57 (Oct. 16); SHAW, supra
note 559, at 54.
The Court was also willing to consider the special features of the Sahara and the constraints those
features imposed on human institutions. It took into account such features as the allocation of migration
routes, waterholes, burial grounds, and cultivable areas and pastures. 1975 I.C.J. at 59-60. And although
the Court appreciated that "'[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their
nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the need of the community,'" the Court
chose a legal test defining a sovereign entity as one that "possesses, in regard to its Members, rights which
it is entitled to ask them to respect" or that is "capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its
Members." Id. at 63 (quoting Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11)). Under this test the Court found that the Bilad Shinguitti was an "'entity'
enjoying some form of sovereignty in Western Sahara. .. ." l at 63. It had no character distinct from
its separate component emirates and tribes. Id. The Court did, however, find that some legal ties not rising
to the level of sovereignty existed between the Bilad Shinguitti and Western Sahara. ld. at 64-65.
No Judge disputed the Court's findings that the Bilad Shinguitti had legal ties but not ties of sovereign-
ty with Western Sahara. Judge DeCastro essentially agreed with the Court's treatment of the Mauritanian
claims, arguing that the passage of tribes over land might create a servitude, but not a tie of sovereignty.
Id. at 164-65 (separate opinion of Judge DeCastro). Judge Ruda, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the
de facto right of each tribe to use certain resources along its route of migration created legal ties, but the
independence of each tribe prevented the Bilad Shinguitti from being "a political unity, juridically capable,
per se, of being the subject of territorial rights." Id. at 176 (dissenting opinion of Judge Ruda).
Some observers have criticized the Court's holding as too general. They argue that the Court should
have specified which tribes had legal rights to which parts of Western Sahara. "To transmute nomadic rights
over part of a territory to rights possessed by the 'Mauritanian entity' over the whole of the territory in
question must be seen as mistaken." SHAW, supra note 559, at 54.
Under this precedent the Court would probably not consider the Toubous to have possessed sovereign
rights over the territory they inhabited, since the fragmented and anarchic Toubou society was unable to
impose obligations on its members, much less avail itself of those obligations.
710. Written Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Western Sahara) 129 (Mar. 27, 1975).
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existed in conditions far different from those prevailing in Europe and had
created institutions of government that were appropriate to those condi-
tions.71' In particular, in contrast to the European state founded on territory,
the North African state was based on the allegiance of peoples.' 2
Morocco also invoked the Islamic conception of the state with its dual
religious and political attributes and its ties of personal allegiance.713 The
Sultan's religious authority and in particular his sherifian descent (i.e., from
Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad) amplified his temporal power, so that
anyone who was a religious subject of the Sultan was ipso facto a political
subject as well.714 Since Islam was the one element that unified all people
of the Islamic state, allegiance to the Sultan as religious leader necessarily
implied allegiance to him as political leader.715
When viewed in the social and economic environment of the Maghreb,
Morocco argued, its ties with Western Sahara amounted to ties of sover-
eignty.716 In particular, it contended that the system of ties between the Sul-
tan and individual tribes of Western Sahara, whereby the Sultan appointed a
qa'id (catd) as an intermediary between the central authority and each tribe,
was "perfectly adapted to tribal realities. ,717
The Court was willing to accept the first part of this argument, but it did
not agree that the Sultan's actions with regard to Western Sahara showed ties
of sovereignty. The Court, taking into account the migration and land-use
patterns of the nomadic tribes of Western Sahara, acknowledged that the area
had "very special characteristics which ... largely determined the way of life
and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it," and that the
"legal regime" of the region could not be properly understood "without refer-
ence to these special characteristics. "71 The Court also expressed its willing-
ness to
take account of the special structure of the Sherifian State. No rule of law...
requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern.... At the same
time, where sovereignty over territory is claimed, the particular structure of a State
711. Oral Statement of Paul Isoart, Representative of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4 Western
Sahara) 252, 256-57 (July 2, 1975).
712. Id.
713. Id. at 259.
714. Id. at261.
715. Oral Statement of Majid Benjelloun, Representative of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4
Western Sahara) 189, 193-94 (June 30, 1975). But see SHIARMA, supra note 544, at 190 ("Just because
believers of Islam in presently disputed areas owed religious allegiance to the Imam, it did not mean that
those territories laid [sic] within the sovereignty of Morocco."); SAYYID ABDU A'LA MAUDUDI, ISLAMIC
LAW AND CONSTITUTION 179 (Khurshid Ahmad ed. & trans., 4th ed. 1969) ("As for those Muslims who
live outside the territory of the Islamic State, it will not assume their guardianship. The relationship of
Islamic brotherhood will be there, but not the legal responsibility of guardianship.")
716. Written Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Western Sahara) 170 (Mar. 27, 1975).
717. Id. at 182; see also Oral Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4 Western Sahara) 262
(July 2, 1975) (statement of Paul Isoart).
718. 1975 I.C.J. at 41.
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may be a relevant element in appreciating the reality or otherwise of a display of
State activity adduced as evidence of that sovereignty.
719
The Court agreed, too, that the sherifian state was special. The Court
acknowledged the significance of the common bond of Islam and the impor-
tance of personal ties of allegiance to the Sultan rather than control over
territory.7 0
Here, however, the Court refused to go further. It stated that religious ties
without proof of political allegiance can not give rise to ties of sovereignty:
"Such an allegiance..., if it is to afford indications of the ruler's sovereign-
ty, must clearly be real and manifested in acts evidencing acceptance of his
political authority. Otherwise, there will be no genuine display or exercise of
State authority." 721 For all the Court's professed willingness to consider
special conditions and accept non-European models of the state, the Court
adhered to the existing dual requirement of the intention to act as sovereign
and the display of outward, objectively observable signs of sovereign authority.
Special characteristics may demonstrate the existence of non-sovereign legal
ties, but they cannot be relevant to a determination of sovereignty.7t
Two Judges disagreed with the Court's decision on this point, arguing that
the Court attached insufficient weight to the Sultan's status as both religious
and political leader of the Muslim community.' Judge Dillard went further,
arguing that the Court improperly applied an overly narrow, Western notion
of legal ties that required a "sense of obligation." Judge Dillard asserted that
such a notion could not apply to the Sahara, where "modes of authority [i.e.,
religious and political] are not sharply delineated and are not part of the
consciousness of people. "724 In his view, an insistence upon outward, observ-
able signs of sovereignty had no place in the Saharan context, because it would
never have entered the people's minds to demand such signs. Instead, the
proper test for the existence of authority is "the consciousness of the peo-
ple"-did they perceive themselves as subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan?
Under this view, the Court completely failed to grasp the thrust of Morocco's
arguments about the Sultan's dual authority over Muslims.
719. Id. at 43-44.
720. Id. at 44.
721. Id.; see also id. at 154 (separate opinion of Judge DeCastro) ("There must be more than a vague
animuspossidendi and 'right of proximity' or the fact of belonging, like Morocco, to the Dar al-Islam.");
id. at 176 (dissenting opinion of Judge Ruda) ("Sporadic manifestations of allegiance and authority...
are not sufficient to declare the existence of legal ties, whether of a territorial or personal character.').
Judge Ruda went even further, stating that the legal ties of allegiance that the Court did find were not legal
ties between the territory and Morocco, but personal ties, so that the Court should have found that there
were no legal ties between the territory and Morocco. Id. at 175 (dissenting opinion of Judge Ruda). This
view implicitly rejects the Court's interpretation of "legal ties." See supra note 707 and accompanying text.
722. See SHAW, supra note 559, at 55.
723. 1975 I.C.J. at 98 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun), 173 (separate opinion of Judge Boni).
724. Id. at 125-26 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard) (emphasis in original).
Yale Journal of International Law
However, it seems equally if not more likely that the Court understood the
Moroccan argument but rejected it. The Court may have felt that reliance upon
subjective perceptions of sovereignty would create insurmountable problems
of proof. How could a tribunal reliably determine, a century or more after the
fact, the perceptions of a people such as the tribes of Western Sahara? Rather
than enter this quagmire the Court may have preferred to hold fast to objective
signs of sovereignty, which could at least be proved with some degree of
certainty before a tribunal.
b. Consideration of the Sultan's Acts in Western Sahara
Having sought to persuade the Court to take into account the special
characteristics of Western Sahara and the nature of the sherifian state, Morocco
then argued that, under these conditions, the actions of the Sultan with regard
to Western Sahara were perfectly adapted to the area and the nature of the
sherifian state and thus were sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty in that
context.
Morocco focused on the efforts of Sultan Hassan I (1876-1894) and his
successors to organize the south of his state against European encroachments.
As part of this strategy,' Morocco argued that Ma al-PAineen, the leader
of a religious brotherhood in Western Sahara similar to the Sanusi, acted as
the Sultan's agent in the area. Ma al-cAineen had founded a nationalist and
Pan-Islamic revivalist brotherhood that advocated the unification of all brother-
hoods in national resistance to colonial expansion. The brotherhood spread
rapidly through the desert. Ma probably enjoyed ties with the Sultan that were
as close as or closer than those the Sanusi had with Turkey or the Ottoman
officials in Tripoli. His brotherhood cooperated with the Sultan in resisting
colonialism, and the tribes of Western Sahara asked Ma to intercede for them
with the Sultan to procure modern arms to use against European encroach-
ment.' According to Morocco, Ma's ties with the Sultan, together with his
activities in the desert, extended the Sultan's sovereignty to Western Saha-
ra.
727
The Court did not agree. It found the evidence of ties between Ma and the
Sultan too inconclusive to support Morocco's claims. 8 Spain had argued
725. Morocco also argued that the Sultan's two trips to the region and various economic actions to
strengthen the area against European initiatives demonstrated his sovereignty over Western Sahara. Oral
Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4 Western Sahara) 263-70 (July 2, 1975) (statement of Paul
Isoart). The Court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that these efforts extended as far
south as Western Sahara. 1975 I.C.J. at 47-48.
726. Written Statement of Morocco, -1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Western Sahara) 187-94 (Mar. 27,
1975).
727. Oral Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4 Western Sahara) 282-83, 286-87 (July 2,
1975) (statement of Paul Isoart).
728. 1975 I.C.J. at 47.
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that Ma and the Sultan cooperated in resisting the European advance because
they shared a common interest in keeping the Europeans out, not because Ma
was the Sultan's vassal.' This alternative explanation may have appealed
to the Court. It certainly appealed to Judge DeCastro, who felt that Ma
cooperated because the arrival of the Europeans would have meant the end of
the lucrative slave trade.73 In any event, the Court's rejection of Morocco's
argument on this point does not augur well for Libyan claims to the Aouzou
Strip based on cooperation between the Ottomans and the Sanusi.
Of critical importance to Morocco's case was the distinction between the
two levels of acceptance of the Sultan's administrative authority among the
Maghrebi tribes. In the Bled Makhzen the tribes fully accepted the Sultan's
authority and paid taxes. In the Bled Siba, which included Western Sahara,
the tribes accepted the Sultan's authority nominally but did not pay taxes.
Morocco argued that this distinction was immaterial. The existence of the Bled
Siba did not represent a challenge to the Sultan's authority, but merely defined
the conditions of its exercise. So long as the people of the Bled Siba accepted
the Sultan as their leader, the specific means by which they showed their
allegiance did not matter."3
However, in line with its insistence on outward displays of political
authority, the Court found the distinction between Bled Makhzen and Bled Siba
extremely relevant. The Bled Siba
was not administered by the Makhzen [the Moroccan administrative apparatus]; it
did not contribute contingents to the Sherifian army; no taxes were collected there
by the Makhzen; the government of the people was in the hands of ealds .... and
their powers were derived more from the acquiescence of the tribes than from any
delegation of authority by the Sultan; even if these local powers did not totally reject
any connection with the Sherifian State, in reality they became defacto independent
powers. 7n
Unable to establish any display of political authority, Morocco had to rely on
arguments that the Sultan's religious authority necessarily translated into
political authority. These arguments could not succeed, given the Court's
insistence on objective displays of sovereignty. The most Morocco could
establish were legal ties not amounting to sovereignty between certain tribes
and the Sultan. 33
The Court's treatment of this issue has important implications for the
Aouzou Strip dispute. The conditions of the exercise of the Sultan's power in
the Bled Siba seem almost identical to the conditions of the exercise of Otto-
729. See id. at 46.
730. Id. at 159-61 (separate opinion of Judge DeCastro).
731. Written Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Western Sahara) 179 (Mar. 27, 1975);
Oral Statement of Morocco, 1975 I.C.J. Pleadings (4 Western Sahara) 262 (July 2, 1975) (statement of
Paul Isoart).
732. 1975 I.C.J. at 44-45.
733. Id. at 48-49, 56-57.
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man authority among the Toubous. The Toubous neither paid taxes to the
Ottoman Sultan nor supplied soldiers to his army. The Derde, in the pay of
the Ottomans after 1906, seems similar to the qaids, appointed by the Sultan
but holding power previous to and independent of this appointment.7 4 As
with Ma al-Aineen, the Court's treatment of this issue may foreclose some
of Libya's potential arguments regarding the Aouzou Strip.
3. Summary
In arguing its case before the I.C.J., Libya will almost certainly raise
claims based on the special nature of the Islamic state and the unique condi-
tions of the Sahara, both of which require consideration of non-Western models
of sovereign authority. In particular, Libya will probably seek to invoke the
dual spiritual and temporal nature of sovereign authority in the Muslim state.
In accordance with that model, it will argue that the Ottoman Sultan, by his
claim to the allegiance of the Islamic community and the recognition of that
position by the Toubous, necessarily commanded the political allegiance of the
Toubous.
The Court announced its willingness to recognize such arguments in
Western Sahara, but only up to a certain point. In particular, the Court would
not accept claims of political authority derived from a position of religious
leadership, even among a people who did not necessarily distinguish between
such modes of authority. If the Court takes a similar stance in the present
dispute, the Libyan case will become much more difficult to establish.
Western Sahara bears directly on the Aouzou Strip dispute in two other
respects, neither of which favors Libya. First, in Western Sahara the Court
considered and rejected claims to sovereignty over an area under the influence
of a religious brotherhood that cooperated with the sovereign in resisting
colonial expansion. The similarity of this brotherhood to the Sanusiya makes
analogy irresistible. If anything, Ma's brotherhood enjoyed closer ties to the
sovereign than did the Sanusi. If those arguments did not succeed in Western
Sahara, claims based on cooperation between the Sanusiya and the Turks are
also likely to fail.
Second, the conditions under which the Sultan exercised political authority
in the Bled Siba are similar to the conditions under which the Ottoman Sultan
allegedly exercised authority over the Toubous in Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi.
The Court's conclusion that such conditions fell far short of proving sovereign
ties in Western Sahara seems to doom in advance any attempt Libya might
make to assert that the Ottoman presence in the Aouzou Strip amounted to a
display of sovereignty.
734. Id. at 45-46,
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However, the Court decided Western Sahara over sixteen years ago, and
the composition of the Court has changed since then to include a greater
proportion of Judges from non-Western states. Perhaps the arguments based
on the special conditions of the Sahara and the nature of the Islamic state will
prove more persuasive this time. If they do, the Court's decision will have
powerful repercussions throughout Africa, crumbling the foundations of ui
possidetis.
G. State Succession
Through the mechanism of state succession, a state that displaces another
state in an area by means of a treaty or a secession inherits all the rights and
obligations of the former sovereign. Thus, under the terms of the Treaty of
Lausanne, Italy gained in Libya all the former rights and obligations of Tur-
key, save certain rights retained by Turkey. Similarly, upon its independence
Chad succeeded to all of France's rights and obligations in its territory. A
successor state generally did not inherit the treaty obligations of the predeces-
sor unless it expressly announced its acceptance of those obligations.735 This
principle did not, however, apply to treaty provisions relating to boundaries.
In such cases, the treaty stipulations, being local, passed with the territory.73
H. The Principle of Uti Possidetis
The principle of uti possidetis reaches the same result as and is closely
related to the doctrine of state succession. Under utipossidetis, former colonies
inherit the boundaries they possess at the time of independence.737 The doc-
trine originated in South America as the former colonies of Spain and Portugal
became independent in the nineteenth century,73 and the newly independent
African states adopted it in the early 1960s in two fundamental O.A.U.
declarations recognizing the inviolability of the former colonial frontiers.
735. MCNAIR, supra note 659, at 341.
736. Id. at 657; see also SHARMA, supra note 544, at 95. The Nigerian scholar A.O. Cukwurah
presents a slightly different view leading to the same result. He states that former colonies inherit their
boundaries at independence through succession, but not through succession of treaties. A.O. CUKWURAH,
THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DIsPUTs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1967). He continues, "[uinlike
ordinary contractual arrangements, [boundary agreements] create an objective juridical situation which
continues independent of the existence of the original signatory parties," provided that the successor states
are linked to the original signatories. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted). This argument seems confused. If
former colonies inherit boundaries by virtue of gaining independence, and the boundaries are "an objective
juridical situation," the insistence upon a link between the former colonial powers and the new states is
superfluous.
737. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 566 (Dec. 22); CuKWTJRAH, supra note
736, at 112-13; McKeon, supra note 651, at 164. The term comes from the Latin phrase Utipossidetis,
Ita possidetis ("As you possess, so you may possess"). CUKWURAH, supra note 736, at 112.
738. See CuKWURAH, supra note 736, at 112-13; SHARMA, supra note 544, at 303.
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1. From Pah-Africanism to Uti Possidetis
The O.A.U.'s adoption of utipossidetis marked a departure from previous
African rhetoric, particularly that of the Pan-African movement. In 1958, at
the height of the movement, the All-African People's Congress adopted a
resolution that denounced the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonial
powers, particularly those that crossed ethnic lines, and called for the abolition
of those boundaries. Under the resolution, the true wishes of the people were
to guide states in delimiting boundaries."3 9 Such principles obviously would
have led to the redrawing of the map of Africa.
However, experience soon revealed that each state had its own problems
and vulnerabilities, and that the constant questioning of state boundaries could
prove tremendously divisive and destabilizing. 7' By 1963 the new African
states had executed an abrupt about-face. At an O.A.U. meeting that year, the
representative of Mali emphasized the need to "take Africa as it is and...
renounce any territorial claims. ... African unity demands of each one of us
complete respect for the . . . present frontiers of our respective states." 74'
The O.A.U. mediated a settlement to the 1963 boundary dispute between
Morocco and Algeria by reliance on uti possidetis.42 The O.A.U. Charter,
adopted at Addis Ababa in the same year, affirmed the principle of "respect
for the sovereignty and for the territorial integrity of each State."743 The
O.A.U. amplified this principle in a resolution adopted in 1964 at a meeting
in Cairo (the Cairo Resolution), declaring that "all the States undertake to
respect the boundaries existing at the moment they became independent."v4
2. The Burkina Faso-Mali Boundary Dispute
In a 1987 boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, a Chamber
of the I.C.J. discussed uti possidetis at length and made statements favoring
a broad application of the principle.745 According to the Chamber, "the prin-
ciple is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of
739. SHAW, supra note 559, at 183.
740. See, e.g., SHAw, supra note 559, at 183-84 (discussing Moroccan claims to Mauritania and
attempted secession of Katanga from Congo); I. WIjLLAM ZARTmAN, THE SAHARA-BRMDoE OR BARRIER?
48-50 (Carnegie Endowment for Peace Int'l Conciliation Series No. 541, 1963) (discussing Morocco's
claims to part of Algeria); Samuel Chime, The Organization of African Unity and African Boundaries, In
AFRICAN BOUNDARY PROEEma 65, 69-71 (Carl G6staWidstrand ed., 1969) (discussing O.A.U. mediation
of Morocco-Algeria dispute by application of utipossidetis).
741. Quotedin McNAR, supra note 659, at 183-84; see also Chime, supra note 740, at 67 (comments
of President Tsiranama of Madagascar).
742. Chime, supra note 740, at 69-71.
743. O.A.U. Charter, supra note 404, art. 3(3).
744. Cairo Resolution, supra note 405, para. 2.
745. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
Vol. 17:301, 1992
The Aouzou Strip
international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected to the
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs." 746 The
Chamber noted that uti possidetis can conflict with the right of self-determina-
tion, but harmonized the two principles by referring to the danger to stability
from proliferating boundary disputes and stating that utipossidetis is often "the
wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have
struggled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would
deprive the continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice."74 The
Chamber concluded, in rejecting any attempt to inject considerations of equity
into the dispute, that "[t]hese frontiers, however unsatisfactory they may be,
possess the authority of uti possidetis and are thus fully in conformity with
contemporary international law."74
The Chamber then applied the principle of uti possidetis to the dispute
before it and concluded that the proper boundary between the two states was
the one existing in 1959-1960, the time when they achieved independence. In
accordance with this conclusion, the Chamber noted that "no legal validity
attache[d] to any subsequent acts of administration" performed by one state
in the territory (determined by reference to this boundary line) of the other
state. 7
49
However, the Chamber did consider the possible effects of a discrepancy
between the boundary as drawn in colonial times and the extent of the colonial
administration in the disputed territory. The Chamber distinguished four
situations. First, where the "reality" of administration "corresponds exactly"
to the boundary as drawn, then the reality can only confirm the exercise of the
right derived from legal title, i.e., the boundary. Second, where the reality of
administration does not correspond exactly to the boundary as drawn, "prefer-
ence should be given to the holder of the title," i.e., the state to whom the
boundary line attributes the territory. Third, where the reality of administration
does not co-exist with any legal title, the reality "must invariably be taken into
account." Finally, where the legal title is not capable of showing the exact
location of the boundary, the realities of administration "can then play an
essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice."'75 Under
746. Id. at 565. The Court also stated that the rule "must be seen not as a mere practice contributing
to the gradual emergence efa principle of custmary international law .... but as the application in Africa
of a rule of general scope." Id.
747. Id. at 566-67.
748. Id. at 633. Judge Abi-Saab dissented from the rejection of equitable principles in a separate
opinion. Under his view a tribunal should apply utipossideiis alone only if the tribunal views a line as a
series of points between two defined points. However, if the tribunal uses "the common idea of a line as
a concrete trace every point of which is specifically identifiable," then it can apply equitable principles infWM
legem, since the boundary line is unlikely to be concretely defined at every point between the endpoints.
Id. at 662 (separate opinion of Judge Abi-Saab).
749. Id. at 570.
750. ld. at 586-87.
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this scheme the legal title arising from agreements (and, where the same state
administered both colonies, from legislation of the colonial state) takes priority
over the actual facts of administration, and those facts play a role only as an
interpretive aid when the legal title does not yield a precise boundary.51
3. Importance to the Present Dispute
In general, uti possidetis has succeeded in Africa against claims based on
historical, ethnic, geographical, or economic considerations, because the
adjustment of boundaries based on these other principles threatens to desta-
bilize governments. Chad has invoked the principle of uti possidetis in the
Aouzou Strip dispute.752 The broad application of uti possidetis and the anal-
ysis developed by the Chamber in the Burkina Faso-Mali dispute favor the
Chadian claim, since the 1955 Treaty between France and Libya attributes the
Aouzou Strip to Chad.
Libya may undermine that conclusion by establishing the 1955 Treaty as
a diktat imposed on it by France, but that would only reintroduce the question
of the location of Libya's boundaries at the time of independence. It would not
prevent the Court from applying uti possidetis; that is, it would not stop the
Court from seeking to determine the location of the boundary at the time of
independence.753 Libya might still be unable to persuade the Court to apply
a norm of decolonization.
However, one difference may influence the Court in the present dispute
not to give the principles applied by the Chamber the same weight that they
enjoyed in the Burkina Faso-Mali case. In that dispute the parties expressly
requested the Chamber to determine the boundary solely by reference to uti
possidetis.7M The Application in the present dispute has no such limitations
and merely asks the Court to "determine the course of the frontier" between
Libya and Chad "in accordance with the principles and rules of international
law applicable in the matter as between the parties. "I The Court may thus
751. In setting up this system of priorities, the Chamber resolved a dispute over the proper version
of utipossideis to apply. Commentators recognized a distinction between utipossidetisjuris, under which
a new state succeeds to all the area attributed by law to the former colonial power, and utipossidetis de
facto, under which the new state's territory extends to the limits of the area actually administered by the
colonial power. See CUKWURAH, supra note 736, at 114. The Chamber clearly adopted utipossidetisjuris
as the proper version of the principle.
752. In the memorandum Chad presented to the Security Council in 1983, Chad invoked both the Cairo
Resolution and Article 3 of the O.A.U. Charter. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 67.
753. Indeed, one observer has noted that Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip need not be seen
as a challenge to utipossideis; Libya could merely be asserting that the boundary at the time of indepen-
dence lay in a different place. Jean-Frangois Guilhaudis, Remarques a propos des rdcents conflits terrn-
toniauo entre Etmt africains (Bande d'Aouwu, Ogaden, Saillant de Kyaka), 22 ANNuAmn FRANgAIS DE
DROl RENATIONAL 223, 233 (1979).
754. See 1986 I.C.J. at 564-65.
755. Quoted in October 26 Order, supra note 516, at 150.
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apply other principles, but given its broad statements that uti possidetis was
a "general principle"'756 of international law and that colonial boundaries "are
fully in conformity with contemporary international law,"757 those principles
will certainly have to include uti possidetis.
I. The Norm of Decolonization
The principle of uti possidetis would preclude Libya from challenging the
boundaries it inherited at independence. Libya could argue, however, that uti
possidetis should not apply at all and that the Court should instead resolve the
dispute by reference to the norm of decolonization. According to this argument
the colonial period was an aberration in African history that distorted the
historical patterns of interaction among African peoples. Since the agreements
by which the colonial powers divided Africa among themselves are illegiti-
mate," the boundaries that resulted from those agreements are also illegiti-
mate. Any dispute territory should therefore revert to the state or entity that
possessed it (or to the successor of such state or entity) immediately before
colonization."5 The decolonization norm thus stands as the antithesis of uti
possidetis.
Although the African states rejected decolonization in the 1960s due to the
instability it engendered, the principle remains a "fundamental postulate of
contemporary international law and relations. 7' It developed through the
League of Nations mandate system, gathered force after World War II, and
has been enshrined in several U.N. resolutions. 6 The precedent of the
I.C.J. does not offer much guidance on the question of which of these two
conflicting principles the Court will apply. In the Western Sahara case Moroc-
co and Algeria presented the issue of the applicability of the decolonization
norm, but the Court did not reach it."6 And although the Chamber of the
756. 1986 I.C.J. at 565.
757. Id. at 633.
758. Muller, supra note 367, at 177.
759. This argument essentially takes a very strong view of native sovereignty. It maintains that
regardless of what European colonists thought, the inhabitants of a territory or their masters possessed rights
of sovereignty over the land, and that European occupations were invalid usurpations of that sovereignty.
The decolonization argument goes beyond this strong view of native sovereignty, however, because it denies
the validity of treaties by which indigenous rulers purported to cede sovereignty. Whereas the proponents
of native sovereignty would have permitted states to acquire title by such treaties, the decolonization
argument holds that these treaties are invariably void as the products of duress, deceit, or misunderstanding.
760. W. Michael Reisman, The Struggle for the Falklands, 93 YALE L.J. 287, 305 n.84 (1983).
761. See Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration of Principles
on International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with
the Principles of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121,
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
762. Morocco argued for application of the decolonization norm, contending that Western Sahara had
been under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco when Spain illegitimately began colonizing the area,
429
Yale Journal of International Law
Court in the 1986 Burkina Faso-Mali boundary dispute made strong statements
in support of utipossidetis, the parties had directed the Chamber to decide the
case exclusively by that principle. Thus the Chamber's statements cannot be
read as favoring uti possidetis over decolonization. 63
Although logically distinct, decolonization is occasionally confused with
self-determination, partly because the two principles usually work toward the
same end. Occasionally, however, they conflict. 7" In the instant case, for
example, a Libyan decolonization argument would call for the Aouzou Strip
to be awarded to Libya as the successor of the Ottoman Empire or the
Sanusiya. In contrast, the self-determination principle would have the inhabit-
ants of the region choose whether to associate with Libya, Chad, or neither
state. The decolonization argument, if successful, supports claims not only to
the Aouzou Strip, but also to most of Chad. The same acts that Libya might
claim demonstrated Ottoman or Sanusi sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip
encompassed areas well to the south of it. The decolonization norm also
logically extends to all of Libya's neighbors. In view of these rather severe
potential repercussions, the decolonization norm may not provide the Court
with a workable basis from which to fix the boundary.
J. Relevant Principles of the Law of Treaties
While the decolonization norm provides Libya with one means to avoid the
application of uti possidetis, Libya could also achieve similar results by a
second argument. It could claim that the boundary to which it acceded at its
independence is not the one specified in the 1955 Treaty. Libya would first
need to argue that the 1955 Treaty resulted from duress and is consequently
invalid. It could then argue that the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords define the
true boundary, even though they were never ratified. Evaluating these claims
and that the territory should revert to Morocco. See supra notes 710-717 and accompanying text. Algeria
took the opposite position, contending that self-determination, not decolonization, should govern the fate
of Western Sahara. It urged the Court not to use the intertemporal law to "confer fresh legal life" on a title
that preceded Spain's "obsolete or ... obsolescent" title. See SHAw, supra note 559, at 58. The Court
did not need to decide whether to apply decolonization to reinstate Morocco's alleged prior title since it
found that Morocco had not demonstrated that it possessed title to Western Sahara at the time of coloniza-
tion. See supra notes 728-733 and accompanying text.
Muhammad Bedjaoui, who argued the case for Algeria, has since become a Judge of the Court. In
the 1986 Burkina Faso-Mali boundary dispute he joined in the Chamber's broad statements in support of
uti possidetis, in contrast with the position he argued in Western Sahara. However, his position in the
Burkina Faso-Mali case may not be a reliable indicator of his perspective on the issue, since the parties
there specifically requested the Chamber to decide the dispute on the basis of utipossidetis. See supra note
754 and accompanying text.
In the years since Western Sahara was decided the international political process has resolved the issue
whether decolonization or self-determination should apply, as the people of Western Sahara are currently
preparing to vote in a United Nations-sponsored plebiscite.
763. See supra note 754 and accompanying text.
764. See Reisman, supra note 760, at 305-08.
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requires an understanding of the law of coercion in treaty formation and of the
legal effect of signature and ratification of treaties.
1. The Law of Coercion in Treaty-Making
Coercion in the making of a treaty can gravely undermine its applicability.
Traditionally, international law left little room for claims of coercion unless
one state had threatened the use of force to procure the signature of the other
state's representative. As long as the signature, or even the subsequent ratifica-
tion, was an act of free will, a state could not claim coercion in the actual
making of the treaty.765 The advent of stronger prohibitions on the use of
force since World War I however, has changed this area of law dramatical-
ly.7" Thirty years ago, Lord McNair wrote that an international tribunal
should "scrutinize closely the circumstances in which a treaty or other interna-
tional engagement was concluded and decline to uphold it in favour of a party
which had secured another party's consent by means of the illegal use or threat
of force."767 However, McNair observed that this principle applied only in
actual instances of use or threat of force, and not in cases of unfair bargaining
based on economic or financial leverage.
Since then, the law has undoubtedly continued to evolve toward a more
expansive interpretation of coercion.768 In a recent maritime boundary arbi-
tration between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, Muhammad Bedjaoui (now ajudge
on the I.C.J.) displayed a great deal of sympathy to a broad understanding of
the term. Judge Bedjaoui's opinion observed the difficulty of inferring acquies-
cence from the practice of states "crushed by an under-development in all
areas." Those states, he argued, do not have the luxury of choice that devel-
oped states enjoy, but rather must act more "to assure a precarious survival
than to enforce their rights or to create others correctly. ,,769 If Libya can
establish this point, it may succeed in undermining the validity of the 1955
Treaty or in having it construed contra stipulatorum. Libya might then be able
to inject the Mussolini-Laval Accords back into the discussion.
765. McNAIR, supra note 659, at 207-08; SHARMA, supra note 544, at 122.
766. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 122. Claims based not on duress but on inequality of bargaining
power enjoy even less favor in the law. As long as the partes expected to conclude binding agreement,
writes one commentator, disparities in bargaining power are irrelevant. Id. at 120, 122.
767. McNAIR, supra note 659, at 210. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
"[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
768. McNAIR, supra note 659, at 210-11.
769. D61imitation de Ia fronti6re maritime (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (1989) (dissenting opinion of
Muhammad Bedjaoui at para. 70), annexed to Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.)
(Application of Guinea-Bissau Instituting Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, August
23, 1989) (on file with author).
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2. The Conclusion, Ratification, and Denunciation of Treaties
If Libya brings the Mussolini-Laval Accords into the discussion, it will
have to surmount an important obstacle: the agreement was never ratified.
Under traditional principles of international law this defect alone would doom
Libya's attempts. However, under more recent case law, Libya may advance
innovative arguments that look to the practice of the parties to determine
whether they expected the agreement to have effect notwithstanding their
failure to comply with certain formalities.
The international law in force at the time the Mussolini-Laval Accords
were signed generally required an exchange of ratification instruments before
a treaty could enter into force.77 Exchanging instruments was in itself part
of the ratification process." According to Lord McNair, "[r]atification is
not... a mere formality.... Ratification has a value which should not be
minimized. "772 The ratification requirement allows the competent authorities
to review the agreement with a thoroughness that is unavailable to the negotia-
tors, and to ensure that the treaty conforms to the negotiator's instructionsYm
Although state practice by 1935 may have been moving away from requiring
ratification exchanges in every case,' the terms of the Treaty of Rome (the
part of the Mussolini-Laval Accords that actually purported to cede the Aouzou
Strip to Italy), expressly required it.' 5 The failure to exchange the instru-
ments thus prevented the Treaty of Rome from becoming effective.
Nevertheless, Libya could argue that France's signature and ratification
sufficiently demonstrated its satisfaction with the agreement. With the legisla-
tive review function satisfied, perhaps the actual exchange of instruments was
unnecessary. Such an argument would, in effect, call for an extension of the
law beyond its current state, but recent case law provides some authority for
such an extension. In the maritime boundary arbitration between Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal, the arbitral tribunal held that the failure to perform certain
formalities required by domestic law did not bar the entry into force of a treaty
where the other party fully expected the treaty to be honored. Guinea-Bissau
sought to nullify an exchange of letters between France and Portugal that had
770. See McNAiR, supra note 659, at 132 ("Today ... it is the exchange of ratifications which
concludes the treaty and gives effect to it.").
771. Id. at 136-37.
772. Id. at 133.
773. Id. at 133; see also Ambatielos (Jurisdiction) (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 28, 69 (July 1)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Basdevant) ("The drafting and signature of an international agreement are the
acts by means of which the will of the contracting States is expressed; ratification is the act by which the
will so expressed is confirmed by the competent authority, for the purpose of giving it binding force.').
774. See McNAiR, supra note 659, at 133.
775. "The present Treaty will be ratified and the ratifications will be exchanged within the shortest
period possible. It will enter into force the day of the exchange of ratifications." Mussolini-Laval Accords,
supra note 898, art. 7, 49 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) at 19.
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not been approved by the Portuguese national assembly as constitutionally
required.776 Senegal argued that the agreement was valid despite the proce-
dural defects, since Portugal had approved it according to the "ensemble of
customs and practices that have palpably altered" constitutional meaning.'
The arbitral tribunal agreed with Senegal, noting that Portugal had been under
an authoritarian regime that frequently sidestepped the national assembly in
entering international agreements, including, for instance, the U.N. Charter.
This custom effectively created a quasi-constitutional practice, and as long as
France had believed, under the circumstances, that the accord was valid, the
agreement would bind Portugal and its successor, Guinea-Bissau.778
However,-that reasoning may not apply in the present case. Because the
exchange of ratifications is intended precisely to assure each side that the other
intends to honor its commitments, the failure to effect an exchange may weigh
much more heavily against the validity of a treaty than the failure to comply
with domestic requirements.
The Mussolini-Laval Accords also raise issues of the legal effect of denun-
ciation because Italy denounced the Accords in 1938. Would its denunciation
have to be given effect? Under the contemporary law of treaties, the terms of
a treaty might imply a right to terminate the agreement. The existence of the
implied right depends on the intent of the parties, as inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty, the terms of the agreement,
and the nature of the subject matter.779
Finally, if Libya does attempt to rely on the Mussolini-Laval Accords,
Chad may raise questions about the failure to fulfill an implied condi-
tion-namely, the failure to conclude the convention on nationality in Tunisia.
The Mussolini-Laval Accords contemplated that this convention would enter
into force on the same date as the Treaty of Rome. Under the system of
classification developed by Lord McNair in his work on the law of treaties,
the conclusion of the Tunisian convention would operate as a condition for
operation of the Treaty of Rome.780
776. Ddlimitation de la fronti~re maritime (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) 53 (1989), annexed to Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (Application of Guinea-Bissau Instituting Proceedings
Before the International Court of Justice, Aug. 23, 1989) (on file with author).
777. Id.
778. Id. 59. The tribunal also held that the failure to publish the agreement in Portugal did not affect
the applicability of the accord, since Guinea-Bissau had received notice of the agreement through other
means. The arbitral panel farther ruled that the failure to register the accord with the United Nations did
not render it inapplicable, since the tribunal was not a U.N. body. Id. 69-78. On a subsequent appeal
based upon matters of arbitral procedure, the I.C.J. upheld the award. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989
(Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 32 (1992).
779. MCNAIR, supra note 659, at 511.
780. See id. at 436-37.
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K. Conclusion
The applicable legal principles in the Aouzou Strip are clearly complex,
and each side can amass many of them to support its claims. The dispute gains
additional complexity from the potential conflict between Western and non-
Western standards of sovereignty. The next part of this article analyzes the
arguments of Libya and Chad in light of the legal principles developed above,
keeping in mind the tension between competing bodies of law. As part VI
concludes, the degree to which the Court entertains arguments based on non-
Western principles will have an enormous influence on the outcome of the
dispute, as well as on the development of the law in general.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CHADIAN AND LIBYAN CLAIMS
Chad's claims to the Aouzou Strip rest on a series of agreements, con-
cluded by France with various other colonial powers between 1890 and 1924,
that purported to reserve northern Chad (including the Aouzou Strip) to
France. In 1955 France negotiated a treaty with Libya in which Libya agreed
that its southern boundary would be the line drawn by those colonial agree-
ments. Chad acceded to that boundary upon its independence in 1960. Prima
facie, the 1955 Treaty provides strong support for Chad's case. Explicit
boundary determinations generally provide the best evidence of the location
of the boundary since they indicate the intention of the parties."'
Consequently, if Libya is to claim territory that it agreed in 1955 would
belong to Chad, it must attack the 1955 treaty as invalid. Libya will most
likely argue, as it has in the past, that the agreement was a product of coer-
cion. If it succeeds Libya would then have to supply some other basis to
support its version of the boundary. It could argue that other agreements-the
alleged cession of 1972, or the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords-defined the
boundary between Chad and Libya. These treaties, however, are not especially
strong bases on which to build a claim of a title. Libya will therefore most
likely have to resort to arguments based on occupation and other methods of
acquiring territory.782 It could argue that France's occupation of the region
was insufficient as a matter of law, or that it was illegal because the area was
not open to occupation. Although these claims may not have much merit under
traditional principles of international law, they carry more force if viewed
under legal concepts appropriate to the geographical and social milieu of the
Sahara.
781. See SHARMA, supra note 544, at 93.
782. See id. at 94 ('if there are no explicit agreements determining the boundary,... the decision-





Section A below sets forth the Chadian claims based on the 1955 treaty and
the colonial agreements upon which it drew to delimit the boundary. Section
B then discusses the arguments Libya might use to undermine the validity of
the 1955 agreement. Section C considers Libya's treaty-based claims to the
region, concluding that they ultimately fail. Sections D and E then examine
Libya's potential arguments attacking the French occupation and claiming title
through the Ottoman Empire or the Sanusiya.
A. Chad's Treaty-Based Claims
1. The 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness
Chad's treaty-based arguments arise primarily from the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Good Neighborliness (1955 Treaty) negotiated by France with the
newly independent United Kingdom of Libya in 1955."' 3 Article 3 of the
1955 Treaty fixes the boundaries of Libya with French possessions, including
French Equatorial Africa, the colony from which Chad emerged as an indepen-
dent state in 1960. The treaty does not refer directly to any landmarks or draw
any lines on maps. Instead, it stipulates that the frontiers "will be those which
result from the international acts in force on the date of the constitution of the
United Kingdom of Libya, such as they are defined in the exchange of letters
attached hereto (Annex I). '""
The accompanying exchange of notes recites the language of Article 3 and
lists a series of agreements between France and various other colonial powers.
The Chadian argument thus derives from a series of accords made by France
between 1898 and 1919 to fix the boundaries of French colonial possessions
in Africa.85 Consequently, an evaluation of the strength of this argument
requires an examination of the terms and validity of those agreements.
2. The 1898 and 1899 Sphere of Influence Treaties and the 1902 Barrre-
Prinetti Letters
On August 5, 1890, France signed a declaration with Great Britain allow-
ing France's Mediterranean possessions to extend southward to Lake
783. 1955 Treaty, supra note 401, reprinted in BROwNLiE, supra note 12, at 30. Because the treaty
envisaged a withdrawal of French troops from Fazzan, France very nearly did not ratify it. See LANNE,
supra note 11, at 214-15; Muller, supra note 367, at 175. Ultimately, however, the instruments of
ratification were exchanged on February 20, 1957. BROWNL.E, supra note 12, at 30.
784. 1955 Treaty, supra note 401, art. 3, reprinted in BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 31.
785. Significantly, the list does not include the 1935 Laval-Mussolini Accords. See id. annex I,
reprinted in BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 32-33.
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Chad." 6 A later agreement with Germany in 1894 delimited the frontiers of
Cameroon and also assured France of a corridor connecting its Mediterranean
colonies with its central African territories.7 7
France began to define the eastern and northern frontiers of this corridor,
which was later to become Chad, by signing a convention with Great Britain
in 1898 (1898 Convention). 88 In this agreement, the first listed in the
exchange of notes annexed to the 1955 Treaty, Great Britain agreed to refrain
from any action in a French sphere of influence comprising "the northern,
eastern, and southern shores of Lake Chad." The agreement did not, however,
indicate the precise extent of territory within the sphere.789 In concluding the
agreement the parties sought primarily to demarcate clearly the frontiers
separating the colonies of the two nations located farther to the south. The
vagueness of the division around Lake Chad attests to the limited extent of
exploration in that region at the time.
The following year France and Great Britain felt it expedient to delimit
their spheres of influence in the region more precisely. The immediate impetus
for this decision was the ignominious end of the Marchand expedition, a
French attempt to challenge English claims to the Upper Nile. The crisis that
ensued when this expedition confronted British forces at Fashoda resulted in
a major colonial setback for France. Th~ophile Delcass6, the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, opted to end France's colonial rivalry with Britain and
abandon French claims to the Upper Nile, rather than lose a potential ally
against Germany.79 Consequently, on March 21, 1899, Great Britain and
France signed a declaration (1899 Declaration) to supplement the 1898 Con-
vention.79 This declaration, the second agreement listed in the annex to the
1955 Treaty, set out principles for determining the western border of the
province of Darfur (in present-day Sudan) with neighboring French posses-
sions, and then proceeded to state:
786. Declarations Respecting Territories in Africa, Aug. 5, 1890, Gr. Brit.-Fr., 173 Consol. T.S.
377.
787. Convention for the Delimitation of French Congo and the Cameroons and of Respective Zones
of Influence in the Region of Lake Chad, Mar. 15, 1894, Fr.-Ger., 180 Consol. T.S. 75.
788. Convention for Delimitation of Possessions West of the Niger, June 14, 1898, U.K.-Fr., 186
Consol. T.S. 313 [hereinafter 1898 Convention]. Instruments of ratification were exchanged on June 13,
1899. BRowNLIE, supra note 12, at 619.
789. 1898 Convention, supra note 788, art. IV, 186 Consol. T.S. at 320.
790. LANNE, supra note 11, at 17. The decision not to challenge Great Britain in the Nile basin did
not please French colonialists. One of the most prominent, Robert de Caix, criticized Delcassd's policy
in an article discussing the 1899 Declaration. See Robert de Caix, La convention franco-anglalse, 9
B.C.A.F. 100, 100-05 (1899) [hereinafter de Caix, La convention]. De Caix proceeded to minimize the
importance of the attribution of Borku and Tibesti to France, stating that "they are not noteworthy lands'
and that the government's attempt to portray them as major gains was essentiallya smokescreen "to deceive
[the public] as to the mediocre character of the agreement." Id. at 103.
791. Declaration Completing Convention of June 14, 1898, Mar. 21, 1899, U.K.-Fr., 186 Consol.
T.S. 331 [hereinafter 1899 Declaration]. The instruments of ratification were exchanged on June 13, 1899.
BROWNiE, supra note 12, at 622.
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It is understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallel the French zone
shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which shall start from the point
of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th degree of longitude east of
Greenwich... , shall run thence to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree
of longitude east of Greenwich... , and shall then follow the 24th degree until
it meets. . . the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed.7'
The parties then agreed to appoint a commission "to delimit on the spot a
frontier-line."793 Remarkably, the 1899 Declaration did not specify where
the northern limit of France's zone would intersect the twenty-fourth meridian.
This point will be discussed in more detail shortly.'9
a. Legitimacy of the Delimitation of Zones of Influence
The line drawn by the 1899 Declaration sets out the foundation for the
Chadian claim to the Aouzou Strip. The 1898 Convention and the 1899
Declaration raise some questions, however, and some scrutiny of the agree-
ments is consequently required. The first question concerns Britain's authority
to negotiate the northern boundary of French possessions. At that time Britain
possessed, as part of Egypt and Sudan, a large part of what is now southeast-
ern Libya, extending as far west as the sixteenth degree of longitude. 7 5 But
Britain's possession of the land east of the sixteenth meridian did not entitle
it to negotiate a limit to French possessions west of that line. That territory
was part of the Turkish sancak of Fazzan, attached to Tripolitania, so that
Turkey, not Britain, would have been the appropriate counterparty to delimit
ownership of the land.
However, Britain and France did not intend these treaties to settle the
ownership question. The treaties therefore did not create a title that was valid
erga omnes. Rather, the parties each pledged to refrain from any action in the
other's zone that might impede the other party's acquisition of sovereignty. 796
By delimiting a French sphere of influence, Britain was not negotiating away
792. 1899 Declaration, supra note 791, art. 3, 186 Consol. T.S. at 332-33.
793. Id. art. 4, 186 Consol. T.S. at 333. The 1899 Declaration did not specify the boundary to the
west of the Tropic of Cancer. However, the map annexed to the agreement allegedly showed the frontier
descending southwest from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with 160 East to the town of
Tummo. (There is some dispute as to whether a map was actually annexed at all to the declaration. See
infra notes 812-815 and accompanying text.) Neither party subsequently challenged this part of the
boundary. LANNE, supra note 11, at 21.
794. See infra notes 821-824 and accompanying text.
795. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 21-22, 246. The territory of Cyrenaica, a Turkish possession, did
not extend far south of the coast. In 1934 Britain recognized Italian sovereignty over the southeastern part
of this piece of land, known as the Sarrah Triangle. See infra notes 833-836 and accompanying text. From
1899, the date of an agreement between Great Britain and Egypt, until 1934, the Sarrah Triangle was
considered to be part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 269, at 51; cf. FERRANDI,
supra note 18, at 2 bis (boundary indicated on map showing European colonial possessions in northern
Africa and routes of access to Lake Chad).
796. 1898 Convention, supra note 788, art. VII, 186 Consol. T.S. at 321-2.
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Turkish territory; it merely promised France to stay out of that area. In order
to gain internationally valid title to the territory, France still had to occupy
it797 or conclude treaties with "the native Chiefs. "798
If, however, Turkey possessed sovereignty over the zone attributed to
France, then France could not acquire any sovereign rights there absent some
legally recognized means such as cession, prescription, or conquest.' Fur-
thermore, if Turkey had rights in the French zone that did not rise to sover-
eignty, the agreements with Great Britain, standing alone, could not confer a
superior right on France. s" The Court may agree with Libya that, given the
special characteristics of the region and the nature of the Ottoman state,
Turkey possessed such rights at the time France concluded its treaties. More-
over, before France occupied the region, Turkey (which was not bound by the
Anglo-French agreements) had induced Derde Chai to accept an Ottoman
stipend and an appointment as kaymakam. These arrangements would prevail
over any right France could claim by virtue of its agreements with Britain."'
France, however, never infringed upon Turkey's rights, but instead waited to
occupy the region until Turkey had renounced its rights to it.
b. Legitimacy Notwithstanding Failure to Specify Ownership
A second question raised by the 1899 Declaration concerns the choice of
the language "the French zone shall be limited." The declaration omits mention
of the ownership of the territory on the other side of the line. °2 Delcass6
apparently insisted on the vague phrasing because he did not feel comfortable
with acknowledging thefait accompli that brought Britain sole control of Egypt
in 1882.1' He also wished to avoid alarming Italy, which had designs on
797. See supra note 528 and accompanying text.
798. 1898 Convention, supra note 788, art. VI, 186 Consol. T.S. at 321.
799. For a discussion of this point, see supra note 661 and accompanying text.
800. See Despagnet, supra note 556, at 117-18 (stating that existing rights of other states in sphere
of influence and even irregular treaties with native chiefs trump over "claims of a country that can only
point to the hinterland conceded to it by another State, and who can't even raise its flag above the regions
claimed by it").
801. French colonialists acknowledged this situation even in 1911, recognizing that in light of the
requirement of effective occupation, the Turkish actions would "make [France's] negotiations with
Constantinople more difficult." De Caix, supra note 790, at 91.
802. 1899 Declaration, supra note 791, art. 3, 186 Consol. T.S. at 332-3.
803. Letter from Th~ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Paul Cambon, French Ambassa-
dor to Great Britain (Mar. 7, 1899), in FRANCE, MnmiTST DES AFFA.Es ETRANobREs, DOCUpmwNS
DIPLOMATIQUES: CORRESPONDANCE CONCERNANT LA DACLARATION ADDTIONNELLE Du 21 MARS 1899
A LA CONVENTION FRANCO-ANGLAISE DU 14 SiAN 1898, No. 11, at 15 (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1899)
[hereinafter CORRESPONDANCE]; LANNE, supra note 11, at 18 n.8, 19; see also Chronique des faits





Tripolitania. ° Again, any objection based on this vague language misunder-
stands the nature of a sphere of influence treaty. Because such treaties could
not determine ownership, they did not need to specify what state, if any,
currently exercised actual sovereignty over the territory in each state's sphere.
Indeed, states could create spheres of influence within other states. 05 Conse-
quently, the failure of the 1899 Declaration to specify the ownership of the
territory beyond the French sphere has no bearing on the validity of the
agreement.
c. French Attempts to Mollify Italy
In order to mollify Italian fears about French intentions, France reached
an agreement with Italy in 1900 to limit French expansion toward Tripoli in
exchange for Italy's promise not to interfere with France's attempts to acquire
Morocco." Two years later France gave more formal assurances in an
exchange of letters dated November 1, 1902 (Barr~re-Prinetti Letters)." ° In
these letters, the third relevant agreement listed by the 1955 Treaty, France
and Italy agreed that "the limit of French expansion in northern Africa [would
be] the frontier of Tripolitania indicated on the map annexed to the declaration
of March 21, 1899, additional to the Franco-English Convention of June 14,
1898. "'' Both governments agreed that the exchange of letters fully settled
their interests in the Mediterranean." ° By restricting French expansion to
804. LANNE, supra note 11, at 19; see also WnLIAM C. ASKEW, EuROPE AND ITALY'S ACQUISITION
OF LIBYA, 1911-1912, at 19 (1942) (discussing Franco-Italian relations in late 1890s); E. ROUARD DE
CARD, ACCORDS SECRETS ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ITAUE CONCERNANT LE MAROC ET LA LYBm 25-26
(1921) [hereinafter ROUARD DE CARD, ACCoRDS SECRETS].
805. European states did exactly that in China. The state gaining such a sphere of influence did not,
however, gain title to that territory, since it was already under the sovereignty of another state. See supra
notes 580-581 and accompanying text.
806. Exchange of Notes, Dec. 14-Dec. 16, 1900, Fr.-It., 189 Consol. T.S. 147; seeBROWNlE,supra
note 12, at 624-26; PICHON, supra note 161, at 82-83.
807. ROUARD DE CARD, ACCORDS SECRETS, supra note 804, at 27; see also RouARD DE CARD, LE
DFfTREND, supra note 357, at 20-22. The letters, which also embodied agreements gravely weakening
Italy's commitment to the Triple Alliance, were actually exchanged in secret on July 10 but were post-dated
to November 1 in order to avoid embarrassing Italy, which had recently renewed the Triple Alliance. The
French, fearing the death of one of the Italian signatories before November, caused two copies to be
executed: one dated July 10, the other dated November 1. On November 1 the first copy was to be
destroyed. See BRoWNLIE, supra note 12, at 623-36.
808. Exchange of Notes, Nov. 1, 1902, Fr.-Italy, 192 Consol. T.S. 155 [hereinafter Barrre-Prinetti
Letters]. The parties inserted the reference to the map annexed to the 1899 Declaration on Italy's sugges-
tion. Telegram from Ambassador Barrbre to Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 28,
1902), in 2 D.D.F. (ser. 2) No. 310, at 373 (1931).
809. Barr~re-Prinetti Letters, supra note 808, 192 Consol. T.S. at 155-7. After 1915 Italian writers
attacked the Barrre-Prinetti Letters on three grounds: first, they were void as a product of the old "secret
diplomacy;" second, they referred only to the section of the boundary between Ghat and Tummno but not
to the section east of Tummo; and third, the Treaty of London cancelled them. Shaw, supra note 269, at
52.
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the area south of the line drawn in 1899, Italy necessarily agreed that France
could attempt to acquire sovereignty as far north as the line.81
After World War I, Italy implicitly acknowledged France's rights to the
area south of the line. Italy claimed that Article 13 of the Treaty of London
superseded the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters by entitling Italy to claim additional
colonial compensations at the expense of France and Great Britain in
Africa." If the Treaty of London did supersede the exchange of letters in
1915, then Italy's argument implies a recognition that the Barrbre-Prinetti
Letters conferred on France a right to acquire sovereign rights, at least as
against Italy, in the area south of the 1899 line.
d. The Question of the Map Annexed to the 1899 Declaration
The Barr~re-Prinetti Letters may have eliminated some problems between
France and Italy in 1902, but today they draw attention to a third problem with
the 1899 Declaration. The letters refer to "the map annexed to the declaration
of March 21, 1899." "Surprisingly," says one observer, "no map was included
with the 1899 convention document-although the 1902 exchange of notes
suggests there was such a map. If it did exist, it has never been found. "12
Others have disputed this claim, reasoning that there must have been a map
because the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters referred to it." Bernard Lanne claims
that the Bulletin du Comiti de l'Afrique fran~aise published the map in
1899.14 The map published there shows the northern frontier of the French
possessions descending more sharply to the south than the present boundary,
meeting the twenty-fourth meridian at approximately 18045 ' , rather than
19030 ' , North latitude."' Significantly, however, the map does keep territo-
ries marked Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi within the French zone, even though
810. Some have argued that the Barr~re-Prinetti Accord precluded Italy from asserting the full extent
of the rights it gained from Turkey in 1912, including the Turkish hinterland claims. McKeon, supra note
651, at 161. That argument, however, is not strictly correct. Italy did not agree in 1902 to renounce any
claims to the area south of the 1899 line. It merely acknowledged that France could attempt to acquire
sovereignty south of the line.
811. See CANTALtIO, supra note 357, at 259.
812. Joff6, supra note 2, at 133; see also Shaw, supra note 269, at 51.
813. As noted above, the parties chose to use the map at Italy's suggestion. See supra note 808.
However, the French diplomatic correspondence does not indicate what caused Italy to make this sugges-
tion.
814. LANNE, supra note 11, at 21.
815. See de Caix, La convention, supra note 790, at 101. For the identical map, see ROuARw DR
CARD, LE DDITtFRND, supra note 357, at 15; E. ROUARD DE CARD, TRArrts DE D L1M1TATION CONCER-
NANT L'AFRiQuE FRANgAJSE 114 bis (1910); Chronique, supra note 803, at 311. The map is reproduced
as Map 9. See Map 10 for a presentation of versions of the boundary drawn by Great Britain.
Coincidentally, the 1935 treaty on which Libya relies also places the point of intersection at 24* Fast,





the line as drawn would actually leave portions of these regions north of the
line.
Chad included an alleged reproduction of the map annexed to the agreement
in a memorandum accompanying its 1983 complaint to the U.N. Security
Council.816 That map, however, was actually published in 1899 by the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a "Yellow Book" on the 1899 Declara-
tion.817 It shows the northern limit of the French zone intersecting the twen-
ty-fourth meridian at approximately 18052 ' North."8
Most likely, no map actually accompanied the original text of the 1899
Declaration. No copy of the agreement has been found with a map annexed.
The agreement itself does not even refer to a map;1 9 no map was even men-
tioned until 1902. Italy, who first suggested including the reference to the map
in the Barrbre-Prinetti Accord, may very well have been referring to the map
published in the French Yellow Book, believing it to be a copy of an official
map annexed to the treaty rather than a mere interpretive guide to the 1898
and 1899 agreements. At the very least Chad could argue that Italy in 1902
could not have been unaware of France's interpretation of the 1899 line as
published in the Yellow Book, since that document was an official publication
of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2
e. Discrepancy Between Treaty Language and Later Practice
The fourth and most significant fourth question raised by the 1899 Declara-
tion concerns the vagueness of the line in the absence of a map, and the
divergence of the line described in the 1899 Declaration from the frontier in
actual practice. The declaration specified that the line was to run "to the south-
east" from the Tropic of Cancer until it intersected 24' East longitude, but it
did not specify a point of intersection.8  However, the history of the negotia-
tions reveals that both parties intended to place within the French zone "all the
816. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 72. For a copy of the map, see Map 8.
817. See FRANCE, MIN tRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGkRES, DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES: DICLAR-
ATION ADDITIONNELLE Du 21 MARS 1899 A LA CONVENTION FRANCO-ANGLAISE DU 14 yOIN 1898 (Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale 1899) [hereinafter FRENCH YELLOW BOOK].
818. The French writer Pichon incorrectly stated that the point of intersection on this map occurred
at 24* East, 19"30' North. PICHON, supra note 161, at 56, 187.
819. In another odd twist, although the 1898 Convention speaks of two annexed maps, only one map
accompanied the text of the agreement, Id. at 187.
820. See id. at 88, 190. On the other hand, the British Foreign Office put the point of intersection
with 24* East near 180 North. Id. at 187.
821. 1899 Declaration, supra note791, art. 3, 186 Consol. T.S. at 332-3. TheFrench text reads "dans
la direction du sud-est." LANNE, supra note 11, at2O. A note published by the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs describing the terms of the agreement was equally vague, stating that the line was to run "in the
direction of the south-east until it meets 240 East longitude." See L'Arrangement, supra note 260, at 145-
46.
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territory forming the oases of Tibesti, Borku,... and Ennedi. "11 The boun-
dary as recognized in practice by France and Britain, and as claimed by Chad,
actually runs east by southeast, intersecting 240 East at 19'30' North latitude.
This line keeps Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi in the French zone. A line running
due south-east, according to a literal reading of the declaration, would intersect
24' East south of 160 North. Such a boundary would, contrary to the parties'
intentions, leave parts of Tibesti and Borku and much of Ennedi outside the
French zone.' Most maps published at the time of the agreement show the
intersection at 18°45' North latitude, which is neither strictly southeast nor as
far north as Chad claims.824
3. Later Treaties Clarifying the Boundary
Although the 1899 Declaration only vaguely defined the limits of the
French sphere of influence, later agreements from the colonial period gave a
more precise indication of the boundary. These agreements are also problem-
atic, however, in that they might have purported to modify retrospectively the
agreement that France had reached with Italy in 1902.
a. The 1919 Convention and the 1924 Protocol
Seeking to rectify the problems arising from a literal interpretation of
"southeast" in the 1899 Declaration, France seized the opportunity when the
time finally came to fix the boundary between the French possessions and
Sudan more definitely, as foreseen in the 1899 Declaration. In 1919 France
and Great Britain concluded a convention (1919 Convention) that supplemented
822. LANNE, supra note 11, at 18. For some of the discussions on this point see Dispatch from Paul
Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain, to Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Jan.
21, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 38, at 61-62 (1959); Letter from Th6ophile Delcass6, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain (Feb. 10, 1899), in CoRREsroN-
DANCE, supra note 803, No. 6, at 10 (insisting on "whole of Tibesti and Borku and all the oases that
depend on them"); Dispatch from Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain, to Th.ophile
Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 16, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 84, at 136-37 (1959);
Telegram from Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador
to Great Britain (Feb. 21, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 87, at 141 (1959); Dispatch from Paul Cambon,
French Ambassador to Great Britain, to Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 22, 1899),
in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 88, at 141-43 (1959); Letter from Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great
Britain, to Th~ophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 27, 1899), in CORRESPONDANCE, supra
note 803, No. 9, at 11; Letter from Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain, to Th6ophile
Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 2, 1899), in CORRESPONDANCE, supra note 803, No. 10
Annex, at 113; see also ROUARD DE CARD, LE Dn"tREND, supra note 357, at 14. In reporting on the
agreement to the French Parliament, Delcass6 stated that Borku and Tibesti would form a "natural rampart"
for the French corridor between the Mediterranean and France's central African colonies. LANNE, supra
note 11, at 20.
823. LANNE, supra note 11, at 23. The British War Office published a 1:3,000,000 scale map of the
Sudan in 1914 showing exactly such a line. Shaw, supra note 269, at 51.
824. See supra note 815. A copy of the map is reproduced as Map 9.
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Map 9: Alleged Copy of Map Annexed to the 1899 Declaration
6 REVUE GrNtRALE DE DRorr ImTERNATIONAL 311 (1899) (reprinted with permission).
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the 1899 Declaration. This agreement, the fourth accord listed in the 1955
Treaty, stipulated that:
[N]othing in this Convention prejudices the interpretation of the Declaration of the
21st March 1899 according to which the words in Article 3 "... . shall run thence
to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Green-
wich..." are accepted as meaning 'shall run thence in a south-easterly direction
until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich at the intersection of
that degree of longitude with parallel 19"30' of latitude. 5
Five years later France and Great Britain reinforced the interpretation given
to the boundary in 1899 by signing a protocol (1924 Protocol) that definitively
fixed on the ground the boundary between French Equatorial Africa and
Sudan. 26 Section VII(g) of the agreement located the northernmost point
of the boundary at 19030 ' North latitude, 240 East longitude, marked on the
land by "a small heap of stones to mark the end of the boundary."827 Because
the Sarrah Triangle, north of the northern boundary of French Equatorial
Africa, was still a British possession, this protocol can be taken to imply that
the boundary separating the Sarrah Triangle from the French possessions south
of it terminated at 240 East, 19030 ' North.
This retrospective interpretation also presents problems. Italy had already
accepted the boundary set in the 1899 Declaration and had occupied Libya
(although the Italian presence in the Libyan interior was only brief). Now, by
subsequent bilateral agreements, France and Britain "interpreted" and possibly
changed that boundary. Although Britain still possessed the Sarrah Triangle,
located immediately north of the boundary, and thus was free to negotiate its
own interpretation with France, France would nevertheless be in breach of its
1902 agreement with Italy if it modified the boundary in a manner inconsistent
with that agreement. In fact, Italy protested the 1919 Convention as an
infringement on its rights, arguing that such a subsequent interpretation could
not bind it unless that interpretation was actually the one France and Italy had
in mind in 1902 when they agreed to abide by the 1899 line. 28
The available evidence supports Italy's argument. Although several maps
purporting to be the official map annexed to the 1899 Declaration have sur-
faced, nobody has been able to authenticate any of them. Most of the maps
produced and circulated at the time of the agreement show the boundary
intersecting 240 East at 18045 ' North. The map published in France's 1899
825. Convention Supplementary to Declaration of Mar. 21, 1899, Sept. 8, 1919, U.K.-Fr., 1921 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmd. 1239), 225 Consol. T.S. 480 [hereinafter 1919 Convention]. In the French version,
the phrase "nothing... prejudices" is translated as "ne modifiera en rien," a phrase connoting an element
of established usage. See LAbNE, supra note 11, at 24. The convention was ratified by the French
Parliament in 1923 and entered into force on December 6 of that year. See id. at 95.
826. Exchange of Notes with Protocol, U.K.-Fr., Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 28 (Cmd. 2221), 28 L.N.T.S.
462 [hereinafter 1924 Protocol].
827. Id. § VIII(g); see also Shaw, supra note 269, at 51.
828. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
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Yellow Book and presented by Chad to the Security Council in 1983-which
is probably the map that France and Italy had in mind in 1902-also shows the
intersection of the "limite des possessions frangaises d'apr~s la Convention du
21 mars 1899" intersecting 240 East at a point well below 190 North.8
Consequently, the 1919 Convention probably interpreted the 1899 Declaration
in a manner inconsistent with the understanding of France and Italy when they
negotiated the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters in 1902.
Nevertheless, such an argument may not succeed. First, consistent with
the intentions of Britain and France, contemporary maps placed Tibesti, Borku,
and Ennedi within the French zone. The 1919 Convention merely gave effect
to these intentions once the parties better understood the geography of the
region. Second, Italy's subsequent practice may indicate that it did not believe
that France occupied more territory in 1914-1916 than it was entitled to. As
commentators have observed, "when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a
provision or an expression contained in a treaty, the relevant conduct of the
contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty... has a high probative
value as to the intention of the parties at the time of its conclusion."830 In
1914, France occupied territory up to the boundary as it would be interpreted
in 1919. Neither Italy, which would later claim rights in Tibesti and Borku,
nor Great Britain, which possessed the Sarrah Triangle and would thus suffer
direct harm if France exceeded the understanding reached in 1899, objected.
Italy claimed "compensations" after World War I based on the Treaty of
829. Maps will obviously play a very significant role in the Court's resolution of this case. In the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case Judge Levi Carneiro stated that maps may be evidence that "the occupation
or exercise of sovereignty was well known." Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 105
(Nov. 17) (separate opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro). In the 1962 decision in Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15), the I.C.J. held that Thailand had acquiesced in or accepted
an erroneous map and therefore could not challenge it. The Court treated the map, which had not been
prepared or approved by a bilateral commission, as if it were part of the boundary agreement in question.
See Guenter Weissberg, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal, 57 AM.
J. INT'L L. 781, 792-98, 801 (1963). This decision prompted one observer to note that "in the adjudication
of boundary disputes, maps have gained much more impact than they have possessed in the past." Id. at
792.
However, in the more recent Burkina Faso-Mali boundary dispute the Court adopted a more restrictive
attitude, stating that "maps can still have no greater legal value than that of corroborative evidence
endorsing a conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means." Territorial Dispute (Burk. Faso v.
Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 583 (Dec. 22). The Court did acknowledge, however, that when maps are "physical
expressions of the will of the State," such as when annexed to an official text, they acquire "legal force
for the purpose of establishing territorial rights." Il at 582. International tribunals generally require that
maps be accurate and reliable. In addition, maps produced by neutral parties, or that tend to restrain a
state's rights, enjoy a greater degree of acceptance. See id. at 582-83; Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v.
Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 852 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928). See generally Charles Cheney Hyde, Maps as
Evidence in International Boundary Disputes, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 311 (1933).
830. MCNAm, supra note 659, at424; see also International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J.
128, 135-36 (July 11) ("Interpretations placed upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not
conclusive as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain recognition by a party
of its own obligations under an instrument."); SHAtMA, supra note 544, at 180 (failures of third parties
to contest exercise of sovereignty amounts to proof of "exclusive display of authority").
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London, but it did not claim that France in 1914-1916 had overstepped the
limits it had agreed to in 1902. Indeed, Italy's reliance on the Treaty of
London rather than the Barrere-Prinetti Letters implies that Italy did not
believe that the letters gave it a valid claim to the territory. Such conduct
would have estopped Italy from later claiming that France exceeded the limits
agreed to in 1902. As Judge Alfaro stated in the Temple ofPreah Vihear case,
"the party which by its recognition, its representation, its declaration, its
conduct or its silence has maintained an attitude that is manifestly contrary to
the right it is claiming .. is precluded from claiming that right. " " When
viewed against this prior acquiescence to the French occupation, Italy's protests
after the 1919 Convention should not stand as an affirmation of its rights. 2
b. Effect of the 1955 Treaty on Earlier Agreements
Assuming that Libya inherited from Italy claims arising from the possible
breaches of the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters, it effectively waived those claims
when it agreed to the boundary defined by the 1955 Treaty. Through reference
to the 1919 Convention and 1924 Protocol, that treaty fixed the endpoint of
Libya's southern boundary at 240 East, 19030 ' North. Therefore, even if
Libya inherited any territorial claims from Italy, it would seem to have agreed
to forego any claim that pushing the endpoint as far north as 19030 ' violated
the 1902 understanding between Italy and France. In addition, the 1955 Treaty
elevated the status of the earliest treaties concerning the French sphere of
influence. Originally, those treaties only delimited the areas in which France
and Great Britain mutually pledged not to interfere with each other's efforts
to acquire sovereignty. However, the 1955 Treaty made the boundaries negoti-
ated in those agreements binding on Libya. In effect, Libya expressly agreed
to be bound by earlier agreements made by Great Britain, even though Libya
had no legal connection of succession or otherwise with Great Britain. Whatev-
er the defects (such as the absence of a contemplated map) those treaties pos-
sessed at the time Britain and France concluded them, Libya's acceptance of
831. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 40 (June 15) (separate opinion
of Judge Alfaro).
832. Although Italy did not contend that France had exceeded the limit it had set for itself in 1902,
Italy argued that the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters did not preclude it from claiming additional territory from
France. Italy maintained that the 1902 agreement applied only to the western boundary of Libya and its
southern boundary as far east as Tummo-but not beyond Tummo--so that there would have been no line
east of Tummo for France to exceed. In fact, Italian colonialists employed this argument to pre-emptFrench
assertions that the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters precluded Italy from demanding territory from France. See
CANTALVrPo, supra note 357, at 257-58. Upon the basis of this argument, Italy proceeded to assert that
the adjustment of the boundary west of Tummo by the Pichon-Bonin Accord in 1919 did not close the
question of boundary adjustments east of Tummo. Id. at 259-60. Without an authentic copy of the official
map, the Court will have to settle these questions of estoppel and treaty interpretation without definitive
guidance.
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the treaties effectively waived any right to raise those defects against Chad's
title.
c. The 1934 Exchange of Notes
In the 1934 Exchange of Notes, Great Britain, Egypt, and Italy fixed the
boundary of Sudan with Libya."a The boundary was to start at the intersec-
tion of the twenty-second parallel with the twenty-fifth meridian of East
longitude, then proceed south again along the meridian "as far as its junction
with the frontier of the French possessions."" 4 Unfortunately, the agreement
did not specify the location of this junction.
The agreement constitutes British recognition of Italy's right to the Sarrah
Triangle, the strip of land located northwest of the eastern segment of the line
drawn in 1899 and 1919."' s However, because the agreement merely fixed
the boundary between Sudan and the Italian colony of Libya, it did not specify
the southern frontier of the Sarrah Triangle-i.e., the part that bordered on
the French possessions. That part of the boundary must be inferred from
earlier agreements between France and the United Kingdom, particularly the
1919 Convention, to which Italy succeeded by virtue of the 1934 Exchange
of Notes, and from practice. 36
4. The 1966 Treaty with Libya
In addition to the treaties dating from France's control over Chad, Chad
may also invoke a treaty of friendship (1966 Treaty) that it concluded with
Libya in 1966.37 Article 2 of this treaty obligated each state to "grant facili-
ties for the movement of the populations established on both sides of the
frontier" within a specified zone, defined by reference to points in Libya and
points in Chad. The treaty included Zouar in the Chadian zone.838 Chad has
argued that this provision constitutes Libyan recognition of Chad's right to
Zouar, especially in light of the fact that Chad was administering the town at
the time the treaty was signed." 9
Article 3 of the same treaty determined legal caravan routes for trade
between the two countries. It defined the four legal routes by reference to
833. 1934 Exchange of Notes, supra note 372.
834. Id. para. 2, 155 L.N.T.S. at 47.
835. Prior to 1934 this territory belonged to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. See BROWNIe, supra note 12,
at 133. See also Map 10.
836. BRoWNIe, supra note 12, at 135.
837. 1966 Treaty, supra note 429, quoted in Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68.
838. Id. art. 2, quoted in Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68.
839. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68. Zouar lies south of the Aouzou Strip, but Libyan
forces were occupying it at the time Chad made this argument.
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Map 10: Sarrah Triangle and Alternative Boundary Positions According
to Britain
85 GEOGRAPHICAL 3. 50, 50 his (1935) (reprinted with permission).
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towns:
1. The Zouar, Bardal, Aouzou, Koufra (and vice versa), (Koufra in Libya) path;
2. The Largeau, Zouar, Wour, Korizo, Gatroum (and vice versa), (Gatroum in
Libya) path;
3. The Largeau, Ounianga, Tekro, Koufra (and vice versa) path;
4. The Fada, Ounianga, Koufra (and vice versa) path.'
Chad has argued that the express designation of Kufrah and al-Qatrun as
Libyan implies Libya's recognition that the other towns were within Chad."'
For if Libya considered Aouzou to be within its territory, why did it specify
that only al-Qatrun and Kufrah were Libyan? Why did it not insist, for exam-
ple, that the first paragraph read "(Aouzou and Koufra in Libya)" instead?
5. Summary
Thus, under the Chadian argument, the 1955 Treaty established the fron-
tiers of Libya with French possessions and fixed the southern boundary along
a line developed during the twenty years between 1899 and 1919, a line to
which later international accords explicitly or implicitly referred. Although the
various accords that shaped and developed this boundary contain some irregu-
larities-in particular the possible non-existence of a map on which the line
was supposedly drawn and the vagueness of treaty language in the absence of
such a map-they do provide strong evidence of international acceptance of
the boundary claimed by Chad. Finally, the 1966 Treaty with Libya confirmed
Libya's acceptance of Tibesti as Chadian territory.
B. Libyan Attempts to Undermine the 1955 Treaty
Because the 1955 Treaty embodies Libya's acceptance of the boundary
claimed by Chad, Libya must seek to prevent the application of the treaty. It
has two possible arguments. First, it could claim that the 1955 Treaty was
superseded in 1972 by an agreement in which President Tombalbaye allegedly
ceded the Aouzou Strip to Libya. The authenticity and validity of this agree-
ment, however, are in grave doubt. Libya could also claim that the 1955
Treaty is invalid as the product of a coercive relationship between France, a
powerful colonial state, and the pliant Libyan monarchy, beholden to Western
interests and unable to resist Western demands.
840. 1966 Treaty, supra note 429, art. 3, quoted in Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68.
841. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68.
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1. The Alleged Cession of 1972
Chadian President Tombalbaye signed a treaty in 1972 (1972 Treaty) in
Tripoli with Colonel Qaddafiy that allegedly ceded the Aouzou Strip to Libya
in a secret clause. According to some sources, the Swedish cartographers who
prepared the Libyan maps incorporating the Aouzou Strip in 1976 reported that
they relied on the 1972 Treaty more than on the Mussolini-Laval Accords in
penning their coordinates.' 2 Chad does not deny the existence of the
treaty-indeed, Chad cited the agreement in its 1988 Memorandum to the
Security CounciW 3-but it does dispute that the treaty ceded territory to
Libya.
Libya has also contended that Tombalbaye ceded it the Aouzou Strip in a
letter to Qaddafiy in 1972. Libya produced a photocopy of the letter at a
meeting of the Bongo Committee in October 1987.1" In the letter, Tombal-
baye promised, in his "capacity as legal President of Chad, ... that the
Aouzou Strip has been and always will be, without any doubt, an integral part
of Libyan territory."' Chad and various observers have raised serious
doubts about the authenticity of this letter.'
Assuming the cession really did occur, Tombalbaye might have had reasons
to go through with it. According to Libya, he ceded the Aouzou Strip in return
for a promise of an end to Libya's support for the rebels and a pledge of
842. Silence officiel etprojets en cours, JEUNE AFMQUB, Dec. 17, 1976, at 32-33.
843. Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 68-69.
844. Comarin, supra note 11, at 8. The full text of the letter is reprinted in id. at 9.
845. Quoted in id. The letter also informs Qaddafly that Chad has decided to break off relations with
Israel, and it asks Qaddafiy to end Libyan aid to FROLINAT. Id.; see also Lemarchand, The Case, supra
note 50, at 114.
846. First, until it produced the letter Libya had essentially refused to discuss the Aouzou Strip. Some
have suggested that Qaddafiy's military setbacks in the spring and summer of 1987, combined with his
perception that African diplomatic opinion favored the Chadian arguments as better documented, induced
Qaddafiy to produce the letter. Comarin, supra note 11, at 9. Second, Libya may have released the letter
in an attempt to stall the O.A.U. and prevent it from announcing an adverse decision in the Aouzou Strip
dispute. Id. Third, Libya has never produced the original of the letter; the photocopy it sent to the Bongo
Committee cannot be scientifically authenticated. Furthermore, the letterhead does not resemble that used
by Tombalbay at the time, the signature is illegible, and the spelling of Tombalbaye's name does not
correspond to the spelling he used at the time. Chad has accused Libya of forging the letters from a
composite of phrases drawn from other letters. ld. at 10. Fourth, the timing of the letter's release is
suspicious. If Libya had the letter all along, it logically should have produced it earlier. Id. Instead, it
waited until Tombalbaye, the only person who could have verified the letter, had been dead for twelve
years. McKeon, supra note 651, at 156-57.
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significant Libyan aid. 7 Another version of the story alleges that Tombal-
baye accepted a large personal bribe in exchange for the Aouzou Strip."'
Whatever the consideration, some circumstantial evidence suggests that
Tombalbaye allowed Libya to occupy the Aouzou Strip. Tombalbaye protested
neither the occupation nor the annexation of the territory, which occurred
shortly after the signing of the 1972 Treaty and the alleged letter. 49 When
questioned in April 1974 by an inhabitant on the Libyan presence in Aouzou,
Tombalbaye reportedly lost his cool and snapped, "This is a matter for the
Chadian government, which is taking care of it.""'0 Tombalbaye also seemed
to facilitate Libyan annexation of the area in his attempts to break up B.E.T.,
but Toubou protests forced him to abandon the effort. 51
Chad has challenged the validity of any territorial cession on the ground
that Tombalbaye lacked the constitutional power to alienate national territory
without parliamentary approval.852 Although this argument may defeat claims
arising under the 1972 Treaty or the letter from Tombalbaye to Qaddafiy,"'
the award in the maritime boundary arbitration between Guinea-Bissau and
Senegal held that such constitutional defects do not necessarily deprive a treaty
of its force."54
Although that decision represents a significant shift in the law, it probably
does not apply to the 1972 Treaty. The Guinea-Bissau decision turned on the
fact that Portugal's customary practice allowed France to expect Portuguese
adherence to the treaty despite lack of parliamentary approval. Libya could not
have had similar expectations regarding the 1972 Treaty. Although the later
years of the Tombalbaye regime were increasingly authoritarian, the secrecy
of the cession-ff a cession ever occurred-suggests that Tombalbaye expected
847. See THoMPsON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 123; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 228-29;
Bernard Lanme, Petit dictionnaire d'iddes reues sur le Tchad, LE MOIS EN AFRIQuE, June-July 1981, at
134-35 [hereinafter Petit dictionnaire]; WHrTEmAN, supra note 414, at 8. Hiss~ne Habr6 made similar
allegations against Tombalbaye. Comarin, supra note 11, at 10-11. Tombalbaye might not have felt that
he was giving up very much, since northern Chad had slipped from the government's control by 1972.
See Lemarchand, The Case, supra note 50, at 114.
848. See THoMPSON &ADLOPF, supra note 45, at 31; see also CooLEY, supra note 407, at 120; Chad
Foreign Minister on Aouzou Strip Dispute with Libya, April Coup Attempt (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 12, 1989) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
849. THOMpSoN & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 123-24; see also LMNNE, supra note 11, at 229.
850. Comarin, supra note 11, at 10.
851. THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 45, at 33.
852. Chad Foreign Minister on Aouou Strip Dispute with Libya, April Coup Attempt (BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Aug. 12, 1989) available in LEXIS, Nexis File, Wires Library. Article 5(3) of the
constitution in force at the time made the President the guarantor of Chad's territorial integrity. Article
70 required the parliament to pass a law authorizing ratification of any treaty. See LANNE, supra note 11,
at 230; McKeon, supra note 651, at 162 & n.158; Comarin, supra note 11, at 11..
853. See McKeon, supra note 651, at 161, 163 & n.167 (alleged cession void as manifest violation
of fundamental law of Chad of which Libya should have known).
854. Dd1imitation de ]a frontire maritime (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (1989), annexed to Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (Application of Guinea-Bissau Instituting Proceedings Before the
International Court of Justice, Aug. 23, 1989) (on file with author); see supra notes 776-778.
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public resistance. Nor can Libya claim that Chad acquiesced in the cession,
since Chad has continually pressed claims to the Aouzou Strip. Claims by
Libya based on the 1972 Treaty thus seem likely to fail before the Court.
Moreover, arguing that Chad ceded the Aouzou Strip in 1972 implies that the
Aouzou Strip was Chad's to cede. This argument could thus prove not only
questionable but also risky.
2. Attacking the 1955 Treaty as Colonial Diktat
If arguments based on the 1972 Treaty are unlikely to succeed, Libya must
undermine the validity of the 1955 Treaty. Since that treaty is the most signifi-
cant document defining the boundary, and since in it Libya expressly agreed
to accept the boundary Chad now claims, the 1955 Treaty would preclude
Libya from asserting its own claims based on treaties or occupation-unless
Libya can demonstrate that it did not freely assent to the 1955 boundary. Libya
has asserted that the 1955 Treaty did not reflect the will of the Libyan people
because King Idris, who concluded the agreement with France, was beholden
to colonial powers and was unable to resist their demands. In particular, Libya
has argued that the presence of French, British, and American military bases
demonstrated Idris's dependence on Western imperialist powers and effectively
rendered him a pawn of Western interests. 5 The Qaddafiy government has
claimed that Libya was not truly free until the 1969 revolution.85 6 Libya has
also contended that Idris forced the 1955 Treaty upon the Libyan people over
the objection of the Libyan legislature (whose consent was not constitutionally
required). 57 The Libyan argument finds further support in King Idris's con-
tinued assertion of title to the Aouzou Strip despite the 1955 Treaty,s an
action that suggests Idris believed Libya had a valid claim but was unable to
enforce it against France. This argument may win support from the Court,
855. The Libyan representative argued before the Security Council in 1983 that France's presence
in southern Libya and Britain's presence in northern Libya placed Libya at a great disadvantage, and that
France refused to remove its troops until Libya accepted the 1955 "agreement permitting it to take parts
of Libya and annex them to its African territories." 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 38-40 (statement
of Mr. Treiki). In 1978 Libya raised a similar argument. The Libyan representative denied, "in view of
the purely formal independence of the former royalist rdgime, the foreign bases-in particular British and
American-in its territory and the foreign influence to which King Idris was subject," that Libya could have
aided the Chadian rebels during the monarchy. 2060th Meeting, supra note 441, at 6 (statement of Mr.
Kikhia). The statement that Idris did not aid the rebels is false. Although Idris did not go to the same length
as Colonel Qaddafiy, he sent modest material aid and gave the rebels sanctuary in Libya. See supra note
413 and accompanying text.
856. Libyan representatives made these arguments at meetings with Chad in 1977, when Chad invoked
the 1955 Treaty. See Chad Memorandum, supra note 419, at 66; 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 54-55
(statement of Mr. Barma).
857. See 2419th Meeting, supra note 485, at 23-25 (statement of Mr. Treiki); 2429th Meeting, supra
note 429, at 38-40 (statement of Mr. Treiki).
858. Joffd, supra note 2, at 34.
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especially in light of Judge Bedjaoui's expansive interpretation of coercion in
Guinea-Bissau's maritime boundary arbitration with Senegal.
a. Idris's Early Ties to the West
The claim that Idris al-Sanusi served colonial interests does have some
historical support, but it requires closer inspection. Evaluation of the claim
requires a review of Idris's rise to power and his conduct as King of Libya.
Idris assumed leadership of the Sanusiya in 1915 following the abdication
of his cousin Ahmad al-Sharif. Idris criticized his predecessor's attacks on
British forces in Egypt and accordingly he quickly won British support,
embarking on a long and mutually beneficial relationship with Great
Britain. 59 Idris made peace with Italy in 1917 and concluded a further Italian
agreement in 1920 that recognized him as hereditary Amir of Cyrenaica, giving
him political control of the main inland oases of Cyrenaica. Two years later
Tripolitanian notables, reacting to Italy's heavy-handed rule there, offered Idris
the Amirate of all Libya. Idris accepted in November 1922, but Italy's cam-
paign to conquer Tripolitania prevented the union, driving Idris into exile in
Egypt.860
Idris remained in Egypt until 1943 and further strengthened his ties with
Great Britain. Shortly after the commencement of World War II the British
asked Idris for cooperation in the fight against Italy. Libyan exiles in Cairo
authorized Idris to collaborate with Great Britain, and they proclaimed a Sanusi
Amirate in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania."6 Yet not all the Libyan exiles
approved of Idris's close relations with the British, even at this early stage.
The revelation that Idris had secretly negotiated with Britain upset some
Tripolitanian notables,862 and they criticized him for not obtaining a British
guarantee of full Libyan post-war independence. 3 Idris in fact favored a
British post-war protectorate in Libya, believing that Libya could not survive
without British protection and assistance."
859. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 30-31.
860. ild. at 32; JONATHAN BEAtMAN, QADDAFI's LIBYA 15 (1986); EVANs-PRITCHARD, supra note
218, at 134, 148-55; PICHON, supra note 161, at 124-30.
861. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 45-46; see also BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 17; EVANs-
PRrcHARD, supra note 218, at 105-06, 226-27. Sanusi forces did participate in the effort against the Axis
in an ancillary capacity, performing internal security tasks and thereby freeing British troops for combat
duty.
862. BEA IMAN, supra note 860, at 17.
863. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 46.
864. BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 18.
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b. The Formation of the Libyan State
The Sanusi cooperation during the war left Idris in good favor with the
British after the defeat of the Axis in North Africa. In addition, Idris gained
the solid support of Cyrenaica due to the established Sanusi presence in the
region. The Tripolitanians, however, were divided on whether to support
Idris." 5
A further complication arose from the presence of Western forces in Libya.
After the war the United States stationed bombers at Wheelus Field, east of
Tripoli; Britain maintained airbases near Tobruk and Tripoli; and French
forces remained in Fazzan, which they had conquered during the war.'
France in particular took a strong interest in the fate of Libya. Hoping to use
Fazzan as a strategic buffer separating Algeria and Tunis from Arab nationalist
influences emanating from Egypt, France resisted withdrawing its garrisons
from the region.867
After the Big Four failed to agree on the future of Libya, they referred the
matter to the U.N. General Assembly, which adopted a resolution calling for
the establishment of an independent Libyan state. 68 Meanwhile Britain,
which was administering Cyrenaica, recognized Idris as the head of the
Cyrenaican government and transferred responsibility to him in September
1949.869
During negotiations in the Libyan Preparatory Committee over the forma-
tion of the state, the Cyrenaican and Fazzanese delegations banded together
against Tripolitania, which had twice their combined population. Whereas the
Tripolitanians favored a unitary state in which their superior numbers could
dominate, the other two regions desired a federal state, with each province
possessing an equal voice. The Western nations also supported a federal state,
believing that it would more easily enable them to preserve their bases.' °
The Cyrenaican and Fazzanese proposal prevailed, and the Libyans proceeded
to choose a National Assembly to decide on a constitution. Each province was
to nominate twenty delegates to the assembly, subject to approval by the entire
Preparatory Committee. Only three of the seven Tripolitanian members of the
Preparatory Committee, however, voted to approve the Tripolitanian delegates
to the National Assembly. The fact that the delegates of one-third of the
population effectively picked the delegates from the other two-thirds troubled
the Tripolitanian populace"' and also the Arab League.' Dominated by
865. WRIGHr, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 50-51.
866. Id. at 49.
867. Id. at 54.
868. See supra notes 389-397 and accompanying text.
869. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 55-56; see also BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 19.
870. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 61.
871. Id. at 62-64; see also BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 23.
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Cyrenaica and Fazzan, the National Assembly declared that Libya would be
a federal constitutional monarchy with Idris as king. The decision sparked
strong protests in Tripoli. 3
c. The Early Years of the Monarchy
Idris demonstrated intolerance of political dissent in his kingdom from the
start. After the first national elections, held in February 1952, the opposition
National Congress Party accused the government of manipulating the votes.
Violent protests and clashes with the police ensued in Tripoli. The government
deported Congress Party leader Bashir Bey Sadawi, arrested others, and
promptly dissolved the party. To this day a party system has not re-emerged
in Libya. 4
The Libyan monarchy quickly became a form of benevolent despotism.
Although Idris pledged during the 1950 constitutional debate that he would
waive his exclusive right to enter into treaties (thus assuring parliament that
it would decide the future of the foreign military bases),87 he "emerged as
the supreme arbiter of national affairs." He did not wield his power visibly,
however, but rather through "a discreet system of palace power and patronage"
that dissociated the monarchy from direct decision-making.8 76 This system
of government created conditions for court intrigues and, later, corruption.
d. Foreign Policy, the Base Agreements, and the Final Years of the
Monarchy
While Idris was a firm if not highly visible ruler, he pursued a timid course
in foreign affairs, displaying a general reluctance to alienate the Western
powers that nurtured him. In part, this meekness derived from his character.
E.E. Evans-Pritchard, author of the classic study of the Sanusiya, wrote in
1947 that "J[dris] has never been a man of action. "77 Although Evans-Prit-
chard found Idris to be "astute and a man of sound political judgment," he also
described him as "often vacillating and evasive..., and though these charac-
teristics may sometimes have been a wise response of the weak negotiating
with the strong..., they seem to be weaknesses to which he is temperamen-
tally prone and to have become an aversion to directness in either thought or
872. WRIaHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 65.
873. BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 23; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 66.
874. WRiGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 77-79; see also id. at93 (discussing general lack oforganized
opposition during monarchy).
875. Id. at 68.
876. Id at 81; see also BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 24.
877. EvAs-PRrrcHARD, supra note 218, at 155.
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action." ' Thus Idris by nature was not willing to challenge his Western
benefactors when they demanded concessions.
More importantly, Idris was not in a position to resist the West even if he
had been so disposed. Libya's extreme poverty made the kingdom dependent
on French, American, and British aid for survival.879 In addition, Western
development agencies under the auspices of Libya's creditors (chiefly the
United States and Great Britain) supervised the Libyan economy, and Western
technicians provided the economic infrastructure. Finally, three Western
nations maintained military bases on Libyan soil. One historian starkly summa-
rized the situation: "Libya was in fact an extreme instance of a dependent
client state, exogenously formed by imperialist powers for their own advan-
tage. "880
These circumstances clearly constrained Idris in the realm of foreign
policy, forcing him to accommodate the West-and in particular the much-
resented military bases-often against the wishes of the Libyan people. In a
population that was profoundly apathetic about political matters, the visible
foreign military bases were perhaps the sole issue that roused the people.8"'
The question of the bases provided the rallying-point for an underground
opposition that criticized the government's close ties with Britain and the
United States, believing that the bases propped up the monarchy.88
In 1953 Libya signed a treaty with Great Britain providing a twenty-year
base lease and overflight rights in return for large foreign aid payments and
the promise of military supplies. A similar agreement with the United States
in 1954 allowed the United States to use Wheelus Field until 1970 for the sum
of $42,000,000. Neither of the deals had any popular support. The American
agreement in particular met strong criticism. Idris had to overcome consider-
able parliamentary opposition, ultimately dismissing Omar Mansur Kikhia, the
President of the Senate and a critic of the base agreement, in order to push the
deal through. 83 Attention now turned to the French military units in Fazzan.
France had been keeping forces in Fazzan by virtue of a temporary agree-
ment signed on December 24, 1951, the date of Libya's independence. The
agreement provided for six-month extensions pending the signing of a treaty
of alliance. France had also been making certain financial contributions to
Libya under a second agreement signed on the same date.8 4 France proposed
878. Id. at 156.
879. BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 24; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 82.
880. BEARMAN, supra note 860, at 25.
881. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 90.
882. Id. at 92.
883. Id. at82-83; MAJIDKHADDURI, MODERNLIBYA: A STuDYINPoLmcALDEVELoPMENT253-57
(1963) [hereinafter KHADDURI, MODERN LIBYA]. According to one scholar, Libya sought to use the base
agreement to obtain U.S. diplomatic support in resolving outstanding issues with France and Italy. Il at
253.
884. KHADDURI, MODERN LIBYA, supra note 883, at 258.
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a treaty of alliance in late 1952, and in response Libya agreed in principle to
allow French forces to remain in Fazzan."' During the ensuing negotiations,
the Libyan government had continued to show a "willingness to accept the
principle of retaining French forces in Libyan territory," but an agreement
eluded the parties 8"
A change of governments in each country broke the deadlock, and when
the negotiations resumed in the summer of 1954, Mustafa Ibn-Halim, the
Libyan Prime Minister, informed France that it would have to withdraw its
forces. 87 France initially rejected an evacuation, but in November Ibn-
Halim, under pressure from the Libyan Parliament, insisted on a withdrawal
and stated that Libya was not willing to renew the temporary military agree-
ment beyond the end of the year.88 In January 1955 France agreed to evacu-
ate its forces.889
This agreement formed the basis for further negotiations in Tripoli in July.
France insisted, however, on retaining the right to return her forces to Fazzan
if a foreign power launched an armed attack. Ultimately, the parties reached
an agreement embodied in the 1955 Treaty, whereby France would evacuate
its forces within one year but retained air and surface transportation rights in
Fazzan, and each party agreed to consult the other in the event or threat of
war.89° Of course, the 1955 Treaty contained one further notable provision:
Article 3, which defined Libya's boundaries with France's possessions.89 '
The Libyan Parliament approved the 1955 Treaty in a closed session. Accord-
ing to one historian, "[n]o serious opposition was raised against it, although
a few attacked the treaty on account of [Ibn-Halim's] acceptance of the rectifi-
cation of the frontiers in favor of France."892
The Sanusi monarchy continued for fourteen years after the conclusion of
the 1955 Treaty. Before the oil boom of the 1960s Libya continued to skirt
885. Id.
886. Id. at 258-59; see also HENRY SERRANO VILLARD, LIBYA: THE NEW ARAB KINGDOM OF NORTH
AFRICA 149 (1956).
887. KHADDURI, MODERN LIBYA, supra note 883, at 259.
888. Id.; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 84.
889. KHADDURI, MODERN LIBYA, supra note 883, at 259-60.
890. Id. at 260; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 85; see also VLARD, supra note 886, at 150.
891. Some historians have described this clause as effecting a "rectification" of the boundary in
France's favor. KIADDURI, MODERN LIBYA, supra note 883, at 260; WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343,
at 85.
892. The treaty was ratified on April 10, 1956. KHADD RI, MODERN LIBYA, supra note 883, at 261;
WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 84. In addition to the agreements with Great Britain, the United States,
and France, Libya also signed a treaty with Italy guaranteeing the rights of Italian settlers to property
expropriated from Libyan tribes by the fascists. One historian has described these agreements as "'unequal
treaties' guaranteeing the country's subordination to Western foreign policy." BEARMAN, supra note 860,
at 25-26.
Libyan forces did attempt to enter the Aouzou Strip while the parties were negotiating the 1955 Treaty,




between the powerful nationalist influences of Egypt and the need to maintain
the flow of Western aid. During the Suez Crisis of 1956 Idris successfully
extracted the British promise not to use its Libyan bases against Egypt. 96
Throughout this period Libya pursued a passive policy designed not to alienate
any one state. Western aid continued, and by the end of the decade oil explora-
tion began to provide substantial revenues. 94
Libya's now financial security had a significant political impact: it finally
enabled Libya to adopt a more independent foreign policy. By the late 1960s
the government had negotiated the withdrawal of some foreign troops and had
made clear its desire not to renew the base agreements. Even in 1964, how-
ever, Idris still opposed severing all links with Great Britain, and he briefly
abdicated before Libya reached a compromise providing for British and U.S.
training for its armed forces."' 5
The influx of oil revenue also multiplied the opportunities for governmental
corruption. The bureaucratic structure, dominated by members and favorites
of the Sanusi family, proved ripe for bribery and nepotism. The electoral
system, too, had always been susceptible to manipulation, influence-peddling,
and patronage. Although the problem was only just beginning in 1960, by 1969
it had become a major justification for the overthrow of the regime. 96 When
Mu'ammar 'al-Qaddafiy initiated his coup against Idris, the Sanusi regime was




The circumstances of Idris's reign arguably support Libya's claim of
foreign domination. The triumph of the federal model despite opposition from
two-thirds of the population gave rise to cries of Western intervention. Idris's
long-standing relationship with the West did not help matters. Clearly, Idris
was the favorite of the West, particularly Great Britain, to whom he owed
much of his good fortune. Furthermore, Idris's natural tendency to avoid
taking a firm stance and his heavy dependence on Western financial support
strengthens the coercion argument. The maintenance of foreign military bases
on Libyan soil despite strong public opposition further suggests coercion, and
the presence of Western troops in turn further constrained Idris's freedom to
act. Finally, the suppression of organized domestic opposition removed coun-
tervailing influences that might have pushed the government to resist the West.
893. WRIGrr, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 86.
894. Id. at 87.
895. Id. at 98-99, 104.
896. Id. at 89-90.
897. Id. at 120-21.
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In this context, the apparent quid pro quo in the 1955 Treaty-the removal of
the French forces from Libyan soil in exchange for a boundary agreement and
certain arrangements permitting French forces to cross Fazzan-may support
a claim of coercion under an expansive interpretation of that term.
C. The Mussolini-Laval Accords
If Libya can discredit the 1955 Treaty, it could then adduce other evidence
to support its claims to the Aouzou Strip. In particular, Libya could invoke
the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Accords. 98 This agreement, of which the 1955
Treaty conspicuously omits any mention, contains France's agreement to cede
the Aouzou Strip to Italy, and indeed it defines the southern limit of the
Aouzou Strip. However, the validity of this agreement, and in particular the
validity of the Treaty of Rome delimiting the mutual boundaries of French and
Italian possessions, remain a matter of fierce debate. France and Italy each
ratified the accords, but they never exchanged the instruments of ratification.
Furthermore, Italy denounced the accords in 1938 without ever having occu-
pied the Aouzou Strip. The Mussolini-Laval Accords, then, are not likely to
furnish persuasive support for Libya's claim.
1. The Treaty of Rome
The 1935 Accords were partly the product of European politics. Italy
claimed certain territorial adjustments under Article 13 of the Treaty of London
as compensation for siding with the Entente during the war.899 Although Italy
gained certain concessions on Libya's western border under the Pichon-Bonin
Accord, it still claimed additional "compensations," 9' and in December 1928
France offered Italy a triangle of land in northern Niger and southern Algeria.
However, Mussolini spurned this proposal and demanded all of Tibesti, most
of Borku, and a large portion of Ennedi, a counterproposal that met with little
enthusiasm from the French.90t By 1935, however, the growing German
threat induced France and Italy to reach an agreement. Mussolini, who had
earlier positioned his forces in the Brenner Pass to deter Hitler's annexation
of Austria, wanted to improve his ties to Britain and France. Similarly, Britain
and France hoped to use Mussolini as a counterweight to German aggres-
898. Treaty, Protocol and Declarations for the Settlement of Respective Interests in Africa, Jan. 7,
1935, Fr.-Italy, 49 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) 16 [hereinafter Mussolini-Laval Accords]. Libya has in
the past invoked the Mussolini-Laval Accords in support of its claim. See BOUQUET, supra note 174, at
80; JouvE, supra note 437, at 153; Joff6, supra note 2, at 33; Legum, supra note 440, at 53.
899. See supra notes 353-356 and accompanying text; see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 83-85, 87.
900. See supra notes 357-363 an accompanying text.
901. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 107-09.
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sion. ° Thus in 1934 and 1935, seeking to prevent an Italo-German alliance
in Europe, France agreed to substantial territorial concessions to Mussolini in
Africa.9
Whereas the boundary claimed by Chad follows a straight line drawn
between geographical coordinates, the line negotiated in 1935 is defined, at
least for part of its western half, by natural features of the land. Its eastern half
is a straight line drawn to the intersection of the twenty-fourth meridian with
18045 ' North latitude.' The line runs roughly parallel to the line claimed
by Chad. The greatest distance separating the two lines is approximately ninety
miles, at 180 East. The smallest separation is approximately fifty miles, at
either end.905
The initial reaction in France was favorable. The agreement put an end to
the Italian claims under the Treaty of London and promised to preserve peace
in Europe with only minimum concessions. 9°6 Some French colonialists criti-
cized the accords, however, arguing that they replaced a natural frontier-the
desert-with an artificial line that gave Italy a territorial toehold on the other
side of the Sahara and that split a geographically and ethnically homogeneous
region.' Nevertheless, the Comit6 de l'Afrique frangaise supported the
accords, believing the boundary to be workable. 9°
But the Mussolini-Laval Accords represented more than a boundary
determination between Italy and France in the central Sahara. The Treaty of
Rome, the part of the Accords that settled the boundary, also committed the
parties to settle "by a special Convention, of which the bases are fixed in a
special protocol of even date [with this agreement]" "the rights of Italians and
Italian colonial subjects in Tunisia."' This subject had actually been a major
bone of contention between France and Italy,91° so its resolution constituted
a major part of the accords. 91' The treaty called upon the parties to negotiate
this convention "as quickly as possible, in such a manner that it will enter into
force on the same date as the present Treaty. "912 The accords also included
902. See id.
903. See id. at 126.
904. Mussolini-Laval Accords, supra note 898, art. 2, 49 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) at 17-18.
905. See BROWNLm, supra note 12, at 122. For a map of the 1935 boundary line, see Map 11.
906. See LANNE, supra note 11, at 135.
907. See, e.g., J. Ladreit de Lacharri~re, Apr&s lesAccords de Rome, 45 B.C.A.F. 73, 75-76 (1935)
(comments of Gen. Tilho); see also LANNE, supra note 11, at 137-38.
908. See Comit6 de l'Afrique franaise, L'Accordfranco-italien, 45 B.C.A.F. 3, 3-6 (1935); see also
LANNE, supra note 11, at 139.
909. Mussolini-Laval Accords, supra note 898, art. 1, 49 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) at 17.
910. See PICHON, supra note 161, at 220-25.
911. One observer has asserted that Mussolini accepted relatively modest territorial concessions from
France because he was anxious to settle the Tunisian nationality question and to obtain France's assent to
eventual Italian intervention in Ethiopia. Comarin, supra note 11, at 7.
912. Mussolini-Laval Accords, supra note 898, art. 1, 49 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) at 17. After
signature of the accords, the French Deputy Henry Bdrenger asked the French government to ensure that
all the accords be ratified at the same time. Ladreit de Lacharribre, supra note 907, at 75.
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Chad Memorandum at 77 (see note 419).
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a secret agreement giving Italy a sovereign hand in Ethiopia." 3
When the Treaty of Rome came before the French Parliament, this protocol
had still not been negotiated. The Chamber of Deputies authorized ratification
by a vote of 555-9, the Senate voted unanimously to approve the treaty in
March 1935, and President Albert Lebrun ratified the agreement shortly
afterward.914 The Italian Parliament overwhelmingly approved the agreement
in May 1935, and it was ratified in June.915 However, the brutal Italian inva-
sion of Ethiopia shortly thereafter, and the reaction of the League of Nations
(including the ordering, with French participation, of sanctions in October
1935) quickly removed any chance of finalizing a treaty and completing the
Tunisian protocol.916 The parties never exchanged instruments of ratification
for the Mussolini-Laval Accords9 17 and never completed the convention on
Tunisian nationality.
In December 1938 the French Ambassador to Italy, Andr6 Frangois-Poncet,
told Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the
French government still considered the 1935 Accords a legitimate settlement
of the French and Italian claims in Africa, and he asked Ciano whether the
Italian government still viewed the accords as viable. Ciano responded by
officially denouncing the accords, noting that the French failure to ratify the
treaty precluded its validity.9"' He also noted that the legitimacy of the treaty
depended upon French acceptance of Italian expansion in East Africa and that
France had never indicated such acceptance. 91 9
2. Analysis of Libya's Argument
Libya has asserted that the Laval-Mussolini Accords are in force between
it and Chad and that they support its claim to the Aouzou Strip.' This claim
cannot stand, since the failure to conclude the Tunisian convention and to
exchange instruments each sufficiently deprived the treaty of any force under
contemporary international law. 92' First, the accords contemplated a conclu-
913. LANNE, supra note 11, at 130-31.
914. L at 147, 167; see also P cHoN, supra note 161, at 256.
915. LANNE, supra note 11, at 167-68; PICHON, supra note 161, at 256.
916. See id. at 154-55.
917. See supra note 770 and infra note 926 and accompanying text.
918. LANNE, supra note 11, at 159, 171. For the text of the Italian response, see La Note Italienne,
LE TEMPS, Mar. 31, 1939, at 2.
919. LANNE, supra note 11, at 171-72.
920. 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 61 (statement of Mr. Treiki); see also 2419th Meeting, supra
note 485, at 6-7 (statement of Mr. Miskine); 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 52-56 (statement of Mr.
Barma) (reporting Libyan assertions made during bilateral discussions); Chad Memorandum, supra note
419, at 66-67.
921. In its bilateral talks with Libya in 1976 and 1977 and before the Security Council in 1983, Chad
argued that the failure to exchange ratifications and Italy's denunciation deprived the Mussolini-Laval
Accords of force. See 2419th Meeting, supra note 485, at 7 (statement of Mr. Miskine) (arguments before
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sion of the Tunisian convention as a necessary component of the main treaty.
The Tunisian convention was not severable. Rather, it was an implied condi-
tion of the Treaty of Rome, intended to enter into force on the same day.m
Therefore, because the convention did not enter into force, the main treaty
itself could not have entered into force.
Second, contemporary international law required ratification before treaties
could become binding,9" and the Treaty of Rome expressly provided that
it would not enter into force until the parties exchanged the instruments of
ratification.924 Because the process of ratification was never completed, the
treaty had no effect. Libya could seek to avoid this conclusion by arguing that
France's signature and ratification sufficiently demonstrated its satisfaction with
the agreement. This claim would draw upon the arguments developed in the
maritime boundary arbitration between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, where the
tribunal de-emphasized the formalities of the treaty approval process and
examined instead whether each party could reasonably expect, under the
circumstances, that the other would honor its commitments.
However, such an argument is flawed in the present case since the ex-
change requirement was intended precisely as a means of ensuring compliance
by the counterparty. France did not consent to the Mussolini-Laval Accords
in 1935 out of good will-it relied on the benefit of a quidpro quo from Italy.
By requiring that the Treaty of Rome become effective only upon the exchange
of ratifications, the accords assured France that Italy would be bound by its
commitments. The exchange of ratifications thus constituted an essential part
of the agreement, and the argument that legislative authorization sufficed to
show intent to be bound would deprive France of the benefit of its bargain.
Consequently, the Mussolini-Laval Accords may not fit within the situation
envisioned by the arbitrators in the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal dispute. The
formalities that were not observed in that case were matters of domestic law
and did not reflect upon the parties' intention to be bound. Here, by contrast,
the formality that was not observed was included in the agreement precisely
to assure that the parties would be bound.9"
Security Council); 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 52-55 (reporting 1976 and 1977 discussions); Chad
Memorandwn, supra note 419, at 67-69. Chad did not refer to the failure to complete the Tunisian
convention. This argument concerning the failure to exchange ratifications was in fact also made by an
Italian commentator at the time. See Virginio Gayda, Tra Italia e Francia: Tutto da rifare, GIORNALE
D'ITAIA, Dec. 10, 1938, at 1. Libya has asserted that notwithstanding the parties' failure to conclude a
Tunisian accord and to exchange the instruments of ratification, the agreement "exists and will remain in
existence." 2429th Meeting, supra note 429, at 61 (statement of Mr. Treiki).
922. See supra note 780 and accompanying text.
923. See supra notes 770-773 and accompanying text.
924. See supra note 775.
925. Of course, if either France or Italy had a practice of inserting provisions into their agreements
requiring exchange of ratifications, and then regularly honored such agreements without actually completing
the exchange, the Mussolini-Laval Accords might be considered binding.
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Libya could respond, however, that Italy likewise authorized ratification,
thus indicating its intention to adhere to the terms of the agreement. It could
further argue that even in 1938 France still considered the Mussolini-Laval
Accords to be a viable settlement for the parties' interests in Africa.' Chad
could reply that France's willingness to honor the agreement remained contin-
gent upon Italy's honoring its commitments, since French forces remained in
the territory that was to have been ceded. Moreover, the fact that France asked
Italy in 1938 whether it still considered the Accords to be valid suggests that
France was willing to be bound only if Italy followed suit.
Finally, Italy's denunciation of the Treaty of Rome in 1938, after failing
to take any steps to occupy the territory designated to it by the Treaty, 7
indicated an intent not to be bound.928 The treaty certainly contained an
implied right to terminate the agreement. All three factors from which such
an intent could be inferred-the surrounding circumstances, the terms of the
agreement, and the nature of the subject matter-support an implied right of
termination in this case. First, the parties negotiated the Treaty for the purpose
of settling their colonial differences in Africa and forging mutual ties against
Germany. By 1938, the deteriorating political situation in Europe prevented
the realization of these goals. Second, the Accords included a secret protocol
relating to Ethiopia and provided for prompt negotiation of the Tunisian
convention. Yet the Accords were unable to satisfy the parties' expectations
in both cases. Finally, the subject matter included the cession of territory and
the conclusion of an additional convention; neither had occurred by 1938. On
the whole, the Mussolini-Laval Accords fundamentally failed to achieve their
purposes.
The 1955 Treaty, if valid, would remove any lingering doubt about the
validity of the Treaty of Rome. In the list of agreements "in force" relating
to the border between Libya and France's African possessions, the 1955 Treaty
specifically excluded mention of the Mussolini-Laval Accords.9" Chad has
capitalized on this fact, asserting that France deliberately omitted the Accords
as a means for definitively negating their validity." 0 The argument finds
support in a general principle of treaty interpretation, inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius, which presumes that where the parties expressly include some
items, they intend to exclude the rest.93 Under this reading the 1955 Treaty
926. See supra note 918 and accompanying text.
927. France's continued presence in the Aouzou Strip and Libya's failure to take possession of the
territory prevented the cession from becoming effective. "[A] cession becomes effective only with the actual
transfer of sovereignty." Schwartzenberger, supra note 651, at 319.
928. See supra notes 918-919 and accompanying text.
929. See supra notes 784-785 and accompanying text.
930. See OfficialRecord of the 2060th Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2060th mtg. at2, U.N. Doe.
S/PV. 2060 (1987) [hereinafter 2060th Meeting] (statement of Mr. Kamougu6); 2419th Meeting, supra note
485, at 11 (statement of Mr. Miskine).
931. See MCNAM, supra note 659, at 399-401.
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would have removed any residual authority of the Mussolini-Laval Accords
upon entering into force.932
D. The Sufficiency of the French Occupation
Libya can mount two challenges to the French occupation of the Aouzou
Strip under traditional principles as alternatives to its claims under the Musso-
lini-Laval Accords. First, it could claim that the occupation was legally insuffi-
cient-i.e., that France did not demonstrate a sufficient degree of control over
the region. This argument is without merit.
A review of the history yields the conclusion that France did not effectively
occupy Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi by 1916, or by 1919, when France and
Italy met to discuss the "compensations" due to Italy under Article 13 of the
Treaty of London. Turkish troops beat French forces to Tibesti and Borku:
they set up posts at Barda in 1908 and outside Ain Galakka in 1911, 931 and
they did not evacuate these areas until 1912. France then pursued and consum-
mated a campaign to subdue the Toubous and drive the Sanusi from Borku,
Ennedi, and Tibesti. This campaign lasted until 1914, but French forces
withdrew from Tibesti during World War I and did not return until 1929. 91'
In this interval Tibesti in particular sank into a state of internal disorder, as
evidenced by the appeals from Toubou notables asking the French to reoccupy
the area. 935
France's brief occupation of Tibesti and Borku probably did not suffice to
perfect title under international law in force at that time. The period of occupa-
tion was too short, especially in light of the disorder that followed. Yet even
if the occupation did suffice to perfect title, international law probably would
have determined that France had abandoned the territory. Although a state
generally had to show the animus to abandon in addition to the physical
withdrawal, a sufficient lapse of time could give rise to a presumption of the
necessary animus.9 6 Moreover, France failed to satisfy the continuing obli-
gation to maintain an administration capable of keeping order and protecting
life and property. 937
Consequently, Tibesti again became terra nullius when France withdrew
its forces in 1916. It was therefore open to occupation by another power,
932. See McKeon, supra note 651, at 162.
933. Until this time France disavowed any intention ofoccupying Borku, Tibesti, or Ennedi. See supra
notes 319-320 and accompanying text. French colonialists recognized that Turkey arrived at the area before
France, and they castigated the French government for its inaction. See de Caix, La question, supra note
288, at 90.
934. See supra notes 344-352 and accompanying text.
935. See supra notes 348-349 and accompanying text.
936. See supra note 693 and accompanying text.




including Italy. Italy, however, was concentrating on subduing Fazzan. The
French carefully monitored Italy's progress and reoccupied Tibesti in 1929 as
Italian forces approached the area.93
The second French occupation of Tibesti clearly satisfied the legal require-
ments for acquisition of title under international law. Except for isolated and
unsupported Libyan statements denying that France ever exercised sovereignty
in the region,939 no one has ever seriously challenged the effectiveness of
the French occupation. France governed B.E.T. as a military territory; its
forces successfully ended the Toubous' raiding, and the French occupation
brought order and security to the region.9" Therefore, if the land was terra
nullius from 1916, France would have regained valid title by 1929-1930, when
its second occupation commenced.
Even if Italy had protested the 1930 French occupation, it probably could
not have defeated France's title. Italy could claim the territory only as part of
its sphere of influence, as it did not attempt to occupy the region. Moreover,
in the event that Italy possessed an inchoate title as a result of the Barr~re-
Prinetti Letters of 1902, that title would have lapsed in the interim period, and
the area again would have become terra nullius. Thus, in 1930 Italy had no
valid entitlement under the Barr~re-Prinetti Letters that Libya could invoke
today.
E. Occupation and the Question of Prior Title
If the French occupation was sufficient under the applicable legal princi-
ples, then Libya will have to claim that the occupation was illegal.94' For
instance, Libya could argue that the area was already under the sovereignty
of its inhabitants, the Sanusiya, or Turkey, and therefore was not open to
occupation. Under traditional principles of occupation these arguments proba-
bly will not succeed. But arguments using either hinterland theories or those
akin to the Morocco claims in Western Sahara may succeed if the Court
accepts the underlying premise of the argument: that the geographical and
social milieu of the Sahara requires an alternative legal standard for resolving
the dispute. In addition to attacking Chad's title, Libya can also use this
argument to support its own claim to the region: if the region was under
938. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
939. See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
940. See Lon Bureau, Le Tibesti d'apr~s les explorations les plus r6centes, 13 LE MONDE COLONIAL
ILLUSTRP 19 (1935).
941. Libya has made such claims before. See 2419th Meeting, supra note 485, at 23-25 (statement
of Mr. Treiki) ("There has never been any sovereignty by Chad over Aouzou throughout history-not
during the royal era, not after the revolution, and not during the Italian or Ottoman periods."); 2429th
Meeting, supra note 429, at 38-40 (statement of Mr. Treild) ("Throughout the Ottoman period, and the
Karamally [sic] period before it, and throughout the Italian period, France . . . had no sovereignty
whatsoever over the Aouzou Strip.").
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Turkish or Sanusi sovereignty Libya can claim title as the successor. Chad's
likely response would be that the French occupation was valid, since no
one-neither the Toubous, nor the Sanusi, nor the Turks-had title to the
region when the French arrived.942 The available evidence favors Chad,
however, and since in boundary disputes each side bears the burden of proving
its case,943 Libya probably will not defeat Chad's claims.
1. The Toubous
The original inhabitants of the Aouzou Strip were the Toubous, who almost
certainly fell into the category of "savage" tribes that troubled contemporary
European jurists and produced so much disagreement among commentators.
Some scholars argued that such tribes, as long as they possessed even the most
rudimentary form of political organization, possessed sovereign rights over the
territory they inhabited. These writers thus maintained that European states
could acquire sovereignty over that territory only through a treaty of ces-
sion.9" The opponents of this argument, who constituted the predominant
voice during the colonial period, believed that the tribes lacked sovereignty
unless they could assure the Europeans of their accustomed rights or could
repulse outside attempts to occupy their land. These writers denied that such
tribes could validly cede sovereignty since they did not possess sovereign rights
themselves.945
European states nevertheless did make a practice of concluding so-called
"glass-bead" treaties with native leaders. Contrary to the holding of the I.C.J.
in the Western Sahara case, however, this practice did not imply that Europe-
ans recognized those tribes as sovereign entities. The treaties were intended
merely to notify other powers of a state's intentions in an area and to provide
evidence of an effective occupation. Moreover, the treatment of the tribes after
such agreements, and the European practice of creating spheres of influence
without regard to ethnic and racial divisions, belie any suggestion that Euro-
pean states viewed tribes as sovereign entities.
Even if the law recognized that some indigenous tribes possessed sovereign
rights, the Toubous probably did not reach the threshold level of internal
organization and cohesion that the law required. Recall that Toubou society
942. After Turkey and Italy protested the 1899 Declaration, France argued that the area was terra
nullius. See Dispatch from Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Constans with
Note for the Sublime Porte (May 29, 1899), in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 191 Annex, at 318-19 (1959)
(territory was "in an organic state, independent of any civilized Power"). French colonialists concurred.
Cf. L'Arrangement, supra note 260, at 144.
943. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 837 (Huber, Arb., Apr. 1928); Min-
quiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 52 (Nov. 17); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 10, 41 (Oct.
16).
944. See supra notes 592-591 and accompanying text.
945. See supra notes 584-584 and accompanying text.
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is loosely organized along clan lines and that the clan plays almost no role in
defining relationships of authority and obedience. Clan chiefs enjoy only
honorific authority and have no power to coerce members of the clan to take
or refrain from a specified action. Rather, each individual is free to act as he
chooses. 9'
To some extent this pattern of organization may have begun to change
among the Teda at the time of the French colonization, since Derde Chai had
gained some powers among the Teda clans. He was already the recognized
spiritual authority, he had some authority to administer justice, and he repre-
sented the Teda in their relations with other clans and with outside powers.
Chai had also gained some authority to tax agricultural produce and booty from
raids, and he perhaps possessed additional leverage from his position as
hr~l ,n 947kaynakam.94
Although these powers may have indicated the inchoate emergence of new
patterns of authority among the Teda, they probably did not qualify the Teda
as a political community having sovereign rights over the land inhabited by
the various Teda clans. The fact remains that Chai still could not bind separate
clans or individuals by his actions, and even the most liberal view of native
sovereignty permitted the occupation of lands whose inhabitants lacked the
social structure to conclude a binding treaty. Lindley, who favored a broad
view of native sovereignty and consequently a narrow view of terra nulli-
us, admitted that even Australia, an analogous territory, was terra nullius since
"no political [indigenous] society to be dealt with" existed when the British
arrived.948 The anarchic and individualistic Toubou culture certainly fit this
description. Assuming that no other power had title to the territory, the land
was open to occupation. France accordingly had no obligation to make treaties
with the Toubous in order to gain the land.
Even if France had wanted to conclude treaties with Chai, it could not have
known that other Teda clans would have respected any agreements. Chai's
attitude and policy toward the French, for instance, did not bind the Gounda
and the Arna, who pursued their own policies.94 9 Nor did the Daza clans of
Borku and elsewhere recognize the Derde's authority to bind them with a
treaty, since the Derde's power extended only to the Teda clans. Moreover,
the Daza possessed no greater level of organization than the Teda. For exam-
ple, different factions of the Anakazza adopted their own policies towards the
French. 9 ° Thus, under any contemporary view of native sovereignty the
Toubous did not possess sovereign rights to the Aouzou Strip.
946. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
947. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
948. See supra notes 595-596 and accompanying text.
949. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
950. See supra notes 334-338 and accompanying text.
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2. The Sanusi
Libya could similarly argue that the Sanusi presence in northern Chad
constituted an effective occupation conferring title on the Sanusiya 51 As
originally conceived at the Congress of Berlin, the principle of effective
occupation applied only to states. Although the Sanusi certainly had a visible
presence in the area, the brotherhood probably did not qualify as a state.
Therefore, if Libya contends that the areas under Sanusi control before the
French occupation rightfully belong to Libya, it will have to produce either
proof of collaboration between the Sanusi and Turkey amounting to ties of
allegiance, or proof that Libya inherited the Sanusi title from King Idris, the
leader of the brotherhood.
The Sanusiya was a religious organization, but the movement also exercised
some political control over its areas of operation. The Sanusiya's achievements
and rapid spread in the Sahara evidence its influence. In seeking to revive and
spread Islam and to distance themselves from the Ottomans, the Sanusi founded
their zawiyahs in areas where the Turks lacked control and where they could
substitute their own authority.95 The social and political condition of Tibesti,
Borku, and Ennedi forced the Sanusi to create authority structures previously
unknown to the area. They brought order to the caravan routes between the
Libyan coast and the Chadian interior, helped to organize resistance to French
expansion, and collected tithes from the local populations. 953 They even
exercised enough influence to enlist some Toubous in raids against the
French.954 The Sanusi were also able to control raiding among the different
groups, particularly between the 'Awlad Sulaiman and the Toubous. 955 Had
these acts been performed by a state, contemporary international law probably
would have recognized them as sufficient to confer sovereignty, especially in
regions as desolate as Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi. Furthermore, when Colonel
Largeau wrote to the Sanusi leaders at Kufrah in 1913 to specify his conditions
for coexistence, he implicitly acknowledged them as the former rulers of the
area. 
956
951. Cf. JoffM, supra note 2, at 48.
952. See Rossi, STORiA, supra note 161, at 335.
953. See supra notes 227-255 and accompanying text.
954. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
955. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 91;
Mangin, supra note 246, at 181; see also DuvEyRiER, supra note 217, at 44. Nachtigal reported that the
head of the zawiyah in Kawar oversaw the oasis, brought economic and cultural benefits from the caravan
trade, and protected the inhabitants against the 'Awlad Sulaiman. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note
26, at 92. Rosita Forbes, noting the lawlessness of the Zawiyah Arab tribe in Fazzan, marvelled at the
ability of the Sanusi to preserve order: "only a power as great as the Senussi could hold them in check."
FoRpus, supra note 181, at 206.
956. See Letter of Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to the Sanusi Leadership (Dec. 31, 1913), in




On the other hand, the Sanusiya's success in coordinating the various local
tribes and clans to resist the French does not necessarily imply that the Sanusi
exercised sovereignty over them. The Sanusi did experience some difficulty
in holding together this confederation of diverse groups. In 1902, for instance,
one faction of the 'Awlad Sulaiman submitted to France while another
remained under the Sanusi banner, for reasons similar to the Anakazza's in
1914: their pasture lands were under French control, while their trade and
date-harvest migrations took them into Borku, which the Sanusi controlled. 91
Even though the Sanusi created a rudimentary administrative apparatus and
"enforce[d] a measure of peace, security, justice and stability,"958 the impact
of this administration on the inhabitants, although of ciucial importance to the
fate of the Aouzou Strip, remains in question. Historians have unearthed little
evidence showing that the Toubous ever accepted Sanusi authority. Although
the Sanusiya made connections with Derde Chai, the brotherhood was unable
to make meaningful inroads among the Toubous. For example, Chai did not
tolerate Sanusi attempts to encroach on the administration of justice for minor
offenses.959 Nor did the Toubous make good Muslims. Indeed, Chai himself
performed sacrifices in order to bring rain to Tibesti. ° Other Toubou ani-
mistic practices and rites likewise continued under an Islamic veneer."' The
Toubous did cooperate with the Sanusi in resisting French expansion, but they
clearly cooperated out of self-interest rather than loyalty to the Sanusi. It seems
improbable (and the evidence fails to demonstrate) that the independent-minded
Toubous, who often defied their own chiefs, ever submitted to Sanusi sover-
eignty.
Consequently, some historians have concluded that the Sanusiya did not
exercise effective authority over the area. Evans-Pritchard, for instance,
believed that the Sanusiya simply lacked the organization and machinery to
control such wide terrains effectively, especially given the "manifold tribal,
racial and cultural divergences."962 In addition, interfamilial rivalries after
the death of Muhammad al-Mahdi threatened to pull the brotherhood apart. 3
The French scholar Ciammaichella agrees, concluding that the breadth of the
territory, the difficulty of communications, and the constant anarchy did not
957. CIAMMICHELLA, supra note 228, at 86-87.
958. WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 84.
959. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
960. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
961. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
962. EVANs-PRiTCHARD, supra note 218, at 26.
963. Id. The structure of the order, with each zawiyah relying on its own resources, encouraged the
creation of zones of influence controlled by various members of the Sanusi family. See id. at 26-27, 77.
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permit Sanusiya's consolidation of political, administrative, and economic
control. 9"
If Libya can establish the requisite Sanusi control over the Aouzou Strip,
it may be able to claim succession to the Sanusi title through King Idris as
head of the movement. The claim would require proof that the Libyan monar-
chy was intended to be a Sanusi state and that the Sanusi holdings accordingly
became the dominion of Libya. The argument, however, finds no factual
support. As one historian has noted, "to Idris the monarchy and the leadership
of the Sanusi Order were two distinct and separate institutions." Idris's attitude
toward succession proves the point: whereas any member of the Sanusi family
was eligible to become head of the Sanusiya after him, the crown could
devolve only upon a member of his branch of the family. 965 The monarchy
thus did not possess the necessary connection to the leadership of the order.
Furthermore, the history of the formation of the Libyan state shows that Libya
arose from the independent provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fazzan.
Despite Idris's prominent role in this process, the Sanusiya as a political
organization played no formal part in the creation and constitution of the
Libyan state. 9"
In summary, Libya will face an uphill struggle in claiming the Aouzou
Strip under a theory of effective occupation based on the presence and activi-
ties of the Sanusiya. Even if Libya convinces the Court that the Sanusi effec-
tively occupied the region, Libya will still have to establish some link by which
it succeeded to the claims of the Sanusiya. Demonstrating this link will be
difficult, since the Sanusiya was not an independent state and the Libyan
monarchy was not a Sanusi state.
3. The Ottoman Presence Under Traditional Principles
Libya might also argue that the Aouzou Strip was under the sovereignty
of the Ottoman Empire. If it establishes this point, Libya could then claim the
territory as Turkey's successor. This argument avoids the difficulty of estab-
lishing the means of succession that plagues Libya's claims based on the Sanusi
964. CiMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 131; see also Andr6 Martel, Aux origines de I'EtatLlbyen:
Laporte et la Sanusiya au Sahara: 1835-1922, in ENIEuX SAHARIENs 233 (stating that even by 1951 in
Cyrenaica, Sanusiya was not state, despite para-state institutions and role in resisting Italian invasion).
Wright, while acknowledging the Sanusi predominance in Cyrenaica, concludes that the degree to which
the order exercised control outside that region is "much more problematic." WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA,
supra note 26, at 91. Others have said that the impact of the Sanusiya is "infinitely more difficult to
unearth" than other historical factors. Lemarchand, A propos du Tchad, supra note 1, at 21.
965. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 81. This fact also undermines the assertion that the Sanusiya
constituted a state. If the control of the Sanusi lands could pass from the crown through a differential
succession, the Libyan state would have to split. Therefore the Sanusiya could not have possessed sovereign
title to the lands where it exercised its influence.
966. See infra notes 868-873 and accompanying text.
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presence. Viewed under traditional criteria, however, the demonstration of
Turkish authority in the region was weaker than that of the Sanusi. Libya has
a stronger case with regard to hinterland theories and Western Sahara-type
arguments.
Yet even if Turkey's actions in the area did amount to effective occupation,
Turkey subsequently abandoned the region, thereby forsaking its sovereign
rights to the land. When France occupied the region, Italy, the successor of
Turkey, did not even bother to protest. If Turkey ever had valid title, it
nevertheless lapsed, thereby enabling France to secure title to the area against
possible advances by Italy or its successors.
a. Acts of Occupation
As recently as December 1990 Colonel Qaddafiy asserted that Chad had
constituted a part of the Ottoman Empire. In a message congratulating Idris
Deby for overthrowing Qaddafiy's nemesis, Hiss ne Habrd, Qaddafly com-
mended Deby on his "splendid triumph over the gang of ignorance and lack-
eys" that "crowned" the
bloody historic epic in which the Iliad of freedom and the permanent brotherhood
between the two fraternal peoples were written in Libyan and Chadian blood. Every
inch of Chadian soil was smeared with the blood of your Libyan brothers since the
Ottoman era, during which we were united in one single state, to the resistance of
the odious French colonisalists [sic].'
Colonel Qaddafiy can invoke some historical facts to support his hyperbolic
prose. The Turks had eyed Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi for a long time. After
retaking control of Tripolitania from the Karamanlis in 1835, the Ottomans
centralized their authority over their Libyan lands, making the sancaks of
Cyrenaica and Fazzan directly dependent on Constantinople. The Ottomans
further divided the sancaks into kazas, each under its own kaymakam, and
created in Fazzan a kaza for the Toubous with its capital at BardaY. 68 The
kaza of the Toubous has attracted little attention in the Aouzou Strip debate,
and it seems to have lapsed until 1907.
At this point, the Turks still had not succeeded in penetrating beyond
Fazzan. The Toubous badly defeated a force of Fazzanese sent by the Ottoman
governor of Fazzan in 1906.969 Shortly thereafter, however, Turkey's for-
tunes began to change. Perhaps sensing the inevitable, Chai Bogarmijourneyed
to Murzuk and accepted a nomination as kaymakam of the Toubous. Two
967. Libyan Leader Sends Message of Congratulations to ldriss Deby (BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, Dec. 7, 1990), available on LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. In the Security Council debate on
the Aouzou Strip in 1983, Libya asserted that its boundaries "during the Ottoman era were at the city of
[FayaI." 2419th Meeting, supra note 485, at 26 (statement of Mr. Treiki).
968. Rossi, SToRiA, supra note 161, at 322-23.
969. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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Turkish soldiers accompanied him back to Bardai.970 In 1908, Osman Efendi
arrived in Bardal with a small detachment of Turkish soldiers and became
kaymakam. The Turks constructed a barracks and some fortifications."' In
1911-1912, Captain Ahmed Rifki camped his detachment outside Ain Galakka
in Borku before returning to the coast to fight the Italian invaders. 9" After
his departure the Turkish lieutenant he left behind made some efforts to extend
Ottoman sovereignty over Ennedi.91 Viewed as a whole these acts probably
sufficed under the international law of the time to confer at least an inchoate
title on Turkey.9 74
Libya can also argue that various indigenous groups in the area perceived
themselves as subject to Turkish sovereignty. In 1912, for instance, the chief
of one Toubou clan, seeking to prevent French reprisals for certain disturbanc-
es, wrote a letter to Colonel Largeau in which he invoked the Franco-Turkish
friendship and stated that "we are dependent upon the Ottoman government
and follow the Turks." 5
On the other hand, the Turkish actions may have been vain gestures that
created an appearance of occupation without actually securing the submission
of the Toubous. The Toubous' traditional hostility to foreign domination
suggests that they would not voluntarily have surrendered any real liberty to
the Turks. Some commentators have asserted that the Turkish administration
had "no lasting effects upon the local population."976 Others with significant
experience among the Toubous reported that the Toubous attacked the with-
drawing Turks.9" Such statements undermine the proposition that the Turkish
presence was sufficient to maintain order and to protect life and property as
the law required.
In any event, the Turks were present in sizeable numbers for only a few
months. The evidence suggests that during that time the Sanusi insisted on
970. See supra notes 275-278 and accompanying text. The Young Turk government announced in
1911 that the "sovereign" of Tibesti (evidently Chai) "has, in relation to us, the situation ofa national very
much disposed to execute our orders." See Dorobantz, supra note 289, at 366. In the absence of proof,
however, this statement is best seen as an inflated boast, since Chai on other occasions jealously guarded
his prerogatives against external usurpation.
971. See supra notes 285-289 and accompanying text.
972. See supra notes 297-316 and accompanying text.
973. See supra notes 317-318 and accompanying text.
974. See McKeon, supra note 651, at 160, In fact, French writers at the time recognized Turkey's
actions as "acts ofauthority" and criticized them as hostile in light of France's well-known designs on the
region. See de Caix, supra note 288, at 88; Dorobantz, supra note 289, at 364 (discussing article in Le
Temps criticizing Turkish actions). Clearly, then, the French felt that Turkey's acts could prevent France
from acquiring sovereignty over the area.
975. See Telegram from Colonel Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to French Ministry of Colonies (July 21,
1912), in CAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 155. The sincerity of the statement is questionable, since
it was obviously in the self-interest of the Toubou chief to tell Largeau that he was under Ottoman
protection.
976. Fisher & Fisher, supra note 240, at 425-26.
977. CHAP.LLE, NOMADES NOMS, supra note 15, at 64; cf. RouARD DE CARD, LE DIFFREND, supra




remaining in control and prevented the Turkish soldiers from performing any
acts of administration. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire's evacuation of its
troops in 1912 and subsequent renunciation of its rights in the region clearly
showed both the corpus and animus necessary for abandonment.97 Therefore
it makes little difference whether the Turks actually acquired sovereignty over
the area. Once they abandoned it the territory reverted to its previous state of
terra nullius, and France was free to occupy it. Turkey's failure to protest the
subsequent French occupation lends additional support to an inference of
abandonment.
b. Succession to Turkish Rights
Demonstrating a Turkish presence is only half the argument. Libya must
still establish some means by which it succeeded to Turkey's rights. It will
most probably rely on a theory of state succession.
Libya is not the first to claim the benefit of the Turkish presence in north-
ern Chad. In the 1920s Italy claimed to succeed to Turkey's rights, arguing
that France had "occupied regions over which Turkey, until our occupation
of Libya, had exercised effective sovereignty: Borku, Tibesti, Ounianga, and
Erdi."9 79 Italy claimed that it had inherited the full extent of the Ottoman
lands in Libya by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne.8 ° However, Italy had
agreed in the 1902 Barrbre-Prinetti Letters that France could extend its posses-
sions up to the line marked in 1899. By eliciting this promise from France,
Italy necessarily agreed in turn that France could acquire sovereign rights in
the entire area south of the line. 98 1 If Turkey possessed rights in that area,
Italy had effectively compromised them in 1902.
Libya, in contrast, was an entirely new entity, a creation of the United
Nations. It did not directly succeed Italy. Rather, interim French and British
administrations succeeded Italy after the conquest of Libya in World War
]1.982 These circumstances could complicate Libya's claim to the Aouzou
Strip through Turkish and Italian succession.9" These technical difficulties,
however, are unlikely to defeat an otherwise reasonable claim.
978. See McKeon, supra note 651, at 160.
979. Les frontiares raridionales, supra note 357, at 42-43 (quoting former Italian Ambassador
Tommaso Tittoni). Beginning in 1927 Italy published maps of its Libyan colony without a southern
boundary, see Les aspirations italiennes vers le Lac Tchad, 38 B.C.A.F. 159, 159 (1928) [hereinafter Les
aspirations italiennes], arguing that the line fixed in 1899 and 1919 was "not a boundary line, but a limit
of zones of influence." Les frontitres maridionales, supra note 357, at 43; see also Les aspirations
italiennes, supra note 979, at 160.
980. Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 318, at 160-63.
981. See supra notes 806-809 and accompanying text.
982. See generally LANNE, supra note 11, at 177-95.
983. 2419th Meeting, supra note 485, at 71 (statement of Mr. Treiki).
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Yet if tie Court applied the decolonization norm, the Turkish occupation
would become very relevant to the current dispute. Since the Turks evacuated
the region in response to an illegitimate action (the Italian invasion of Libya),
and since France's occupation constituted another illegitimate action, the
decolonization norm would demand that the Aouzou Strip-indeed, the full
extent of the land controlled by the Ottomans-be returned to Libya as the
successor of Turkey.
c. Turko-Sanusi Cooperation
Libya may also argue, as Morocco did with regard to Ma al-PAineen in
Western Sahara,9 that the Sanusi functioned as agents of the Ottoman gov-
ernors in Tripoli, effectively extending Ottoman sovereignty over Borku,
Tibesti, and Ennedi. Libya could then claim the Aouzou Strip as Turkey's
successor. The argument would enable Libya to embrace the Sanusi presence
in the area while avoiding the problem of finding a means of succession from
the Sanusi. Under I.C.J. precedent, Libya must show more than a simple
convergence of interests between the Sanusi and the Turks in order to establish
the Sanusiya as an instrument of the Ottoman Empire. To prove that the Sanusi
truly acted as Ottoman agents, Libya must demonstrate a relationship of
subordination, not merely of equality." The evidence, however, does not
support this contention. While the Sanusi and the Ottomans did partially
cooperate in Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi, the cooperation was based on com-
mon interests, not allegiance. Moreover, the Sanusi insisted on maintaining
a degree of independence that is completely inconsistent with claims of Turkish
domination. Libya must also prove that the Sanusi exercised a sufficiently
strong influence over northern Chad to constitute sovereignty. The available
evidence on this point does not conclusively support this position.
(1) The Turko-Sanusi Modus Vivendi in Cyrenaica
The Sanusi and the Turks certainly were wary of each other. The Turks
mistrusted the Sanusi as a potential threat to their authority, and the Sanusi
viewed the Turks as poor Muslims.986 In fact, some historians have suggested
that the order deliberately established its headquarters in the desert and twice
moved south to avoid Ottoman control.987 Others have argued that the reloca-
984. See supra notes 726-727 and accompanying text.
985. See infra notes 726-730 and accompanying text.
986. EvANs-ParrcHARD, supra note 218, at 71; Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 162; see also
HACHAYCHI, supra note 217, at 106; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra note 26, at 118; supra notes 223-
226 and accompanying text.
987. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text; ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 59-60.
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tions mainly reflected the Sanusiya's interest in spreading its message south
and in preventing French expansion. 988
Despite their mutual suspicions, the Sanusi and the Turks benefitted from
a tacit understanding of non-interference. The Turks knew that the Sanusi
would support Turkey against the European powers. Likewise, the Sanusi must
have known that the Ottoman Empire alone could protect Muslim interests.9 9
The common interest in order, security, and trade in the interior allowed the
Sanusi and the Turks to reach a modus vivendi. 9' The Turks "had neither
the will nor the resources to govern the interior,"' and they knew that the
Sanusi, with their extensive network of zawiyahs among the Bedouin tribes,
could best procure the cooperation of the tribes. 9 ....
Consequently, in Cyrenaica, where the Sanusiya enjoyed the strongest
support, the Turks permitted the Sanusi to control the interior and to perform
many governmental functions, "so long as taxes were paid[,] no overt act was
committed against the Sultan's authority .... and [Cyrenaica] sent its annual
tribute to Istanbul." 3 The Sanusi thus became "de facto rulers of the country
under nominal Turkish sovereignty," 994 and the Sanusiya developed into "a
proto-state with an embryonic government of its own." 95 It is important to
remember, however, that this relationship operated mainly in the Cyrenaican
interior, whose proximity to the coast led the Ottomans to place a premium
on maintaining order there, and where the extensive Sanusi network provided
a means by which the Sanusi could perform governmental functions. Neither
of these conditions existed elsewhere.
(2) Attempts to Extend Cooperation Southward
Although the Sanusi presence was not as strong as in Cyrenaica, the
Ottomans hoped to use the Sanusi presence deep in the desert to counter
French expansion. Sultan Abdfdhamid II (1876-1909) took a special interest
in the Sanusiya and made several overtures in an effort to further his Pan-
Islamic policies. In 1890, at the Sultan's bidding, the vali (governor) of
Cyrenaica visited the Sanusi headquarters at 'al-Jaghbub and met with
Muhammad al-Mahdi. 9 96 The following year the Sultan sent one of his aides,
988. See MARTIN, supra note 235, at 113. See also EvANs-PtrrcHARD, supra note 218, at 15-16,
22; HACAYCHI, supra note 217, at 114-15; Martel, supra note 964, at 235.
989. EVANS-PR1TCHARD, supra note 218, at 92.
990. See id. at 98.
991. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 13.
992. Ev ds-PtrrcHARD, supra note 218, at 97-98.
993. Id. at 93.
994. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 13; see also Rossi, STORIA, supra note 161, at 335.
995. EVANS-PRrrCHARD, supra note 218, at 99.
996. ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 62.
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Sadiq al-Mu'ayyad al-Azm, to 'al-Jaghbub directly from Constantinople.'m
In September 1895, after Muhammad al-Mahdi had moved the Sanusi head-
quarters to Kufrah, the Sultan sent him a letter reiterating his authority as
leader of the Islamic world and urging the Sanusi leader to support Muslim
unity and resist European encroachment.? 8 In November the Sultan wrote
again to Muhammad al-Mahdi, informing him of afirman (imperial decree)
instructing the Ottoman valis of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to respect the
Sanusiya's agents and to observe strictly the privileges granted in previous
firmans. Shortly thereafter, in November 1895, Sadiq al-Mu'ayyad al-
cAzm made another visit to the Sanusi at Kufrah, conferred with Muhammad
al-Mahdi, and returned to Constantinople with a letter for the Sultan from the
Sanusi leader."' Another envoy from the Sultan visited Gouro in
1899.l o10
This pattern of activity suggests that Abdfilhamid increasingly sought to
develop ties with the Sanusi and to enlist them in the resistance to French
advances in the Sahara. Initially, however, the Sanusi did not seem to desire
close cooperation. They would not permit the Turkish flag to fly at 'al-Jaghbub
or Kufrah, nor would they allow Turkish representatives to reside there."
However, the French advance into Ouadai and the threat of an Italian invasion
brought the Sanusi and the Turks closer together. 1" Small Turkish forces
arrived in Tibesti and Borku soon afterward. 1" The Sanusi now sought to
"proclaim Ottoman sovereignty in the Sahara" in order to deter French attacks
on their zawiyahs and to gain access to the Turks' diplomatic facilities in order
to protest French aggression. They acted purely out of self-interest, however,
not out of loyalty to the Sultan. They sought to use the Turks as a shield
against France, and they were unwilling to compromise their independence
even by recognizing purely formal Turkish sovereignty over the area. For
example, when Turkish officials arrived at Kufrah in 1908, they were not
permitted to raise the Ottoman flag or reside in the oasis due to protests by
the Sanusi and the Zawiyah, the local Arab tribe."°°5 cAbd-Allah Tuwwar's
997. Id. at 63; see also Rossi, Penetraione, supra note 161, at 162. According to Rossi, this visit
occurred in 1886, rather than 1891. Id.
998. ZIADF, supra note 217, at 63-64.
999. Id. at 64. The Sanusiya benefitted from two imperialfinans exempting its property from taxation
and permitting the order to collect tithes from its followers and to grant sanctuary. Id. at 61; EVANS-
PRIrcHARD, supra note 218, at 91-92.
1000. RossI, STORIA, supra note 161, at 343; ZIADEH, supra note 217, at 64; Rossi, Penetrarione,
supra note 161, at 163; see also HACHAYCHI, supra note 217, at 105-06.
1001. Martel, supra note 964, at 237.
1002. EVANS-PRrrCHARD, supra note 218, at 102.
1003. CIAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 120.
1004. See supra notes 285-305 and accompanying text.
1005. Id.; see also supra notes 283-284 and accompanying text; WRIGHT, CENTRAL SAHARA, supra





refusal to allow Captain Rifki to camp within Ain Galakka also illustrates the
defiant Sanusi attitude."°
(3) Legal Effects of the Turko-Sanusi Cooperation
In Western Sahara, the I.C.J. ruled on more favorable facts that the
activities of Ma al-CAineen established only a relationship of cooperation, not
allegiance or subordination, between Ma and the Moroccan Sultan."
Although the Ottoman Sultan undertook various efforts to open channels with
them, the Sanusi cooperated only grudgingly. They essentially sought to use
the Ottomans to ward off French attacks, but they were unwilling to cede local
control to Turkey. The evidence does not establish a relation of authority that
would sufficiently demonstrate Turkish sovereignty over the area. Conse-
quently, Libya will probably fail to convince the Court of its entitlement to the
Aouzou Strip by arguing that the Sultan dominated the Sanusiya.
4. Libyan Arguments Based. on Non-Traditional Principles
Although its arguments based on traditional legal principles are unlikely
to succeed, Libya could put forth arguments utilizing different criteria of
sovereignty. First, Libya could contend, as Turkey argued in 1890 and 1899,
that the region was a Turkish hinterland appurtenant to the Tripolitanian coast,
and that a lesser presence would therefore suffice to confer title under interna-
tional law. Second, it could contend that Turkey's actions in the Aouzou Strip
were sufficient to create sovereignty as the concept was understood in the
context of Islam and the North African geographical, social, and political
milieu. Finally, Libya could argue, as Morocco argued with respect to Ma al-
cAineen in Western Sahara, that the Sanusi acted as agents of the Ottoman
1006. See supra notes 301-305 and accompanying text. A further example appears in the correspon-
dence of 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar with the French military authorities in the territory of Chad. In April 1912,
'Abd-Allah Tuwwar had written to Col. Largeau, stressing the Sanusi rather than the Ottoman role in
negotiating with Bonnel de Mdzibres for a purported division of Chad between France and the Sanusiya.
See Telegram from Col. Victor-Emmanuel Largeau to French colonial administration at Brazzaville (May
30, 1912) (quoting letter from 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar dated Apr. 12, 1912 (24 RabN-al-thani 1330)), in
CAMMAICHELLA, supra note 228, at 152, 152-53. Other letters, however, show a greater degree of Turko-
Sanusi cooperation. In October 1912, 'Abd-Allah Tuwwar, callinghimself "Kaymakam ofBorku," explained
that "we" (the Sanusi and the Turkish government) had detached the Turkish lieutenant to Ennedi with a
few ikhwan to defend the inhabitants against "troublemakers" and to "protect the caravans." Letter from
'Abd-Allah Tuwwar to French commandant of Ouadai (Oct. 1912), in CIAMMAcHELLA, supra note 228,
at 156, 156-57. A further letter in late October emphasized Turko-Sanusi cooperation in policing Ennedi
and protecting the trade routes, and asked France to do the same in its territory. Letter from 'Abd-Allah
Tuwwar to French commandant of Ouadai (Oct. 26, 1912 (15 Thu-al-qada 1330)), in CLAMMmACELLA,
supra note 228, at 158, 158-59.
1007. See supra notes 728-730 and accompanying text.
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Empire, and that the Sanusi actions accordingly extended Turkish sovereignty
in the region.
a. Turkish Claims to the Region as a Hinterland
Libya may rely on the related argument that the Aouzou Strip constituted
a Turkish hinterland. In 1890 Turkey claimed a hinterland extending as far
south as Lake Chad, maintaining that control of trans-Saharan trade was
essential for developing the Libyan coast.'0' Turkey made the same argu-
ment in protesting the 1899 Declaration. The hinterland claimed by Turkey
arose from entitlements based on ancient historical rights and geographical and
social unity with the Libyan coastal regions." French commentators argued
that such claims lacked juridical validity, and they carefully distinguished the
Turkish hinterland from the sphere of influence (which they called the true
"hinterland") created by treaties with other states. Valid hinterlands, as the
French authors used that term, arose only from international accords; interna-
tional law did not permit a state to claim a hinterland by unilateral action. 010
Italy revived the Turkish claim to the Tripolitanian hinterland in the 1920s
on the grounds that it inherited the area as successor to the Ottoman Empire
in Libya. 1 Like Turkey, Italy based its claims to the region on the impor-
tance to Libya of trans-Saharan trade. 0' 2 In support of this argument, Italian
colonialists presented evidence that virtually all of the trans-Saharan caravaners
agreed that Ain Galakka belonged to Tripoli. 0 13
While the Porte clearly asserted lesser rights than full sovereignty under
European standards, Turkey nevertheless argued that the area was under its
sovereignty according to its understanding of the term. Turkey invoked a series
of activities that support the claim:
military excursions; sending of civil functionaries, magistrates and religious person-
ages, numerous caravans leaving periodically for those countries from Tripoli, and
returning there; prosperous commerce; mention of the name of His Imperial Majesty
the Sultan in public prayers of an immense, almost exclusively Muslim population
... these are.., some of the circumstances denoting the multiple ties, material
and moral, that have existed for all time between the populations of these regions
and the authorities of Tripolitania. 14
1008. BOUQUET, supra note 174, at 58.
1009. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
1010. See Mangeot, supra note 211, at 326.
1011. See id.; see also JoffM, supra note 2, at 33-34; Les aspirations italiennes, supra note 979, at
160-61.
1012. SeeLes aspirations italiennes, supra note 979, at 161; see also L'Arrangement, supra note 260,
at 145.
1013. Les aspirations italiennes, supra note 979, at 161.
1014. Letter from Milnir Bey, Turkish Ambassador to France, to Th6ophile Delcassd, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, May 19, 1899, in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 179, at 293, 297 (1959).
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France completely rejected these claims, but it also completely misunderstood
them. France construed them within a traditional Western framework, not
within the Islamic milieu that the Sultan intended. In the margin by the words
"religious personages," someone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, perhaps
Delcass6, had written, "that's not a title."1 15 Likewise, in the margin by
a passage mentioning the Sultan's name, someone had written, "[b]y the same
argument, the Pope could claim the sovereignty of half the world.... France
cannot accept that the Sultan claims that the Muslim religion of this or that
population creates for him any right over [that population]."1"" These com-
ments suggest a complete misunderstanding of the Sultan's position within the
Islamic world, where religious authority is inseparable from secular authority.
The Turks expressed their claims in terms of a hinterland because the
concept apparently best embodied the relationship they intended to convey.
Unfortunately, they misunderstood the Western legal implication of the hinter-
land term. As noted in part IV above, territorial claims based on geographical
proximity or necessity enjoyed an uncertain status under late nineteenth and
early twentieth century international law.1017 Scholars disfavored such
claims, but the practice of states showed that the hinterland created a presump-
tion of title in the absence of competing claims." 18 Although Turkey's pro-
tests against the Franco-British agreements of 1890 and 1899 probably kept
Turkey's claim alive, the hinterland argument was strongest when no other
state asserted a competing claim to the territory. France and Britain recognized
Turkey's rights to a certain hinterland in 1890 and 1899, but they did not think
that it extended as far south as Tibesti, Borku, and Ennedi. Judging from the
Ottoman attempts to establish sovereignty over the Toubous during this period,
the Turks did not believe that they possessed sovereignty over those areas ei-
ther. 0 19
The Turkish claims applied nineteenth-century European concepts to a
realm beyond their traditional operation. Struggling to voice its protest in terms
that were both comprehensible and persuasive, Turkey chose the closest
analogy: the hinterland doctrine. Yet the hinterland theory simply could not
encompass Turkey's relationship with the interior populations and the nature
of the rights engendered by this relationship.l°"° The hinterland was based
1015. Id. at 297 n.*.
1016. Id. at 297 n.**. Delcass6 made identical remarks in a formal response delivered to Turkey
shortly thereafter. See Dispatch from Thdophile Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador
Constans, May 29, 1899, in 15 D.D.F. (ser. 1) No. 191, at 317-18 (1959).
1017. France, in particular, vigorously denied that the concept had any validity. See Dispatch from
Th~ophile Delcassd, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Constans, May 29, 1899, in 15 D.D.F.
(ser. 1) No. 191, at 317-18 (1959).
1018. See supra notes 628-651 and accompanying text.
1019. See supra notes 205, 270 and accompanying text.
1020. Scholars have recognized that Turkey was at a disadvantage in seeking to resist the European
advance by invoking European legal principles utterly foreign to the region in question. Cf. WRIGHT,
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upon a concept of a reasonable territorial appurtenance; Turkey's arguments
really relied on personal relationships, which had no necessary connection with
territory. Turkey's protests thus rested on, but failed to express, a notion of
sovereignty different from the concept that applied in the West.
b. Arguments Based on the Special Characteristics of the Area and Its
People and the Nature of the Ottoman State
The inability of the hinterland theory to capture and express Turkey's
arguments suggests an alternative argument departing from the nineteenth-
century legal concepts that handcuffed the Sultan. Libya, in an argument
recalling Morocco's pleadings in Western Sahara,"° 'l could urge the Court
to evaluate the Ottoman presence under the notions of sovereignty appropriate
to the Central Sahara, rather than the Western standards that developed in a
far different geographical and social milieu. In particular, Libya could argue
.that territorial concepts of sovereignty make little sense in the vast, barren
stretches of the desert. Instead, because Saharan society is largely nomadic,
sovereignty is more personal and communal: it moves with the person or group
rather than remaining fixed on the ground. Libya could draw an analogy
between the Toubous and the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, arguing that the
Ottomans essentially replicated with the Toubous the governance structures
they had used to bring the Bedouin under their sovereignty. Finally, Libya
could argue that by virtue of the Ottoman Sultan's status as supreme religious
and secular leader, religious allegiance necessarily implied political allegiance
as well. Thus, Turkey exercised sovereignty over northern Chad even though
its displays of state authority might not have sufficed under a Western under-
standing of that term.
(1) Non-Western Standards of Sovereignty
Libya could contend that "the original indigenous assumptions over the
basis of division of sovereign political authority""o did not require the same
degree of state authority prevailing in Europe, and that the local populations
recognized the authority of the Sultan by virtue of his position alone.
If Libya can persuade the Court to apply the concepts of sovereignty that
the inhabitants of the area themselves applied, its chances for success increase
significantly. The physical and human realities of the region, including the
existence of scattered nomadic peoples roaming over vast expanses of territory,
LIBYA, supra note 343, at 18-20 (discussing problem of creating boundaries in regions that had never
known them).
1021. See supra notes 710-724 and accompanying text.
1022. JoffM, supra note 2, at 29.
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arguably compelled different methods of governing and different forms of ties
between peoples and their sovereign. Such peoples could not be governed from
a fixed point or by an outsider. Libya could contend that by inducing Chai to
accept an Ottoman stipend, flag, and soldiers, and by creating a kaza especially
for the Toubous with Chai as its kaymakam, the Turks employed the means
that were most suited to the physical and political realities of the region. The
Turks themselves believed that this relationship made the Derde their vas-
sal. 10 23
(2) The Bedouin Analogy
To support this position Libya can argue that the Ottomans sought to
establish sovereignty over the Toubous by methods similar to those used on
the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, whose tribal structure was not markedly
different from that of the Toubous, and whom other states widely acknowl-
edged as subjects of the Sultan. If the methods worked in one case, the argu-
ment goes, it should work equally well to create a relationship of sovereignty
in the other.
The structure of Bedouin society, with its divisions into tribes and tribal
sections, paralleled that of the Toubous. 124 The Bedouin chiefs, like their
Toubou counterparts, possessed "precarious authority" that rested "not on force
but on the renown and esteem they enjoy[ed] in the tribe." The similarities
continue: the Bedouin chief "was chosen for his age and wisdom or for his
prowess," and he acted as a dispute arbiter, diplomat, war commander, and
special liaison to the Turks. 1" Moreover, the Bedouins, like the Toubous,
were nomadic, and "the necessities of Bedouin life... imposed a recognition
of individual rights without regard to tribal affiliations or social status," 26
just as clan affiliation meant very little among the Toubous. Finally, the
1023. In 1911, the Young Turk government asserted that the "sovereign" of Tibesti "has, in relation
to us, the situation of a national very much disposed to execute our orders." See supra note 970; see also
Jacques Latrdmolire, Tchad: Le lent cheminement des evidences, MARctigs TROPICAUX, Jan. 4, 1985,
at 9. Latrimolibre also asserts, incorrectly, that the Derde "had his residence" in Tripoli. IL at 9. Although
this was perhaps true when Oueddei Kichidemi fled Chad in the late 1960s, it was not true during the
Turkish period.
1024. EVANS-PRrcHARD, supra note 218, at 46. The Bedouins probably possessed greater internal
cohesion than the Toubous, however. Although Evans-Pritchard described "a system of balanced opposition
between tribes and tribal sections" such that "there cannot therefore be any single authority in a tribe"
(reminiscent of the Toubou clan structure), the Bedouin divisions did possess some capacity to "act
corporately," a trait that rarely existed among the Toubous. See id. at 59. Nevertheless, the Bedouin use
of the extended family unit produced similar internal fighting and feuding that marked Toubou society.
See id. at 56.
1025. Id. at 60.
1026. Id. at 54.
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Bedouin system of assigning land and other resource rights resembled the
structure used by the Toubous.1° 7
The system the Ottomans developed to govern the tribes suited this milieu
well. The authorities in Tripoli appointed madars (mudirs), officials who
served as liaisons for each Bedouin tribe, "since the tribes and their sections
are the fundamental social departments of the country."'°28 (The practice
brings to mind the Moroccan Sultan's use of qa'ids as representatives to the
Western Saharan tribes. 1') The Turks also used the Sanusi as intermediar-
ies in their dealings with the Bedouin. The Sanusi, in turn, developed their
own system for interacting with the tribes: they constructed a separate zawiyah
for each tribe, and the leader of the zawiyah represented the order in dealing
with his assigned tribe. 13'
If the Bedouin social and political structure resembled the Toubou system,
and the Turks and Sanusi successfully developed institutions of control in
accordance with that structure, then the same structure and the same Turko-
Sanusi cooperation should have brought the Toubous under Turkish sovereignty
as well. This line of reasoning is appealing, but it is not invulnerable. A
Bedouin chief, although lacking absolute power, enjoyed much more authority
within his tribe than his Toubou counterpart. In reality, the Toubou chief
lacked any power at all to bind clan members. Moreover, the Toubou clan did
not function as a cohesive social unit. Its members virtually never gathered
together at the same place and time; instead, individual members were more
likely to be interspersed with members of other clans than with members of
their own clan. Chad can thus argue that although the Toubou clan system
superficially resembled Bedouin society, the lack of Toubou cohesion rendered
the clan an inadequate administrative structure.
(3) Religious Cohesion
Libya need not limit its argument to the political plane. The Sultan and the
populace also interacted within the "religious dimension." l°31 Libya can ar-
gue that the spread of Islam among the Toubous necessarily created a further
dimension of allegiance to the Sultan as their spiritual leader, and that
acknowledgment of the Sultan's religious authority implied acceptance of his
1027. Compare id. at 55 with supra notes 61-62, 97 and accompanying text.
1028. EVANS-PRrrCHARD, supra note 218, at 94.
1029. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 45-46 (Oct. 16).
1030. See id. at 70-73, 80, 97-98. *[The] Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
organization [in Cyrenaical largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouins." Id.
at 84.
1031. Lemarchand, A propos du Tchad, supra note 1, at 21.
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political authority.1032 Western observers have not always appreciated the
power and extent of the religious dimension of Islam.' 33 As Morocco
argued in Western Sahara, religious allegiance necessarily implies some degree
of political allegiance. Libya could apply the same argument to the Aouzou
Strip dispute.
Libya can contend, as Italian historians have indicated, that beginning with
the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Sultan's authority was recog-
nized in Tibesti, "even if not in a definite or continuous manner. I Even
further south, in Sudanic regions, the population displayed affection toward
the "Great Caliph" Abdfilhamid.0 35 Establishing this kind of relationship
with certainty is difficult, however, since the Sultan's authority waned with
distance, and even the tribes within the limits of the vilyet did not display
"total adhesion to the Porte. "1036 Yet "total adhesion" is not what the Libyan
argument requires. Libya need only prove the existence of relations adequate
and appropriate to the characteristics of the area and its inhabitants.
Nevertheless, Libya's task will not be easy. Some have concluded that the
tribes of the "large, if shadowy, hinterland of Tripoli, largely Islamized and
extending far into Africa, might well have accepted the Sultan's rule" had the
Sultan pursued such a course.1 37 But evidence of the Sultan's actual political
authority is scant: "if the tribes ... of the central and eastern Sahara prayed
for the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople, this spiritual supremacy was about all
the allegiance [this Commander] of the Faithful could exact."' 38
(4) Summary
Libya must establish that the Sultan's relations with the Toubous sufficed
to create sovereign ties when measured against the appropriate standard. That
standard must take into account the geographical and political conditions of
the Sahara; it must also take into account the nature of the Islamic state. Yet
even if Libya can prove that Turkey's activities established sovereignty under
this standard, it still must convince the I.C.J. to apply that standard. Herein
lies Libya's greater challenge. The Court in Western Sahara was reluctant to
1032. Libya can argue that the Karamanlis in Tripoli attracted similar allegiance. They used the title
amir al-mnu'minin, or "commander of the faithful," a title usually reserved for great Muslim leaders like
the Sultans of Morocco and Turkey. The term generally denotes plenary domestic power, and it suggests
a kind of autocratic permanence. C.R. Pennell, PoliticalLoyalty and the Central Government in Precolonial
Libya, in SOCIAL AND EcONoMIc DEVELOPMENT OF LmYA 1, 3 (E.G.H. Joff6 & K.S. McLachlan eds.,
1982).
1033. See WRiGHT, LiBYA, supra note 343, at 20.
1034. Rossi, Penetrazione, supra note 161, at 165.
1035. Rossi, STORTA, supra note 161, at 343.
1036. Muller, supra note 367, at 167.
1037. WRIGHT, LIBYA, supra note 343, at 23.
1038. Id. at 17-18.
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depart from the traditional Western-oriented test of state authority. But if the
Court revises this approach in the present dispute, the decision may have
enormous and far-reaching implications for African boundaries.
c. Decolonization
Even if Libya establishes that Turkey possessed sovereignty over the
Aouzou under a non-traditional understanding of sovereignty, it still must
surmount one major obstacle: Turkey's abandonment of the region in
19 12 .1° 9 Turkey's prior title (if any) to the Aouzou Strip would be irrele-
vant if the abandonment was valid under international law. The area would
have become terra nuius, and any state, including France, could have
acquired title to it. In order to avoid this difficulty, Libya could urge the Court
to apply the norm of decolonization, under which the Aouzou Strip would be
returned to the state that possessed it at the moment of colonization or to the
successor of that state. Libya would then claim the Aouzou Strip as the
successor of the Ottoman Empire.
In order to avail itself of this argument, Libya must still demonstrate that
Turkey exercised sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip region. If the Aouzou
Strip was not under Ottoman sovereignty at the time of colonization, Libya
could not gain by the decolonization norm territory that its predecessor never
possessed. Libya could not merely assert a claim to the Aouzou Strip based
on the similarity of the people inhabiting both sides of the border and their
interaction over the centuries. Decolonization works to restore a prior title,
not to create a new one.
A claim to the Aouzou Strip based on the decolonization norm would also
directly challenge the principle of uti possidetis. As noted previously, the
African states rejected a revisionist approach in favor of uti possidetis in the
early 1960s because redrawing boundaries threatened the stability of every
state." 4 Nevertheless, revisionist claims based on decolonization have not
disappeared; Morocco's claim in Western Sahara is a significant example.
The decolonization arguments ultimately highlight the same tensions raised
by the case as a whole. Whether the territory was validly open to occupation
or not, France took possession of it and performed there the necessary acts to
1039. Turkey could argue that it did not totally relinquish its religious influence in Libya. Under the
provisional peace treaty ending the Italo-Turkish War, the Sultan was entitle to appoint a representative
in Libya to ensure that the inhabitants respected Muslim law and were able to worship. Provisional Treaty
of Peace, Oct. 15, 1912, It.-Turk., art. I, 217 Consol. T.S. 137, 138; id. Annex 2, 217 Consol. T.S. at
139-40. Italy promised to assure that "the name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as Caliph, will continue
to be pronounced in the public prayers of Muslims .... " Id., 217 Consol. T.S. at 140. However, these
provisions specifically applied only to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Sultan retained no such rights in
Fazzan or other regions.
1040. See supra notes 739-744 and accompanying text.
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establish sovereignty. Over time, French and then Chadian possession of the
region became part of the established order. To invalidate that title and restore
a title that has been outdated for at least sixty years would wreak havoc with
expectations and stability. For these reasons alone the decolonization argument
is not likely to have a significant impact on the resolution of the Aouzou Strip
dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Aouzou Strip belongs to Chad under current principles of international
law. The Court is unlikely to view the alleged cession of 1972, poorly docu-
mented and manifestly in violation of Chad's constitution, as a valid basis of
title. Libya will therefore have to attack the 1955 Treaty, in which it agreed
to accept the boundary drawn in the various colonial agreements on which
Chad relies. These agreements placed the Aouzou Strip within French, and
later Chadian, territory. Libya can make a strong argument that the 1955
Treaty was the product of coercion, but such an argument may not succeed
under the understanding of coercion in use in 1955. Even .under the more
expansive meaning presently in use, Libya's argument is still at the frontier
of the law.
Libya's claims based on the Mussolini-Laval Accords also ultimately have
little merit. The failure of France and Italy to exchange ratifications or to
complete the convention on Tunisian nationality as required by the terms of
the agreement prevented the Accords from entering into force. Additionally,
since Italy never took possession of the territory, the cession never became
effective. Italy's denunciation of the Accords in 1938 sealed the fate of the
agreement. Finally, the 1955 Treaty excluded the Mussolini-Laval Accords
from the list of agreements used to draw the boundary between Libya and
France's African possessions.
Libya will therefore have to argue that the Aouzou Strip belonged to
Turkey, directly or indirectly, and that the French occupation was invalid.
Under international standards, however, the area was terra nullius when the
French arrived. The Toubous did not qualify as a political society under
contemporary (i.e., European) legal standards, so they possessed no sover-
eignty over the area. Even under the modem test announced in Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,1"'1 the Toubous
did not constitute a sovereign entity. The anarchic Toubou society prevented
any true obligations from arising between the clan chiefs and the members,
and the chiefs could not compel the members to obey them.
1041. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr.
11).
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Nor did the Sanusi have title to the area; the order failed to display the
requisite amount of state authority. And although the Turks may have gained
title between 1908 and 1913, they subsequently abandoned the region. France
later moved in, permanently occupying the area by 1929.
Libya may have more success arguing that the Aouzou Strip was a Turkish
hinterland. Under this theory, Turkey would not need to have displayed the
authority necessary to establish authority by occupation, especially if no other
power claimed the area. Lesser acts could demonstrate sufficient interest to
create a hinterland. But the juridical status of the hinterland was uncertain.
Although contemporary jurists generally disdained such theories, state practice
and international case law accorded them greater acceptance.
Libya's best argument seeks to have the Turkish and the Sanusi presence
evaluated according to standards of sovereignty prevailing among the people
of the region. This approach, however, has failed in the past, and it may also
fail here. Although it makes sound theoretical sense, the claim presents
significant problems of proof. It would require the Court, decades after the
fact, to determine the subjective beliefs of persons who did not leave written
records. The argument also departs from customary legal practice. It essen-
tially eviscerates the effective occupation requirement, since it requires only
a minimal display of sovereignty to establish ties, as long as the claimant can
prove that the level of activity suited the local conditions. Instead of settling
the law, a ruling that favors this approach would create enormous uncertainty.
Yet even if the Court accepts an alternative notion of sovereignty, Libya
still may not prevail. The inability of the Aouzou Strip's inhabitants, the
Toubous, to establish any sovereign control in the central Sahara cuts against
Libya's position. Toubou society prevented the concentration of authority to
bind individuals and families in any manner. If no Toubou chief could com-
mand the obedience of clan members, then surely no outside power could win
their obedience by merely concluding an agreement with a chief. Definitive
acquisition of sovereignty over the Toubous could arise only from territorial
occupation. France achieved this, and Turkey did not. France thus obtained
legal title to the Aouzou Strip, and Chad as its successor inherited that title.
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